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Abstract 
There is a lively academic debate concerning US foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
era and especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Neoconservatism 
has become a cause celebre in the literature of international relations with a variety of 
scholars disagreeing as to its supposed impact on Washington's world affairs 
approach and the Bush administration's decision to remove Saddam Hussein from 
, 
power manu militari. This thesis is an analysis of the way this political ideology was 
interpreted in the European elite media. It will be demonstrated how a significant 
section of key opinion-forming newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
framed neoconservatism during the administration of Bill Clinton and partly that of 
George W. Bush. There will be an exploration of whether and how newspapers vary 
in their coverage. 
The thesis will outline that the influence of the neoconservatives in US foreign 
policy can be disputed and will suggest that their ideas can be hardly considered as 
revolutionary ones. It will then focus on the media coverage and will show that the 
prominence devoted to neoconservatism by the accessed print sources is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. The findings indicate that the newspapers differed in their 
representation of the political ideology only in the period before 9/11 when they 
mainly discussed it in the context of domestic affairs. By contrast, after the terrorist 
atrocities and especially since 2003 they linked neoconservatism to US foreign policy 
and largely focused on it - as opposed to competing international relations theories -, 
representing it in a remarkably similar way. With the exception of The Times, which 
followed a comparatively balanced approach, they constructed it as a driving force 
behind George W. Bush's international politics approach and the war on Iraq. The 
media emphasis on neoconservatism will be attributed to different factors - such the 
scapegoat theory - which maybe influenced the journalistic work. The general 
consensus as to their understanding of neoconservatism and its supposed impact will 
not support the claim of a European public sphere but will be considered as a positive 
step towards its possible creation. 
Key Words: Neoconservatism, US foreign policy, 9/11, democracy, preemption, 
unilateralism, war on Iraq, Strauss, agenda-setting, framing, European media, 
European public sphere 
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Preface and acknowledgments 
I was inspired to undertake this research project during my postgraduate studies in 
London, Nice, Berlin and Rome from September 2002 until June 2004. The reason was 
the Iraq war, the debate concerning the necessity of this military operation, and the 
highly anti-American feeling which dominated European public opinion. After reading 
relevant books and articles, attending lectures of scholars from several countries and at 
various universities and living the experience of many anti-war demonstrations, I found it 
also interesting to investigate the position of various media in the European Union. My 
main question was how they constructed US foreign policy and if their coverage could 
reflect and maybe reinforce the negative public attitude towards the US in Europe. 
My education background had been based by 2004 on history and international 
relations. Therefore, a serious concern for me was to be supervised by a scholar who 
would not only have knowledge in the area of politics but who would be also an expert in 
media and communication studies. Dr. Dominic Wring offered me this broad guidance in 
the department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. Without his help and 
support this PhD thesis would have been a non-starter from the beginning. Other 
scholars in the same department such as Professor Dennis Smith, Dr. David Deacon, Dr. 
John Richardson and Dr. James Stanyer also were ready to offer me a piece of advice 
every time I asked them. 
This PhD thesis was a risky project. Its character was interdisciplinary. It had to be 
approached from three disciplinary perspectives, which had to be linked together. The 
first has its basis in international relations, the second in media studies and the third in 
European politics. This project also required translation of a high number of articles from 
French, German and Italian into English. All these issues made theoretically the 
implementation of the thesis difficult and perplexed because the time budget was limited 
as well. Acknowledging this difficulty, I had to limit the scope of the research in order to 
make it doable. In cooperation with my supervisor Dr. l?ominic Wring I decided to focus 
on a particular aspect of US foreign policy. This was neoconservatism as the impact of 
this ideology was highly debatable in the aftermath of 11 September. 
During my PhD studies I endeavoured to write essays and make presentations 
relevant to the chapters of my thesis in various conferences in order to receive feedback 
from professors with different backgrounds. There is a list of scholars I want to thank for 
the useful comments they gave me. Professor Alan Bryman helped me in my effort to 
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organise the methodology of the thesis and choose the appropriate research methods. 
In the area of US foreign policy, I am thankful to Dr. Steven Hurst from Manchester 
Metropolitan University, whom I met when I presented a paper on the history of 
neoconservatism at the American Politics Group's conference in January 2006. I also 
want to thank Professor Anne Norton. I had a valuable discussion with her after my 
presentation on 'Leo Strauss and the European media' on the occasion of The Legacy 
of Leo Strauss' conference, which took place in Nottingham in March 2006. 
While my research was still in progress, I attempted to present some of the findings at 
the 'Internationalising Media Studies: Imperatives and Impediments' conference at the 
University of Westminster in September 2006. During this event I was lucky to 
exchange views with many scholars such as Professor of international communication 
Daya Thussu. In the area of European studies I am thankful to Dr. Stelios Stavridis from 
the University of Zaragoza with whom I co-authored a joint chapter concerning European 
public opinion in the book he edited: Understanding and Evaluating the European Union: 
Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. I want also to thank Professor Dimitris 
Chrysochoou from the University of Crete for his comments after my presentation on the 
European public sphere on the island of Spetses in July 2008. 
The scholarship on American Studies I was awarded by the Hellenic Republic after 
pan-hellenic examinations in April 2005 and the subsequent co-operation I had with my 
supervisor in Greece' Professor Kostas Ifantis were also significant for the 
implementation of my doctorate. Furthermore, my job as columnist in the Greek 
newspaper 'Apogevmatini' from January 2007 onwards has proved to be important as 
well. After coming across a significant part of the bibliography on media studies I started 
to combine my theoretical knowledge on journalism with practical experience. Finally, 
the comments and suggestions of John Downey from Loughborough University and 
Robin Brown from the University of Leeds during my viva voce examination on 10 
November 2008 significantly contributed to improve the thesis. 
Above all I want to thank my father, mother and friends for their love and support. 
G.T. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War the Unites States has been widely perceived to be the 
hyperpower in the international arena. The Soviet Union collapsed and the bipolar 
structure of the world changed into a unipolar one with the US remaining as the only 
superpower. As Joseph Nye observes, 'not since Rome has one nation loomed so large 
above the others' (Nye, 2002: 1). Washington's foreign policy has influenced areas and 
issues, which could not but affect its partnership with traditional allies, such as the 
European Union. This became largely evident in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were considered by the US as 
responsible for organising the multiple murderous suicide bombings. The fight against 
terror became the highest priority of the administration of George W. Bush. Responding 
to the onslaughts the US led a defensive war against Afghanistan in October 2001 and 
continued with a preemptive one against Iraq in March 2003. 
The war the US had to wage and lead ·was one of a new type with a global battlefield. 
The fundamental conflict structure after 9/11 was not that of a confrontation between 
nation states but of a fight of an international coalition of countries against terror. 
Territorial borders are not respected by either the terrorists or the US as a limitation for 
their operations (Hoijer et aI., 2004, 7, 8). As Gary Hart puts it, 'states no longer control 
when, where, and how violence - war - will be conducted and whether it will be 
organised and carried out in accordance with established international conventions' (Hart, 
2004: 6). Terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, certainly operate across national 
borders and directly target civil society, as the Madrid and London bombings in March 
2004 and July 2005 respectively highlighted. For their part, mainstream Muslims accuse 
the US oflaunching a total war against the entire Islamist movement (Gerges, 2005: 70). 
One of the basic features of the way the US fought its war on terror and especially that 
against Iraq was its ignorance for multilateral institutions and its intention to go alone 
without cooperating with its strategic partners. For this reason transatlantic relations 
suffered a period of high tension. When George W. Bush, for instance, made his 'axis of 
evil' speech in January 2002 including Iraq, Iraq and North Korea in a list of countries 
Washington might invade, the response of France was that the US was following a 
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simplistic foreign policy (Dalley, The New York Times, 07/02/02). The war on Iraq was a 
watershed for EU-US relations. Many European countries, most notably France and 
Germany, opposed the idea of a military campaign against Baghdad. Their preference for 
the option of diplomacy and a peaceful solution contradicted the US decision of using 
military force without UN authorisation. 
The war on Iraq did not only outline the transatlantic rift. It also highlighted the failure 
of the EU to speak with one voice in international politics. Britain, Italy, Spain and other 
European countries such as Denmark and Poland did not agree with the approach of 
France and Germany. By contrast, they openly backed US administration's decision to 
start a military campaign against Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. 
Nevertheless, in spite of EU's disintegration and its split over US foreign policy, civil 
society in the member-states ofthe Union showed a remarkable degree of coherence. Not 
only European public opinion was not fragmented vis-a-vis the US but it also formed a 
common front. Anti-Americanism was on the rise in Europe while the picture of 
President Bush remained highly negative even in the countries the governments of which 
supported the Iraq war.) 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent US response arguably 
underlined American hegemony in world affairs. Numerous intellectuals embarked on an 
attempt to analyse US foreign policy after those atrocities. Their views are often 
contradictory. There are scholars who see continuity in the conduct of US foreign policy. 
For example, professor of American history Peter Leffler writes that the differences 
between George W. Bush and his predecessors 'have more to do with style than with 
substance' and that 'there is nothing revolutionary in [his] goals or vision' (Leffler, 2004: 
23). On the contrary, other scholars do not agree with that approach. For instance, 
according to historian John Lewis Gaddis, in his first four years in office George W. 
Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of US grand strategy since the presidency 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Gaddis, 2005: 2). 
Amid different interpretations of US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September, a 
specific political ideology started gradually to become a usual reference in the literature 
I It is noted that the tenn 'Europe' or 'European' will be used to refer to the EU and subsequently to 
member states of the Union. 
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of international relations. This was neoconservatism. Although neoconservatism had 
preexisted in this literature before 11 September, scholars who dealt with the term 
afterwards, laid greater emphasis on its principles and main representatives. However, 
they mainly concentrated on its potential impact on US foreign policy. The way in 
which the 'so called' neoconservatives within the US administration influenced George 
W. Bush's world affairs approach has turned out to be a highly controversial issue. 
Within this context, the work and teaching of political philosopher Leo Strauss came to 
the forefront as well. His supposed influence on the neoconservatives, and subsequently, 
on Washington's decision to start its military operation against Iraq in 2003 developed 
into an additional debatable issue. 
This research project focuses on European interpretations of neoconservatism. In this 
regard, European opinion-forming and agenda-setting newspapers offer a useful source 
for such an analysis. Specifically, newspapers from Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
that is to say of the 'Big Four' of the European Union are accessed. The study of the 
media is significant because they tend to represent and reinforce the views of their 
readers (Lambert, 2003: 63). Even before the beginning of the Second World War, E. H. 
Carr had already considered the press as an 'immensely powerful organ of opinion' (Carr, 
1940: 6). As also Roger Silverstone puts it: 'It is all about power [ ... ] The power the 
media have to set an agenda. The power they have to destroy one. The power they have 
to influence and change the political process. The power to enable, to inform. The power 
to deceive'. Media representations frame as well as inform experiences (Silverstone, 
1999: 138, 143). 
In the context of the EU and because of the globalization process the role of the media 
is also important as they can theoretically contribute to the creation of a European public 
sphere. In its white paper in 2006, for instance, the Commission considered the media as 
key players in its communication strategy (EU web site, 01102/06). Its purpose is to close 
the gap between the Union and the citizens of its member-states and to enhance the 
public debate in Europe. Although neoconservatism is not a European issue itself but is 
related to developments in the US, the analysis of its coverage can reveal something 
about political journalism at the EU level. It can also show if citizens of the 'Big Four', 
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understood US foreign policy in a similar way - through the perspective of 
neoconservatism - despite the division of their governments' positions. 
The thesis will analyse the coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite media 
for a period of 13 years, from the beginning of 1993 until the end 2005. This covers both 
tenns of the administration of Bill Clinton and five years of that of George Bush. The 
main objective of the research project is to investigate how neoconservatism has 
impacted on the agenda of the elite newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. It 
will be demonstrated if the media of the 'Big Four' constructed the political ideology in a 
similar way and whether they represented the neoconservatives and political philosopher 
Leo Strauss as influencing Washington's world affairs approach. This discussion will be 
associated to the debate concerning the potential existence of a European public sphere. 
In addition, explanations for the media stance will be given and the quality of the 
coverage will be assessed. What will be specifically considered is if the insistence on the 
neoconservative cause can provide a satisfactory background for the development of US 
foreign policy after 11 September. 
The thesis will start with an examination of the relationship between neoconservatism 
and US foreign policy by placing it in a historical perspective. This will be the aim of 
Chapter 2. Although neoconservatism is related not only to world affairs but also 
domestic politics the chapter will mainly concentrate on the former aspect because of the 
supposed impact of this political ideology on the foreign policy of George W. Bush. It 
will be discussed how and why neoconservatism emerged, how it developed and what are 
its fundamental features and principles. The discussion will consider whether 
neoconservatism had an influence on US politics before the terrorist attacks of 11 
September. The analysis will draw on the work of politicians and intellectuals who are 
either sympathetic towards or critical of the ideology and the neoconservatives. 
. The subsequent goal of the thesis will be to analyse the debate concerning the alleged 
neoconservative influence on the Bush administration. Chapter 3 will deal with this issue 
outlining that the supposed impact of the political ideology was disputed in the literature 
of international relations. It will discuss the role of non-neoconservative politicians in 
Washington's planning of the Iraq war and will iocus on other toreign policy schools 
shaping Bush's world affairs approach such as nationalism and realism. It will also 
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explore if US foreign policy after 911l and especially its preemptive strategy can be 
regarded as a revolutionary one by concentrating on precedents in intemational relations 
and American history. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the significance of neoconservatism and US foreign policy for 
the EU. The course of EU-US relations since 1945 wiII be discussed. The role of the 
media concerning the transatlantic rift before the war on Iraq of 2003 wiII also be 
outlined. In parallel with that the discussion will concentrate on their theoretical 
relationship with politics. Issues of major concern will include the way the media 
understand the world and perceive reality as well as their potential influence on public 
opinion. Subsequently, the methodological issues raised by this project will be analysed. 
It will be explained why both quantitative and qualitative methods will be used while a 
framework for the comparison of ditIerent media systems will be given. This chapter 
wiII also deal with the choice of specific European newspapers in the context of a 
potential creation of a European public sphere and with problematic aspects of the thesis 
such as the use of online resources and the translation from three European languages 
into English. 
The results of the quantitative content analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. A 
particular focus wiII be the comparison of the volume of articles published before and 
after 11 September 2001. The data wiII be categorised according to the ideology and 
nationality of the newspapers accessed. With the use of specific histograms the stance of 
the given media will be explored at specific junctures as for example in the first eight 
months on the Bush presidency. This chapter will also explore if the accessed 
newspapers used the abbreviation 'neocons' in their a11icIes demonstrating maybe a 
familiatity in their usage of the teml neoconservatism or its equivalents. 
The next sections of the thesis will be devoted to qualitative analysis of the coverage. 
As it is interesting to show how the term was used by the media over a several-years 
period, the nature of the articles wiII be examined in two periods having the day of the 
terrorist attacks as a dividing line. Chapter 6 will deal with the period prior to the 
atrocities and will indicate how the media interpreted neoconservatism and if they did so 
in relation to US foreign policy. Chapter 7 will discuss how the selected newspapers 
understood neoconservatism in the context of the new international environment after the 
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onslaughts of 11 September. The main figures and policies of neoconservatism as 
identified by the media will be described and compared to the relevant findings of the 
previous chapter. 
Chapter 8 will analyse the way the newspapers interpreted the impact of the political 
ideology on US foreign policy. In particular, what will be explored is how the media 
assessed the role of the neoconservative group in influencing the Bush administration to 
topple Saddam Hussein's regime manu militmi in 2003. This chapter will also examine 
if other theories of international relations were discussed in the European press. In so 
doing it will conclude if the interest shown by the newspapers in neoconservatism was 
misplaced or not and if they signifi<tantly framed US foreign policy through the 
perspective of this political ideology. 
Chapter 9 will attempt to complement the previous one. It will deal with the supposed 
influence of political philosopher Leo Strauss on the neoconservatives as mediated by the 
chosen European newspapers. Its main goal will be to explore if the media focused on 
Strauss in their interest in political ideology after 9/11 and if they saw him as a highly 
influential figure not only for members of the group but also for US contemporary 
politics. This will maybe constitute a case study of this project as it will be based on both 
quantitative and qualitative methods while it will also provide a theoretical framework for 
the alleged influence of Leo Strauss. 
Chapter 10 will summarise the findings of the project. It will attempt to find potential 
explanations for the stance of the European elite newspapers and their position on 
neoconservatism. The media coverage of the political ideology will be placed within the 
framework of international relations and various interpretations of US foreign policy after 
11 September. The chapter will also concentrate on the nature of journalism in the 
aftermath of 9/11. It will focus on the common political discourse of the media and will 
discuss the idea of the potential creation of a European public sphere. The chapter will 
finally suggest ideas for future research and ways this project·can be complemented and 
expanded. 
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Chapter 2: The Genesis of Neoconservatism 
The use of theories concerning foreign policy can provide a background of how states act 
in the international arena. US world affairs approach cannot be an exception. There are 
particular foreign policy schools which help explain US strategy in international relations 
from the era of the American Revolution onwards. Waiter Russell Mead focuses on 
different debates which have shaped US foreign policy (Mead, 2001).2 Mead, who 
argues that the US has had a successful history in international relations from its very 
first beginning, defines four different foreign policy schools: the HamiItonians, 
Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Wilsonians (lbid; Mead, 2002: 165). 
Hamiltonians, named after first Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, pursue the 
national interest and commerce as business is their raison d' etre for US foreign policy. 
Their main objective is to enhance US position in world's market place. Jeffersonians, 
named after US President from 1801 until 1809 Thomas Jefferson, are those who put US 
domestic interest above its international one and aim at pursuing democracy at home in 
order to be a beacon to other nations. Jacksonians, named after US President from 1828 
until 1836 Andrew Jackson, are populists who emphasise self-reliance and the use of 
coercion. Jacksonians are not against the use of military force in the international arena. 
Finally, Wilsonians, named after US President from 1913 until 1921 Woodrow Wilson, 
are interested in spreading democracy and champion international law. In other words, 
they want to make the world safe for democracy by taking the force out of international 
relations and replacing it with judicial nOTInS (Mead, 2001). 
The categorizations made by Waiter Russell Mead offer a framework that can 
potentially explain the evolution of US fo~eign policy from 1776 onwards. Realism, 
isolationism, nationalism and liberal internationalism are the principles HamiItonians, 
Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Wilsonians respectively advocate. Many scholars employ 
all or some of those principles in order to analyse US foreign policy (Hurst, 2005; 
Krauthammer, 2004; Nye 2004; Podhoretz, 2005). In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September and especially a few months before the war on Iraq of 2003, the 
attention of scholars and intellectuals started to turn towards a comparatively new 
2 WaIter Russell Mead is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
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political ideology. This was neoconservatism, which contains some elements of both the 
schools of Jacksonians and Wilsonians, as to its support for a potential usage of military 
force and democracy promotion but not necessarily on the basis of international law. 
Neoconservatism was not born after the attacks of 11 September but many years before 
them. Consequently, it is important to examine its evolution in a historical perspective. 
that is to say before 11 September and the beginning of George W. Bush presidency. 
The Neoconservatives 
The tenn 'neoconservative' entered the modem American lexicon in the 1970s to define 
a new political tendency fonned mainly by those who had turned towards the right having 
abandoned their often left-wing affiliation. The leading American socialist Michael 
Harrington and the editors of Dissent first used the word neoconservative in the 1970s as 
a derogatory description of fonner allies who had been either comrades in the US 
Socialist Party or traditional liberals (Dorrien, 2004: 7). Specifically, these ex-allies of 
Harrington in the Socialist Part or old liberals were a group of intellectuals including 
Edward Banfield, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol, Seymour 
Martin Lipset, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Nonnan Podhoretz, Robert 
Tucker and James Q. Wilson.3 
The intellectuals who became known as neoconservatives 111 the 1970s were not 
particularly satisfied with the label which had been attributed to them. They tended to 
reject the tenn as 'pejorative' (Podhoretz, 1996: 20). Nevertheless, as Nonnan Podhoretz 
points out, they eventually surrendered to the name because nothing these people could 
3 Edward Banfield was Professor of Urban Government at Harvard University while he also taught at the 
University of Pennsylvania. His best known work is The Unheavenly City in which he discussed the urban 
crisis. Daniel Bell, author of the books The End of Ideology and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 
was a sociologist and social theorist. Nathan Glazer was then professor of education and sociology at the 
University of California in Berkeley and co-authored along with Daniel P. Moynihan the book Beyond the 
Melting Pot. Sidney Hook was an American philosopher and professor at the New York University. Irving 
Kristol had graduated from the City College of New York in 1940 and was professor of social thought at 
the New York University Graduate School of Business. Seymour Martin Lipset was a sociologist and 
political scientist teaching at various universities such as at the University of California and Harvard. 
Daniel P. Moynihan was a social scientist specialised in urban affairs having studied at the City College of 
New York, Fletcher School of Law Diplomacy and London School of Economics. Michael Novak was a 
theologian and professor at various universities including Stanford and Harvard. Norman Podhoretz had 
studied English and Hebrew literature and was contributor to many journals. Robert Tucker was a political 
scientist and professor at John Hopkins University. Finally, James Q. Wilson was professor of political 
science at Harvard University. 
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say or do prevented them from being called neoconservatives (!bid: 20, 21). In the words 
ofIrving Kristol, 'a neoconservative was a liberal, who had been mugged by reality,' that 
is to say a person with a liberal past who had embraced liberal values and maybe never 
abandoned them (Kirkpatrick, 2004: 35). These intellectuals had not constituted a 
particular political entity previously. Almost all of them were born in the 1920s or 
shortly before or after. Many ofthem were Jews coming to age in a decade during which 
the triumph of fascism and Nazi power resulted in the outbreak of the Second World War 
and the Holocaust. They were also socialists and anti-Stalinists and combated 
Communists in the name of various socialist factions (Steinfels, 1979: 24-27). Stefan 
Halper and Jonathan Clarke comment that neoconservative thinkers like Bell, Glazer, 
Kristol, Lipset and Moynihan became an identifiable group in the 1930s as a non-
communist entity in order to discuss the nature of their anti-Stalinism (Halper and Clarke, 
2004: 45). 
The early Marxism of the future neoconservatives was enough for critics to call them 
'quasi-Marxists conservatives' (Steinfels, 1979:28). Original neoconservatives are often 
associated with Leon Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' theory. Examples of the critics 
who link the neoconservatives to Leon Trotsky include isolationist politician Patrick 
Buchanan who writes that the original neoconservatives were ex-Trotskyites (Buchanan, 
2004: 37). Similarly, Michael Lind argues that most neoconservative intellectuals 'are 
products of the largely Jewish-American Trotskyist movement of the 1930.' (Lind, 2003: 
10). In parallel, writing in Foreign Affairs John Judis compares the Trotskyists and the 
neoconservatives in terms of their approach to socialism and democracy respectively. 
Judis explains that Trotskyists were convinced internationalists who believed that Stalin 
was trying to build socialism in one country and not through world revolution had 
thereby created 'a degenerate worker's state instead of a genuine dictatorship of the 
proletariat.' He therefore argues that neoconservatism is a kind of inverted Trotskyism 
which seeks to export democracy [ ... ] in the same way that Trotsky originally envisaged 
exporting socialism.'(Judis, 1995:126). 
However, the connection between the philosophy of Leon Trotsky and that of 
neoconservatism has been disputed. According to Jonah Golberg, Trotsky is never 
quoted in neoconservative op-eds and journals or invoked in neoconservative debates and 
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conferences and the neoconservatives have never publicly expressed any fondness for 
Trotsky (Goldberg, 2003). In addition, Max Boot, who would become known as a 
neoconservative in the 1990s, considers as 'absurd' the charge that the neoconservatives 
are adherents to the 'permanent revolution' theory of Trotsky, noting that Trotsky was a 
communist who remained committed to establishing a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' on 
coming to power (Boot, 2004: 51). Furthermore, Murray Friedman writes in his account 
about neoconservatism that although Irving Kristol had backed Trotsky, Nathan Glazer 
and Daniel Bell had been anti-Trotskyites (Friedman, 2005: 28). 
The intellectuals who would be called neoconservatives in the 1970s were mainly anti-
communist liberals and loyal Democrats in the years after 1945, the 1950s and the 1960s. 
From the beginning of the Cold War, they were absorbed into the general liberal 
consensus. This implied an acknowledgment of the danger of communism, a support for 
the idea of containment and the US's new world role in the Cold War era and a strong 
belief in democracy. With reference to domestic affairs, these liberals embraced the idea 
of a struggle against oppression, stagnation, pride and corruption (Ehrman, 1994: 15-17). 
Talking into account that the neoconservatives had expressed for many years a liberal 
ideology it is important to investigate the reasons that led to their reemergence as a new 
political group with a right-wing label. 
There is little debate concerning the reasons that led the neoconservatives to constitute 
a particular political entity in the 1970s and most scholars whether neoconservative or not 
seem to agree on this issue. Specifically, the liberal consensus started to lose its 
coherence in the latter half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Ehrman, 1994: 
32; From, 1994: 126, 127). Developments in American society as well as within the 
framework of the Cold War and the US struggle against the Soviet Union became open to 
debate and caused many disturbances in liberal circles. A response was required to the 
revolutionary rhetoric and radicalism of the New Left and the counterculture which 
allegedly led to social disorders in the 1960s (Aronowitz, 2007, 57-58). The ambitious 
attempts for reform in America coincided with the spread of the use of violence. For 
instance, black and white militancy was on the rise because of the civil rights movement. 
Furthermore, the war in Vietnam also contributed to social disorder. Widespread protests, 
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campus militancy, urban rioting and clashes with the police caused alarm to the 
intellectuals who later be called neoconservatives (Berlet, 2007: 87). 
The war in Vietnam also created scepticism about the purposes of American 
internationalism. The necessity of US involvement in international affairs and the extent 
to which it had to compete with the Soviet Union became major issues of discussion. 
Many liberals considered America's role in this war as 'evil.'(Halper and Clarke, 2004: 
52). As the war in Vietnam was escalating, revisionist theories of the Cold War gained 
strength (Ehrman, 1994: 21). Questions arose about the direction of US foreign policy 
under Lyndon 10hnson and no theory appeared which could unify the liberals. As a result 
of these debatable issues, a new group emerged after the defeat of the Democratic 
candidate Hubert Humphrey and the victory of Richard Nixon in the 1968 elections had 
freed liberals from responsibility for policy and allowed them a chance to develop 
alternatives. 
The new group of liberals saw a threat to democracy caused by the afore mentioned 
domestic and international developments and reconsidered much of what they had 
believed earlier (Ehrman, 1994: 24,33, 35). They turned away from what they viewed 
as the excess of the 'counterculture,' the racial conflict, the urban riots and the national 
divisions over the war in Vietnam (Steinfels, 1981: 39). They also feared the risks of 
Soviet expansionism abroad caused by a potential US hands-off approach in the Third 
World and expressed their dismay at the Left's unwillingness to stand up to the Soviets 
(Frum, 1994: 126, 127). They also saw the debate over Vietnam as a mechanism to 
identify anti-American people (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 52). Their response was 
neoconservatism. 
Core Philosophy 
The main principles of neoconservatism cannot be easily identified. Neoconservatives 
themselves reject the idea of they constitute a movement meaning a body of persons with 
specific common goals. For instance, lrving Kristol writes that when two 
neoconservatives meet they are more likely to argue with one another than to agree. He 
talks about 'a neoconservative persuasion' and not a movement (Kristol, 2004: 33). This 
persuasion has been called 'a neoconservative tendency' by Norman Podhoretz 
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(Podhoretz, 1996: 20). However, there was common ground which united 
neoconservative intellectuals in the 1970s. Although Irving Kristol did not agree with the 
idea of a movement, he attempted to define an ideological consensus synthesised around 
five main points in an article he wrote in Newsweek in 1976. Neoconservatism was not 
necessarily hostile to the idea of a welfare state but was opposed to the paternalistic state. 
It also had considerable respect for the market as long as individual freedoms were 
preserved. Furthermore, it respected traditional values such as religion and the family. It 
also rejected the egalitarianism in which everyone would have 'equal shares of 
everything.' Finally, with reference to foreign policy, neoconservatism expressed a fear 
that 'American democracy was not likely to survive for long in a world that was 
overwhelmingly hostile to American values' (Steinfels, 1979: 51, 52). 
Scholars dismiss the contention of Kristol and Podhoretz that neoconservatism has not 
evolved as a movement since its emergence. Peter Steinfels uses the word movement to 
describe neoconservatism although he acknowledges there was no manifesto or 
programme, nor were statements issued from any association for neoconservatives 
(Steinfels, 1979: 49). Scholars also largely agree that the description offered by Irving 
Kristol captures the way the original neoconservative intellectuals were thinking in the 
1970s. Thus, leading commentators Stefan Halper and 10nathan Clarke contend, the 
points made by Kristol provide a framework for understanding of the group's thinking 
(Halper and Clarke, 2004: 49). 
During the 1970s the neoconservatives strongly opposed ideas and policies such as 
affirmative action, prison reform, the Equal Rights Amendment and more inclusive 
admissions to colleges and universities. Feminism, environmentalism and gay rights 
were anathema to their agenda. The neoconservatives were unsettled by Lyndon 
10hnson's Great Society (Noble, 2007: 111). They believed 10hnson's war on the poverty 
mostly benefited a 'new class' of bureaucrats and social workers (Domen, 2004: 9). 
Neoconservative intellectuals as Irving Kristol and Robert Novak explained that 
liberalism was catering to emerging generational power bloc, in other words the 'new 
class' children of the 1960s, who greatly increased the ranks of the non-producing 
managerial class of America (Ibid, 2004: 9). As Novak observed: 'Over 35 percent ofthe 
GNP is now supplied by the knowledge industry: federal and local government workers, 
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researchers, lawyers, planners, consultants, educators, information systems operatives, 
journalists, social workers and others. Most of the workers in this industry depend for 
their livelihood on expanding and activist government expenditure' (quoted in Steinfels, 
1979: 57). 
The neoconservatives did not oppose the idea of welfare state in the way traditional 
conservatism did (Steinfels, 1979: 41). The leading neoconservatives had approved the 
New Deal reforms because they had been supporters of this policy of Franklin Roosevelt 
in the 1930s. Irving Kristol recalled they were 'children of the depression [ ... ] and felt a 
measure of loyalty to the spirit of the New Deal if not to all its programs and policies' 
(Kristol, 1995: 84). Although there was no neoconservative consensus on specific 
proposals and every government initiative would be judged separately, the 
neoconservatives generally supported programs that relieved potentially social tensions 
(Steinfels, 1979: 41). 
In the international arena, the neoconservatives supported Israel and were dubious 
about Arab intentions. This stance has become open to debate as to the real motivation of 
the group. Neoconservatives argue they viewed Israel as a democratic and vulnerable 
outpost in a strategically vital region and that their support for it can be explained on the 
basis of their staunch anti- Soviet and anti-Communist position during the Cold War 
years (Podhoretz, 1996: 22). They also observe that their support for Israel is often 
attributed to the fact that many of them are Jewish (Podhoretz, 1996: 22). This is a 
contention they obviously reject. However, Patrick Buchanan, a leading right-wing critic 
of neoconservatism, suggests this is a convenient distraction: 'Neocons say we attack 
them because they are Jewish. We do not' (Buchanan, 2003). Whatever their motivation, 
the neoconservatives' support for Israel was sincere.4 After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 
the group feared that the US would force Israel to accept a settlement on the basis of what 
they saw as a detrimental 'land for peace' agreement. 
4 After the end of the Cold War scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen WaIt linked the 
neoconservative group to the Israeli lobby in the US (Mearsheimer and WaIt, 2006) 
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Towards a 'Movement' 
At the beginning of the 1970s the neoconservatives felt confident that their own views 
could offer the US a future of practical and efficient change. Leading figures in their 
group, consisted of social scientists, academics and important figures in literary circles 
who all endeavoured to promote their views. They were linked to two key journals. The 
one was Commentary, the monthly published since 1959 by the American Jewish 
Committee with Norman Podhoretz as its editor in chief. The other was The Public 
Interest founded by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in 196~. Alongside these ventures, the 
neoconservatives made their presence felt through think tanks. A major base emerged in 
the American Enterprise Institute which was originally a right-wing exponent of 
unreconstructed free enterprise (Dorrien, 2004: 11). Leading neoconservatives also 
developed strong links with the Heritage Foundation, Georgetown Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Aspen Institute, Hudson Institute and the Freedom House. 
The neoconservatives had little influence over Democratic Party thinking. Indeed, they 
became slowly isolated within it. The post 1968 reforms of the Party had introduced a 
largely primary based system that reduced the importance of the national party 
conventions. This helped shift the Democrats toward what the neoconservatives saw as 
ideas antipathetic to what they believed were the interests of the US (Ehrman, 1994: 62). 
By the time George McGovern had become the presidential candidate in 1972, the 
neoconservatives had become totally disenchanted. They were especially alienated by 
McGovern's call for co-operation with the Soviet Union and his more dovish foreign 
policy views (Friedman, 2005: 137; Kirkpatrick, 2004: 240). Irving Kristol, who had 
voted for Richard Nixon in 1968, now openly supported him, became a Republican in 
1972 (Ehrman, 1994: 46). 
Following the 1972 defeat, many neoconservatives lined up behind Democratic leaders 
such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson and founded the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority in opposition to supporters of McGovern (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 
55, Stelzer, 2004: 22, 23). The Coalition was organised by Ben Wattenberg and Midge 
Decter who was Norman Podhoretz's wife. Others involved were the prominent writer, 
Max Kampelman, political scientist and professor at Georgetown University Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and Penn Kemble. Sponsors were also Bell, Glazer, Lipset, Novak, 
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Podhoretz and the Harvard professor Richard Pipes. In defending a muscular American 
confrontation with the Soviet Union" the neoconservatives were fiercely critical of the 
Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy of detente. However, the coalition of the Democratic 
Majority was ineffective and by the end of 1974, they were only a minority faction within 
the Party. They lacked effective organisation and leadership and had little hope that their 
approach would bring success (Ehrman, 1994: 60-62). 
Hitherto the neoconservative political philosophy was primarily the product of theory 
rather than practice. The group was mainly observing, analysing and criticising 
developments in domestic and foreign affairs from outside and not acting from inside. 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan was the first neoconservative to bridge the gap between the 
intellectual and practical political sphere (Ehrman, 1994: 63). A social scientist 
specialising in urban and ethnic affairs Moynihan had served as an assistant to Governor 
of New York Averell Harriman in the 1950s and to Secretary of Labour Arthur Goldberg 
in Kennedy's administration. Although Moynihan was a Democrat, he also served as 
Secretary of the Urban Affairs Council and US ambassador in India during Nixon's 
administration. While he was in India Moynihan argued that President Woodrow Wilson 
had been correct standing for a quest for legitimacy in the world order which envisaged 
the US had 'to defend, and where possible, to advance democratic principles in the world 
at large'(Ehrman, 1994: 80). 
Moynihan's appointment as US ambassador at the UN during Ford's administration 
gave him the opportunity to further express his beliefs. His support for Israel and 
condemnation of the 1975 UN Resolution, which equated Zionism with racism, were 
characteristic of his rhetoric (Friedman, 2005: 149, Halper and Clarke, 2004: 59). 
However, in early 1976 Moynihan resigned his position due to continuous disagreements 
with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. After his departure from the UN, 
he was elected Senator of New York and thus became the first neoconservative to hold 
public office. Moynihan opposed the Carter administration's foreign policy of seeking 
greater cooperation rather than confrontation with Moscow (Friedman, 2005: 149). He 
agreed with Henry lackson's argument for a muscular US foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union. 
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------- ---
President Carter did not entrust any administration positions to neoconservatives. 
Moynihan, Podhoretz and Lipset - being outside from government - strongly were able to 
criticise the foreign policy of Carter in public. During this period Jeane Kirkpatrick also 
emerged as a leading neoconservative. Months into the Iranian Revolution, Kirkpatrick 
published her article 'Dictatorships and Double Standards' in Commentary magazine. 
She argued that the role of the US in the Third World should have been 'the liberalization 
and democratization, provided that [ ... ] proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual 
change rather than perfect democracy overnight' (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 44). Kirkpatrick's 
argument was that democratising Third World countries might take 'decades or even 
centuries' and that the Carter administration had to apply its belief in democracy to all 
countries equally (Mann, 2004: 92, 93). Accordingly, in seeking political liberalisation 
the Carter administration had to ensure that this attempt would not bring the opposite 
result as was the case ofIran. (Mann, 2004: 92-93). 
The neoconservatives were largely against the second strategic nuclear arms treaty 
(SALT II) with the Soviet Union. Prominent advocates such as Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Eugene Rostow joined the Committee on the Present Danger 
founded by Paul Nitze in 1976 (Friedman, 2005: 142, 143). The Committee was not 
solely a neoconservative but a politically independent organisation (Ehrman, 1994: 112). 
It aimed at offering a better understanding of the problems the US foreign policy was 
facing because of the enlargement of Soviet strategic and military forces. Because of this 
it was perhaphs inevitable that it gained the support of the neoconservatives. 
The neoconservatives hoped that Moynihan might challenge Carter for the Democratic 
nomination of the candidate of the Democratic Party leadership in the 1980 presidential 
election. When it became clear that this would not happen they realised they no longer 
had a credible figure within the Party to turn to as a leader (Ehrman, 1994: 99). Ronald 
Reagan proved a better alternative. Reagan's victory in the elections of 1980 gave the 
group renewed hope. The 'empire of evil' rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and his strong 
anticommunism resembled neoconservative ambitions taking into account the foreign 
policy challenges the administration faced. The latter included the attacks by anti-
government guerrillas and leftist rebels in Nicaragua, Grenada and El Salvador, the 
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Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the unrest in Poland (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 
163). 
The Politics of Realignment 
Following Reagan's victory many neoconservatives sought to influence his 
administration. As Max Boot observes, 'following the 1980 election, US President 
Ronald Reagan became the new standard bearer of the neoconservative cause' (Boot, 
2004). In February 1981 the Committee for the Free World was formed by Midge Decter. 
It aimed at defending and preserving the free world 'against the rising menace of 
totalitarian barbarism in books, newspapers, broadcasts, classrooms and in all public 
institutions' (Ehrman, 1994: 139). This committee helped put neoconservatives in touch 
with one another by organising conferences and supporting campus groups of students. 
One of those who supported financially the Committee for the Free World was Donald 
Rumsfeld (Ehrman, 1994: 140, 141). 
Many of the neoconservatives took important positions in Reagan's administration. 
Reagan, who had read the article of Kirkpatrick about dictatorships and double standards, 
appointed her as US ambassador to the UN from 1981 until 1985. Young 
neoconservative politicians, who would hold governmental positions two decades later 
during George W. Bush's administration, served President Reagan. Elliot Abrams was 
appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs, later for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and then for Inter-American affairs. Richard 
Perle became Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy with 
Douglas Feith as his special counsel. Feith also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for Negotiations policy. Paul Wolfowitz was initially made Head of Policy 
Planning at the State Department and later Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. Lewis Libby was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in the office of the 
Secretary of State and later served in the US Department of State as Director of Special 
Projects in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Friedman, 2005: 153). 
The neoconservative politicians sought to establish new policies designed to restore the 
strength of the US and to defend liberal democracy in the world. At the same time, 
neoconservative intellectuals also saw the beginning of the Reagan administration as an 
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opportunity for the implementation of a US foreign policy in order to contain Soviet 
expansionism. Podhoretz argued that under Reagan the Republican Party would 
reassume the responsibility for restraining Soviet expansionism, which had been 
abandoned after the Vietnam War (Podhoretz, 1984: 449). In his first term, President 
Reagan followed a series of policies in the international arena which could maybe be 
described as neoconservative. For example, his plans for the Strategic Defence Inititiative 
(SDI) showed his determination for a muscular confrontation with Moscow. In parallel 
with this, he followed a policy of assistance to anti communist guerrillas and governments 
known as the Reagan Doctrine. In particular, the US president endeavoured to help the 
right-wing government in El Salvador, the contra rebels in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist 
guerrillas in Angola and the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan. In October 1983, American 
forces invaded Grenada deposing a Cuban supported Marxist regime. 
The foreign policy of Reagan's first term also saw disagreements between 
neoconservative politicians and intellectuals. Kirkpatrick and Abrams viewed his 
administration as greatly successful. For instance, the former told the New York Times in 
1985 that the US was not isolated and humiliated as it has happened before 1980 
(Ehrman, 1994: 161). By contrast, intellectuals as Kristol and Podhoretz were dismayed 
by Reagan's foreign policy. The first complained for a 'muddle' in his international 
affairs approach whilst the second talked about 'a case of mistaken identity' (Ehrman, 
1994: 147; Halper and Clarke, 2004: 164 and 166). The disagreement between 
politicians and intellectuals over Reagan's foreign policy did not necessarily mean that 
neoconservatism was not united in theory and practice. The intellectuals were 
disillusioned by Reagan because - being free from policy responsibility - they maybe 
expected action through the use of force to a greater extent to demonstrate a stronger anti-
Soviet stance. For their part, the politicians could possibly have more limited 
expectations because they faced the realities of governing and were responsible for 
decisions and their consequences. 
The second term of the Reagan administration hardly reflected a neoconservative 
dimension. The departure of Kirkpatrick from the UN deprived the neoconservatives 
from an important voice within the administration. They saw their anti-Soviet foreign 
policy approach gradually lose its dynamism. John Ehrman attributes this change to the 
23 
domestic developments of the Soviet Union (Ehnnan, 1994: 173). In 1985 Mikhail 
Gorbachev became the Soviet leader and thereafter followed a series of drastic domestic 
refonns in his country as well as a conciliatory policy towards the West. His perestroika 
and the new climate of cooperation between the Kremlin and the White House, notably 
the discussion for an anns control agreement, left advocates of a muscular anti-Soviet 
foreign policy - inter alia the neoconservatives - somewhat isolated. 
Further to this, in the second tenn of Reagan a foreign policy based on democracy 
promotion was partly followed. In that regard, respresentatives of the second generation 
- as we will see - of neoconservatism William Kristol and Robert Kagan published an 
article in Foreign Affairs. They argued that 'during the Reagan years, the USA pressed 
for changes in right-wing and left-wing dictatorships alike, among both friends and foes 
- in the Philippines, South Korea, Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union'(Kristol and 
Kagan, 1996: 27). In other words, beyond pressing for changes in left-wing dictatorships 
on the basis of the Reagan Doctrine the Reagan administration also showed an interest in 
promoting democracy in right-wing countries such as Philippines and South Korea. 
Significantly, it withdrew its support from dictator Marcos in Philippines in 1986 and 
thus contributed to the transfonnation from a dictatorship to a democracy. Wolfowitz and 
his aide Scooter Libby together with Richard Annitage, the deputy assistant secretary of 
defence for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and assistant secretary of defence in the 
Reagan years, played a key role in the case of Philippines. In addition, administration put 
pressure on the president of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan to pave the way for 
democratic elections and political change in his country. 
If the pressure for changes in left-wing dictatorships is explained in the interest of the 
US struggle against the Soviet Union, a similar policy in right-wing dictatorships can go 
beyond the specific goal of Moscow's containment. As James Mann observes, anti-
Communism was the main principle of the neoconservatives at that time and therefore 
right-wing dictators might be viewed as helpful to a US anti-Soviet foreign policy (Mann, 
2004: 93). The spread of democracy, such as in the case of Philippines, shows maybe 
that some neoconservative politicians had started to envisage a different approach of 
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foreign policy.5 They were developing ideas which would be applied a few years after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (lbid, Mann, 2004: 136). 
New World Order 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were seminal events. The 
collapse of the bipolar structure of the world, the decline of communism and the 
emergence of the US as the sole superpower required a reconsideration of international 
relations. Within this framework, neoconservatism suffered a critical crisis. Norman 
Podhoretz admitted that it did not exist any longer as a distinctive phenomenon 
(Podhoretz, 1996: 19-27). The struggle for the protection of democracy and against the 
spread of communism could not theoretically find any resonance in the post Cold War era. 
Despite Podhoretz's pronouncement, the neoconservatives started to get accustomed to 
the new conditions and to ponder over the future role of the US in the post Cold War era. 
They rejected the idea of isolationism and approved that of US involvement in word 
affairs. The scope and limits of this involvement, however, became open to debate within 
their circle. Original neoconservatives like Kristol, Tucker and Kirkpatrick expressed a 
more realist approach, insisting on a narrow definition of the national interest of the US 
and arguing that Americans should avoid open-ended crusades to spread democracy 
(Glazer, 1990: 31-35; Kirkpatrick, 1990: 40-44). Although they strongly supported liberal 
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s they had done so primarily as a matter of defence. For 
instance, Irving Kristol wrote in The National Interest: 'All in all, it is perfectly possible 
to envisage a post-Cold War foreign policy for the United States which, constantly 
defining (even redefining our national interest as the world changes (and as we change 
too), would be sensible and realistic (Kristol, 1990: 25). According to the new approach 
of the neoconservatives, as Kirkpatrick argued, American interests abroad would have to 
be limited (Kagan and Kristol, 2000: 59). 
The view of original neoconservatives differed from that of young intellectuals, 
influenced by the 'movement', such as Charles Krauthammer and Joshua Muravchik, 
who came to the forefront in the 1980s and early 1990s. The latter, in other words the 
5 Intellectuals as ITYing Kristol and Nonnan Podhoretz remained silent concerning this foreign policy 
approach of the Reagan administration 
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new generation of neoconservative intellectuals saw the export of democracy as an 
important goal of US foreign policy. They envisaged a foreign policy based on this 
principle not for the sake of democracy itself but to bolster US security and further its 
world preeminence (Wolfson, 2004: 227). Krauthammer argued that the US had to be 
prepared to act alone to face down or disarm countries threatening to use their weapons to 
upset international stability (Krauthammer, 1991: 23-33). He named Iraq and North 
Korea as 'weapon states' and considered the proliferation of munitions of mass 
destruction as an imminent danger for the US in the post Cold War era (lbid, 1991: 30).6 
In parallel, Muravchik argued that that the US should concentrate on spreading 
democracy in order to create a friendlier and more peaceful global environment in the 
world and prevent the outbreak of a large scale war (Muravchik, 1996: 152).1 
Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defence under George H. W. Bush, 
prepared a 'Defence Planning Guidance' for intra-Defence Department use in which he 
called for a US military sufficiently powerful to prevent the emergence of any rival in 
anywhere in the world. He also encouraged the spread of democracy and open 
economics and argued that military force had to be used, if necessary, to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post Cold War era, the second 
generation of neoconservative intellectuals and politicians such as Krauthammer, 
Muravchik, Wolfowitz and Abrams started to assume the positions of original 
neoconservatives (Friedman, 2005: 230,231; Halper and Clarke, 2004: 78, 79, 99). The 
latter were approaching or were already over 70 and had adopted a more realist approach 
in international affairs as noted above. The views of Krauthammer and Muravchik as well 
as the 'Defense Planning Guidance' of Wolfowitz mirror the neoconservative foreign 
policy philosophy of the post Cold War era. Thus, the term neoconservatism will now be 
used to refer to the position of the new generation of neoconservative intellectuals and 
politicians.8 
6 Elliot Abrams agreed with Krauthammer's approach (Ehrman, 1994: 183). 
7 Ben Wattenberg, who was former speechwriter for President Lyndon Johnson and adviser to Senator 
Hubert Humphrey, also agreed with the idea of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy (Dorrien, 
2004: 77-79). 
8 It should me mentioned that original neoconservatives as Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick aligned with the 
position of the second generation as to the potential use of US military force after 11 September (PNAC 
website, 20109/01). 
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Scholars who either are neoconservative or can be maybe associated with their group 
focus on particular foreign policy principles. 9 Irving Kristol does not constitute an 
exception despite his preference to realism in the post Cold War era. He believes that the 
neoconservative group serves US interests in the international arena by considering 
patriotism as a natural and healthy sentiment and distinguishing friends from enemies 
(Kristol, 2004: 36). Subsequently, it does not describe national interest in geographical 
terms (!bid: 36). Scholar Peter Walisson adds that this national interest is not defined as 
power but as values and identifies the success of liberty as its supreme value (Wallison, 
2004). Another supporter, Irvin Stelzer believes that neoconservatives seek to promote 
democracy by deposing dictatorial regimes that threaten American security and by 
accepting the use force if diplomatic methods fail. He also adds they are prepared to 
follow regime change policy with nation-building relying. Stelzer summarises their 
position as such: 'diplomacy if possible, force if necessary; the UN if possible, ad hoc 
coalition or unilateral action if necessary; and preemptive strikes if it is reasonable to 
anticipate hostile action on the part of America's enemies' (Stelzer, 2004: 9, 10). 
The neoconservatives differ from President's Woodrow Wilson ambition to remake the 
world in what they do not rely on multilateral institutions as the UN. Journalist William 
Shawcross argues that they cannot rely on the UN because it cannot treat the US any 
differently from other member states. In this way, the neoconservatives consider it 
absurd that the US should theoretically have parity with dictatorships such as Liberia, 
North Korea or Libya or that it has to be constrained by the power of veto of nations like 
France (Shawcross, 2004: 60, 61). 
Non-neoconservative scholars also concentrated on the foreign policy principles of the 
group during the post Cold War era. There is ·an agreement over what the 
neoconservatives themselves argue. For example, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke 
9 The thesis focuses on neoconservatism and foreign policy. However, this does not mean that this political 
ideology ignored domestic affairs. Its political purpose of neoconservatism is to convert the Republican 
Party in the US into a new kind of conservative politics that would be suitable to govern. This implies 
cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth and prosperity for everyone. In Irving 
Kristol's words, 'it is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of 
affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less 
vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of 
economic reckoning' (Kristol, 2004: 33-35). 
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believe that the group analyses issues in black and white and that its watchword is global 
unilateralism (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 11). Lawrence Davidson portrays the 
neoconservatives as choosing between good and evil (Davidson, 2007: 248, 249). 
Moreover, Zbigniew Brzezinski compares their doctrine in the post-Cold War era to an 
updated version of imperialism (Brzezinski, 2007: 37). Steven Hurst also argues that the 
group insists on the promotion of American values and democracy (Hurst, 2005: 81, 82). 
Famous scholar for his criticism over US foreign policy Noam Chomsky gives a 
different dimension about neoconservatism and its possible impact. In particular, he 
argues: 
'It is not clear what the term is supposed to mean. In practice it is the programme of radical 
statist reactionaries, who believe that the US should rule the world by force if necessary, in 
the interests of the narrow sectors of concentrated private power and wealth that they 
represent, and that the powerful state they forge should serve those interests, not the 
interests of the public.[ ... ] Within elite sectors, there is a great deal of concern over their 
brazen arrogance, remarkable incompetence, and willingness to increase serious threats to 
the country and to transfer a huge burden to coming generations for short-term gain' 
(Chomsky's web site, 04/02/04). 
Ironically, Chomsky's scepticism over the term reflects the VIew of many 
neoconservatives, as for example Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. 
The Senior Bush and Clinton Administrations 
From the end of the Cold War until the end of the 1990s, the neoconservatives were 
marginalised from power. George H.W. Bush alienated the neoconservatives with his 
supposedly soft and pragmatic foreign policy (Muravchik, 1993: 15). US President, 
Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft were 
embarrassed by Wolfowitz's 'Defence Planning Guidance' (Dorrien, 2004: 41). 
Wolfowitz's plan was revised and a new less radical version was devised. The 
administration was cautious over the use of force for the protection of democracy, and, 
for instance, no action was taken in response to Tiananmen Square in 1989. In addition, it 
decided not to invade Baghdad in order to topple Saddam Hussein's regime after the 
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liberation of Kuwait in 1991. However, what greatly disillusioned the neoconservatives 
was the inactivity over the Yugoslav wars which was interpreted as encouraging Serbian 
aggression (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 82). The neoconservatives also criticised Bush's 
Senior Middle East policy because of his intention to promote the Arab-Israeli peace 
process by putting pressure on Israel to stop the settlements (Ehrman, 1994: 196, 197).10 
Some neoconservative intellectuals, notably Joshua Muravchik and Ben Wattenberg, 
supported Bill Clinton for US President in the 1992 elections because the Democrat had 
presented himself as a strong defender of American foreign and economic interests 
abroad. Nonetheless, his foreign policy led those neoconservatives who supported him to 
regret their choice (Muravchik, 1994: 15-22). The group began attacking Clinton in the 
spring of 1993 because it believed that the President had failed to exploit what they saw 
as American global hegemony (Ehrman,1994: 203; Haley, 2006: 109). The 
neoconservatives focused on Clinton's failure to rescue the Bosnians and on his 
supposedly ineffective multilateralism with the UN in the case of Somalia. In an article 
published in Foreign Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz wrote that Clinton had confused the 
meaning of the national interest (Wolfowitz, 1994: 28-43). The neoconservatives 
believed that countries such as Haiti and Somalia were of little strategic importance for 
the US while they were sceptical over the necessity of multilateralism and UN 
authorisation for American action. 
Conclusion 
The analysis shows that neoconservatism can arguably be considered as a movement. 
Irving Kristol and Joshua Muravchik call it a 'persuasion' and a 'distinctive sensibility'. 
Internal disagreements within the circle of the neoconservatives can also be 
acknowledged. As senior editor of the Weekly Standard David Brooks puts it: 'if you 
ever read a sentence that starts with neocons believe, there is a 99.44 per cent chance 
everything else in that sentence will be untrue' (Brooks, 2004: 42). However, all 
influential political tendencies can maybe have tensions. Further to this, many scholars 
10 For example, the US administration decided to postpone $ 10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel in 1991. 
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either sympathetic or critical towards neoconservatism elaborate and agree on its 
principles and thus show that a consensus which unites its adherents possibly exists. 
The meaning of the term neoconservatism depends on the period it was invoked. There 
is a significant distinction between the philosophy of the group during the Cold War and 
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the former period, the 'movement' 
considered democracy an antidote to communism and was more interested in the fight 
against this threat rather than the democratisation of regimes which were friendly to the 
US. By contrast, in the post Cold war era, it saw the promotion of democracy as an 
important goal of US foreign policy as a means to create friendly regimes in the world. 
Within this context, original neaconservatives such as Irving Kristol and Jeane 
Kirkpatrick differ from younger advocates like Robert Kagan and Paul Wolfowitz. The 
fanner had been once Democrats and are former liberals who 'had been mugged by 
reality.' The latter have not gone through a liberal or leftist phase and have been always 
Republicans. 
A period of US history before the presidency of George W. Bush which maybe saw 
neoconservatism find resonance in day-ta-day politics was during the first term of the 
administration of Ronald Reagan. Despite disagreements between politicians and 
intellectuals of the group at that time, the strong anticommunist rhetoric of the President 
united them. In the Gearge H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton years, however, the f,'fOUp was 
rather marginalised. What is interesting, at this stage, is to continue the analysis of 
neaconservatism by focusing on the period after these years when the political ideology 
became a highly debatable issue as to its supposed impact on the Bush administration. 
This will be the aim of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: A Neoconservative Revolution? 
Neoconservatism did not enter the literature of intemational relations after 11 September 
2001. It preexisted. V mious scholars had dealt with it analysing its principles in a foreign 
policy context as well as in a domestic one from the 1970s onwards. This political 
ideology, however, received more attention with the tem..1list atrocities. In the petiod 
which followed this event, neoconservatism became a cause celebre in intemational 
relations as to its supposed impact on George W. Bush's administration and the US 
decision for a military operation against Iraq. This chapter will focus on the debate 
conceming the alleged influence of the neoconservative group on the US President. It 
\vill start with an analysis of George W. Bush foreign policy approach in his preelection 
campaign and will then concentrate on his policy in the first eight months of his 
presidency. 
The chapter will subsequently examme the period after 11 September 2001 by 
presenting the contradictory theories which developed as an explanation for US foreign 
policy. In particular, it will attempt to challenge the conventional wisdom that the 
neoconservative group led the Bush administration to the Iraq war. The analysis will do 
so in two ways. Firstly, it will assess the stance of non-neoconservative politicians, for 
example realist and nationalist ones, discussing US decision-making in the run up to the 
Iraq war. And secondly, it will employ foreign policy precedents in order to show that the 
idea of a preemptive military operation against Iraq was arguably a revolutionary one and 
that US foreign policy questionably showed signs of change in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
chapter will finally deal with the crisis the neoconservative group entered with the 
continuing instability of Iraq and the disassociation of once prominent adherent Francis 
Fukuyama from the 'movement'. 
Rise of the Neoconservatives 
The pragmatism of the administration of George H.W. Bush and the assertive 
multilateralism of Bill Clinton fonned obstacles to neoconservative views. However, the 
election of 2000 offered a new oppOltunity for the group. George W. Bush, the son of the 
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former US president, was not an expert in foreign policy. In the period before the 
presidential election discussions focused on what George W. Bush knew about world 
affairs (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 35). The Texas governor was often criticised for his 
lack of international policy experience. For example, he could not mention the name of 
important world leaders as the President of Pakistan and made gaffes confusing Slovakia 
and Slovenia and referring to Greeks as Grecians, to Kosovars as Kosovians and to East 
Timorese as East Timorians (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 17-20). 
Bush responded by arguing that what mattered was his ability to select good people and 
that he had eminent advisers with more experience than the Democrats (Mann, 2004: ix). 
He therefore assembled a group of Republican experts, nicknamed 'the Vulcans' in honor 
of the Roman god of fire, the forge and metalwork to tutor him (lbid, 2004: ix, x),. The 
team was led by Condoleezza Rice, Brent Scowcroft's adviser on the Soviet Union 
during his father's administration and former professor at Stanford University, and Paul 
Wolfowitz who was spending the Clinton years outside government as the Dean of the 
John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Other Vu1cans included Richard 
Armitage, Robert Blackwill, Stephen Hadley, Richard Perle, Dov Zakheim and Robert 
Zoellick (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 22).11 Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and Colin 
Powell played important roles in the campaign of Bush but were not members of his pre-
election day-to-day activities (Mann, 2004: 251-252). Cheney and Rumsfeld had first 
worked together during the Nixon administration while the former as Secretary of 
Defence had selected Powell to be the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the first 
Bush administration. 
It can be argued that Bush's Junior foreign policy attitude was shaped by politicians 
from different schools of foreign policy thought: realism, nationalism and 
11 Annitage, after serving in Vietnam and in the Reagan administration had worked as a special envoy for a 
variety of jobs under George H. W. Bush. Blackwill had joined the Foreign Service in countries such as 
Kenya, Britain and Israel since 1967. He also had been the chief US negotiator at the Vienna talks on force 
reduction under Reagan as well as White House adviser on European and Soviet affairs in the first Bush 
administration. Hadley had worked for Scowcroft during the Ford Presidency and had been assistant 
secretary of defence for international security policy in the first Bush administration. Perle, as it has been 
already mentioned, had worked in the Defence Department in the Reagan years. Zakheim had been deputy 
undersecretary of Defence for planning and resources in the Reagan administration. Zoellick, an expert in 
economics and trade, had served at the Treasury Department in the Reagan years and as counsel to 
Secretary of State James Baker and later as his deputy chief of staff during George H. W. Bush 
administration (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 27-30). 
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neoconservatism. The balance of power approach is the basis of the first. Realism 
narrows down the definition of the national interest on the grounds of a tough-minded 
foreign policy and for this reason can be considered as the 'sworn enemy' of 
neoconservatism (Marshall, 2003: 146). Nationalism and neoconservatism share many 
commonalities such as a deep scepticism towards traditional Wilsonianism's commitment 
to the rule of law. This can be translated into a common antipathy for international 
organisations. In addition, both nationalism and neoconservatism believe in the 
importance of an increased US military budget and in the necessity for the use of military 
power. Their main difference is that the former is sceptical about nation-building and 
democracy spreading and reluctant to remake the world in American image (Daalder and 
Lindsay, 2003: 15-16). Scholars agree as to the foreign policy school of most of the 
Vu1cans. Rice, Powell, Blackwill and Zoellick can be considered realists, Cheney and 
Rumsfeld nationalists and Wolfowitz, Hadley, Perle and Zakheim as neoconservatives. 
Richard Armitage cannot be easily identified as as his views appeared contradictory. 
James Mann writes that he was a 'centrist Republican' (Mann, 2004: 369). 
During the preelection campaign of George W. Bush the neoconservatives generally 
did not support him in the Republican primaries. Instead, they were sympathetic to 
Senator John McCain. McCain became a hero for them because he had supported 
Clinton's intervention against Slobodan Milosevic which George W. Bush had strongly 
criticised.12 The neoconservatives had started since the mid 1990s to present their foreign 
policy views. In 1997, William Kristol, the son of Irving, along with Dick Cheney, 
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Elliot Abrams founded the Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC). This was a centre of hawkish thinking combining foreign 
policy perspectives from nationalism with neoconservatism. Along with the PNAC, the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage foundation, think tanks as the 
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Centre for Security Policy 
(CSP) also became important places for the promotion of neoconservative views (Halper 
and Clarke, 2004: 103). During this period, Robert Kagan, Max Boot, Francis Fukuyama 
and Lawrence Kaplan also became prominent advocates. 
12 Not all the neoconservatives agreed with this intervention. Charles Krauthammer was an exception and 
opposed US involvement in Kosovo. That is because he found the connection between Kosovo and the US 
interests tenuous (Krauthammer, 1999: 8). 
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The neoconservatives also expressed themselves in the Weekly Standard under the 
editship of William Kristol Junior since 1995. The National Review and the editorial 
pages of the Wall Street Journal also helped promote neoconservative views while the 
Washington Post boasted Charles Krauthammer as a columnist. A central figure of the 
relationship between the media and the neoconservatives is media entrepreneur Rupert 
Murdoch. Murdoch, who owns The Weekly Standard, has built an empire and financially 
assisted the neoconservative group. He mainly did so through his Fox Broadcasting 
Network. Murdoch can also be considered as crucial to the promotion of the 
neoconservative position in the European media because of his ownership of The Times. 
Other sponsors of the group include the New York based entrepreneur Bruce Kovner and 
chairman of Caxton Corporation and Roger Hertog, vice chairman of Alliance Capital 
management (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 188). 
In June 1997 the members of the PNAC issued a document summarising their foreign 
policy views. This paper, known as the Statement of Principles, was signed by all the 
neoconservative members of the PNAC including Elliott Abrams, Eliot Cohen, Midge 
Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, 1. Lewis Libby, 
Norman Podhoretz and Paul Wolfowitz. Significantly, the statement was also signed by 
non neoconservative politicians such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. The 
document agreed that US foreign policy was adrift and critisised the Clinton 
Administration for 'cuts in foreign affairs and defence spending, inattention to the tools 
of statecraft and inconstant leadership' which had resulted in increasing difficulty for the 
US in sustaining its global influence in the world and dealing with threats and challenges 
(PNAC website, 03/06/1997). Thus, they wrote that the US had to increase its military 
budget, to challenge hostile regimes, and 'to accept responsibility for America's unique 
role in preserving an international order friendly to [its] security, prosperity and 
principles' (!bid). 
In January 1998 leading neoconservatives such as Abrams, Bolton, Robert Kagan, 
Kristol Junior, Perle, Wolfowitz and Zakheim sent a letter to President Clinton declaring 
their policy orientation over the Iraq issue. This was also signed by Donald Rumsfeld and 
Richard Armitage and can be seen as anticipatory for the second Gulf War five years 
later. Here, the neoconservatives expressed their disapproval for the policy of 
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containment towards Iraq for it having not produced any positive results. They 
elaborated on a different US approach: 'The only acceptable strategy is one that 
eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass 
destruction.' 'In the near term this means a willingness to undertake military action as 
diplomacy is clearly failing' while 'in the long term it means removing Saddam Hussein 
and his regime from power'(PNAC web site, 26/01/98). 
Other Republicans took different positions. Condoleezza Rice, for instance, wrote in 
Foreign Affairs, that rogue regimes such as Iraq and North Korea 'are living on borrowed 
time, so there need be no sense of panic about them'. She argued that 'a clear and 
classical statement of deterrence' was the appropriate strategy (Rice, 2000: 61). 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that realists, like Rice were sceptical about 
multilateralism. In this regard, Robert Zoellick argued that for the Republicans 
international agreements and institutions were a means to achieve ends. (Zoellick, 2000: 
69). Realists such as Zoellick focused on the need of the US army to be able to defeat 
potential enemies (Zoellick, 2000: 69). 
George W. Bush's world affairs approach before 11 September was rather shaped by 
realism than by neoconservatism. Bush' speeches before his election suggest the future 
President showed a neoconservative inclination only in areas this overlapped with realist 
thinking. With reference to US unilateral policy Bush had said in August 2000: 'Now it's 
time not to defend outdated treaties but to defend the American people'(Bush's speech, 
03/08/00). Concerning the strategic needs of the US Bush called the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty as an 'artefact of the Cold War' and said that if elected he would 
add 1 $ billion a year to the defence budget aiming in order to build up the defence of the 
country against missiles, terrorism and technological invasions (CNN website, 23/09/99). 
The position of Bush Junior had been evident since November 1999 when he had said 
that the president of the US must be 'a clear-eyed' realist' (Bush's speech, 19/11/99). In 
this speech, Bush championed the idea of a 'distinctly American internationalism' (lbid). 
Significantly, he said that 'military power is not the final measure of might,' and thereby 
contradicted a fundamental neoconservative tenet (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 112). In 
addition, Bush focused on the importance of US involvement in the world only if its 
35 
vision and strategy were clear.13 The future US President was therefore not in favour of 
nation-building in what he saw as 'endless and aimless deployments' of US troops (CNN 
website, 23/09/99). The foreign policy priorities of George W. Bush would - inter alia -
include the extension of peace throughout the world on the basis of cooperation between 
the US and its partners, the defence of his country's interests in the Persian Gulf, the 
advancement of the Middle East peace process and the check against the delivery of 
weapons of mass destruction (Bush' speech, 19111199). The further challenges were 
China and Russia. By contrast, little was made on two issues, which would eventually 
dominate the Bush presidency: terrorism and Iraq. 
Early Bush Administration 
The US presidential election of 2000 was one of the closest races in American history. 
After a dispute with Al Gore over the vote count in Florida, George W. Bush won the 
November election and took office in January 2001. He was in power for approximately 
eight months before the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The analysis of these first 
months can provide a background with which his policy after 11 September can be 
compared. It can also inform an important research question, specifically the continuity 
or discontinuity of US foreign policy after 11 September and the role of neoconservatism 
before and after the attacks. 
After George W. Bush was elected president in the US, the influence of the 
neoconservative 'movement' mainly derived from its presence within the government. In 
particular, Paul Wolfowitz became Deputy Secretary of Defense, Douglas Feith Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy and Lewis 'Scooter' Libby Vice President chief of Staff. 
Elliot Abrams the National Security Council staffer for Near East, South-west Asian, and 
North African Affairs, Richard Perle a member of the Defense Policy Board, a civilian 
group that advised the Pentagon, and John Bolton assumed the role of Under Secretary of 
State. Neoconservatives did not have representatives in the top tier of the US 
administration, which comprised Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin 
\3 Here we can possibly acknowledge a similarity with Colin Powell's doctrine during the first Gulf War. 
According to 'realist' Powell the US had to precisely define its aims in the case it plans to use its military 
forces abroad (Powell, 1995; Gordon and Trainor, 1995). 
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Powell, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice. 
Foreign policy was not a priority of George W. Bush when he came into power. He 
was more interested in domestic affairs and in particular in the administration's $1.3 
trillion tax cut, in the establishment of a White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives to facilitate the use of federal funds, in privatisation of part of the 
Social Security system and in his education agenda (Pfiffner, 2004: 4). In this way, Bush 
contradicted the promises of his pre-election campaign by rejecting the idea of additional 
money for the Pentagon and decided to proceed with the Clinton administration's 
proposal for a budget of $310 billion for 2002 (Daalder and Clarke, 2003: 63). Bush's 
failure to increase defence spending provoked disappointment within neoconservative 
circles. This sentiment was mainly expressed in the pages of the Weekly Standard 
(Halper and Clarke, 2004: 129). 
In foreign policy George W. Bush adopted a unilateralist stance in his first eight months 
in office. As James Mann notes, however, this policy was not an innovation of George 
W. Bush but had begun in the 1990's (Mann, 2004: 287). For instance, the Clinton 
Administration had refused to sign the international treaty banning the use of land mines. 
What Bush Junior did was to strengthen unilateral policy by taking more drastic steps in 
this direction. His administration refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol which proposed a 
large cut in greenhouse gases. It also opposed a string of other international agreements 
such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a 
pact to control trafficking in small arms and a new protocol to the Biological Weapons 
Convention (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 65). Furthermore, the Bush administration was 
preparing to withdraw from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Misssile) Treaty; it finally did after 
the terrorist attacks, in December 2001. The unilateralist approach of the Bush 
administration had become evident not only through the abrogation of international 
treaties but also through his policy of disengagement from significant international issues 
which contradicted the more active involvement of Bill Clinton. His 'hands-off 
approach' regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and his policy of non-discussions with 
North Korea constitute examples (Gordon, 2003: 157). 
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The neoconservatives approved the unilateral policy of George W. Bush. However, the 
moderation of Col in Powell and his State Department tempered maybe a more hard-line 
approach. In the first eight months of the administration, the neoconservatives expressed 
their strongest displeasure over US relations with China (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 130). 
After the collision of American and Chinese planes, which caused the death of the latter's 
pilot and the detention of the US crew by Beijing, neoconservatives were outraged that 
Bush had authorised a letter of regret to encourage the release of the prisoners. They saw 
this apology as 'a national humiliation' (Kagan and Kristol, 2001). 
After the Terrorist Attacks 
On 11 September 2001 an unprecedented event took place. Four US planes were 
hijacked by terrorists and crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field 
in Pennsylvania killing more than 3000 people in a matter of hours. The event was a 
national tragedy for the USA. It also marked a turning point and encouraged much 
debate over demanding a new vision for the future (Kissinger, 2002: 289). The 
overwhelming majority of the American people obviously wanted, those responsible for 
the atrocities to be brought to justice. The fight against terrorism became the highest 
priority for US foreign policy. In his speech to the American public on 9111, President 
Bush signalled the way the US would react when he said: 'We will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them' (Bush's 
speech, 11109/01). 
The beginning of the new post 9/11 era was marked by several developments. For 
example, the Patriot Act entitled authorities to ignore the private rights of the American 
people in their attempt to collect information about terrorists. The desire of Washington 
to use its military capability was highlighted with the war against Afghanistan. The 
invocation of article 5 of NATO and the cooperation of many countries, such as France 
and Germany, meant American unilateralism did not come to the forefront. The initial 
success of the war against Afghanistan boosted Washington's confidence. The next step 
would see a shift from a strategy of self-defence, as happened with Afghanistan, to a pre-
emptive one. 
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Bush's State of Union address on 29 January 2002 was a crucial point. With his speech 
on that day, the President placed Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an 'axis of evil' countries 
which sought to produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (Bush's speech, 
29/01/02). According to Bush, the US had to act in order to prevent this development. 
The new US strategy was officially laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 
September 2002. In the document a particular passage linked US foreign policy to the 
necessity of preemption: 
We will build defences against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will 
cooperate with other nations to deny, contain and curtail our enemies efforts to acquire 
dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will 
act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America 
and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, 
using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation' 
(NSS, 2002). 
The US subsequently undertook a military operation against Iraq in order for the regime 
of Sad dam Hussein's to be toppled. Washington's decision was made irrespective of the 
UN and international law. The war on Iraq mirrors the desire and the core philosophy of 
the neoconservatives but can be arguably attributed to their supposed crucial role. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks international relations literature flourished with debates 
regarding the potential impact of the group on the US administration which remains a 
highly controversial issue. As it will be shown, two contradictory theories developed. 
There are scholars who concentrate on the significant influence of the neoconservatives 
on Washington's decision to start a war against Iraq. This point of view is propagated by 
Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke (2004). Other scholars who adopt this position are 
for instance Alex Callinicos (2003: 47), Layne Christopher (2007: 85), Robert Merry 
(2005: 156) and Dimitris Kairidis (2008: 77). For example, Alex Callinicos referring to 
the neocons talks about 'a right-wing camarilla at the heart of the Bush administration' 
(Callinicos, 2003: 47, 48). Furthermore, critics of neoconservatism such as Patrick 
Buchanan (2004) and Michael Lind (2003) also concentrate on this point of view. It is 
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striking what another critic of neoconservatism, fonner counsel to President Bill Clinton 
Sidney Blumenthal writes in his account: 'Foreign policy was captured by 
neoconservative ideologues, a small group of sectarian rooted in the hothouse 
environment of the capital's right-wing think tanks (Blumenthal, 2006: 8). 
Other academics, on the contrary, disagree with the idea that the role of the 
neoconservatives was of great significance. Steven Hurst, for instance, argues that it was 
the nationalist conservative doctrine which continued to be the basic approach of US 
foreign policy after the terrorist attacks (Hurst, 2005). For their part, Ivo Daalder and 
James Lindsay consider the supposed impact of the neoconservatives on US foreign 
policy as exaggerated (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). George Lieber adopts a similar 
position and equates with a conspiracy theory the view that the group controlled the Bush 
administration (Lieber, 2005: 184-192). Neoconservatives themselves also contest the 
idea that they played a critical role in gaining the upper hand in the White House (Boot, 
2004). Furthermore, there are scholars and politicians who analyse US foreign policy 
after 11 September without referring to neoconservatism. In their accounts Madeleine 
Albright (2006) and Al Gore (2007) do not mention the tenn, maybe connoting that the 
neoconservatives themselves - as a particular foreign policy group - do not deserve 
particular attention. The position of No am Chomsky, who - as the previous chapter noted 
- is unsure about the meaning of the political ideology, constitutes an additional example. 
The following analysis will attempt to show why the view that the neoconservatives 
largely influenced US foreign policy after 9/11 can be challenged. 
Distributing the Responsibility 
The insistence on the neoconservative cause downgrades the role of other US politicians -
many of them higher ranked than the neoconservatives - who also supported the Iraq war 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September. As Al Gore puts its: 'We are all 
responsible for the decisions our country makes. We have a Congress. We have an 
independent judiciary. We have checks and balances. We are a nation oflaws. We have 
free speech. We have free press. Have they all failed us?' (Gore, 2007: 2). 
Various politicians without the label 'neoconservative' publicly endorsed the idea of 
the Iraq war. On 2 October 2002, for example, American Congress authorised President 
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persuade the leaders of other countries of the world for the necessity of a US-led war 
against Iraq. 
The role of another non-neoconservative but realist politician, Condoleezza Rice should 
be taken into account. Before becoming US Secretary of State in 2005 Rice had worked 
as Bush's National Security Adviser. Although she had not favoured a military operation 
against Iraq before 11 September, she became a fervent supporter of in the context of the 
US war on terror. Madeleine Albright, for instance, notes that former National Security 
Adviser 'had conjured up the image of a mushroom cloud, as a warning that a failure on 
our part to attack might lead to nuclear annihilation' (Albright, 2006: 252). In her 
attempt to explain the necessity of the war Rice published an article in New York Times in 
January 2003 entitled as 'Why We Know Iraq is Lying'. In this article she concluded: 
'Iraq is proving not that it is nation bent on disarmament but that it is a nation with 
something to hide' (Rice, 2003). 
Powell and Rice publicly supported the war against Iraq after 9/11. Other important 
figures of Bush's administration, however, had endorsed such as an idea before the 
atrocities. These are Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld who can be considered as nationalist politicians. We know from Paul O'Neill, 
the Treasury Secretary from 2001 until 2003 that Cheney allegedly started to plan the war 
only one month after Bush Junior came to power, in February 2001 (Suskind, 2004: 96). 
As for Rumsfeld he had explicitly expressed his desire from 1998. It was mentioned 
before that former US Secretary of Defence had signed a letter of the PNAC in this year 
stressing the need for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Richard Clarke, who 
was special advisor to President Bush for Cyberspace Security from 2001 to 2003, also 
argues that Rumsfeld and Cheney focused on Iraq before the terrorist attacks of 11 
September (Clarke, 2004: 228, 229, 237). 
The position of Rumsfe1d and Cheney was strengthened in the aftennath of9!11. They 
believed that military force was the only option for the US (Von Hernlann, 2006: 22). 
The 9/11 Commission Report provides valuable information concerning the stance of 
fonner US Secretary of Defence. According to the report, on the aftemoon of 11 
September Rumsfeld told General Myers that he was not 'simply interested in striking 
empty training sites' and said that 'his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same 
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George W. Bush to use force in the case of Iraq in order 'to defend the national security 
of the US against the continuing threat posed' by this country (White House web site, 
02/10/02). This authorisation was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 
296-133 and in the Senate by a vote of 77-23 (CNN web site, 11/10/02). It is thus evident 
that numerous US politicians, among them Democrats, had expressed their agreement. 
A characteristic example of Democrats favouring the Iraq war is presidential candidate 
in the 2004 elections John Kerry. Despite his criticism for Bush's strategy in 2004, Kerry 
had supported military action in the crucial vote of October 2002 (CNN web site, 
10/08/04). He is certainly not a neoconservative. The speech of Howard Belman in the 
Congress debate is also indicative of the stance of some Democrats.14 He - inter alia -said: 
'Mr. Speaker, I was a fervent opponent of the Vietnam war and a strong supporter of sensible 
detente with the Soviet Union. But under today's circumstances, the best way to give peace a 
chance and to save the most lives, American and Iraqi. is for America to stand united and for 
Congress to authorize the President to use force if Saddam does not give up his weapons of 
mass destruction'. 
(See Bennan's speech in Sifry and Cerf, 2003: 360) 
The analysis of US foreign policy before the Iraq war, however, should mainly focus on 
the stance of members of the Bush administration. Starting with realist politicians first 
the attention is tumed towards Col in Powell. FOlmer US Secretary of State spoke to the 
UN General Assembly on 5 February 2003 and explained the reasons this war would be 
necessary. Powell - inter alia - said: 'My second purpose today is to provide you with 
additional information, to share with you what the US knows about Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism' (Powell's address, 05/02/03). 
Not only did he argue that Iraq had possessed weapons of mass destruction but he also 
focused on the connection between this country and al-Qaeda. Former US Secretary of 
State regretted for his speech a posteriori by calling it a 'blot' on his record (ABC website, 
09/09/05). At a critical juncture, however, Colin Powell generally perceived to be a 
moderate politician was not reserved. On the contrary, he attempted with his speech to 
l~ Congressman Howard Bernlan represented the 28th District of California. He was elected for the first 
time to Congress in 1982. 
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time - not only Bin Laden (The 9111 Commission Report, 2004: 334. 335). For his part, 
Dick Cheney openly suppOlted the idea of a military operation against Baghdad in 
August 2002. In this month, he asserted that there was no doubt that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction (Ricks, 2006: 49). 
Tenet's 'Slam Dunk' 
The responsibility of the CIA and its former non-neoconservative Director George Tenet 
also was high concerning the Iraq war. Bob Woodward notes that Tenet's phrase 'slam 
dunk' in a meeting he had with George W. Bush on 21 December 2002 was crucial for 
US President's decision to launch the war (Woodward, 2006: 303, 304). Tenet used this 
phrase when Bush asked him if the CIA could provide better information about the 
possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein in order for the American 
people to be convinced for the necessity of the war. Tenet then argued that strengthening 
the public presentation was a 'slam dunk'. 
Former Director of the CIA did not put into question that he had said the phrase in his 
memoir (Tenet, 2007: 359-367). Although he argues that it was misused, he still believes 
that many people consider it as a crucial moment which shaped the view of US President 
(Ibid: 359). In order to downplay the impact of his phrase Tenet also writes that the 
decision for the war had been made many months before the meeting of 21 December 
2002. He recalls that on 12 September 2001 he met Richard Perle, 'one of the 
godfathers of the neoconservative movement' who told him: 'Iraq has to pay a price for 
what happened yesterday. They bear responsibility' (2007: ix). For their part, the 
neoconservatives deny that meeting took place. William Kristol underlined that Perle 
had been in France on 12 September and went back to the US a few days later (Kristol, 
29/04/07). Who says the truth remains unknown. In any case Tenet was certainly not 
detached from the US administration's decision to attack Iraq. 
George Tenet's role in the US preparation for the military operation against Baghdad, 
however, is not only related to the supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction 
by Saddam. Fonner CIA Director also suggested that Iraq had links with al-Qaeda. He 
sent, for example, a letter to Senator Bob Graham on 7 October 2002 after the latter 
requested that Tenet declassified the agency's judgements in the likelihood ofIraq using 
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that kind of weapons against the US. In this letter. Tenet wrote that the understanding of 
the CIA for the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was based on 'sources of varying 
credibility. And he argued: 'We have solid repOlting of senior level contacts between 
Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade' (See this letter in Sifry and Cerf. 2003: 369). 
Bush as a Puppet? 
After discussing the role of the US Congress and individuals such as Colin Powell, 
Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and George Tenet, an analysis of US 
foreign policy in the period before the invasion of Baghdad cannot but focus on the 
stance of George W. Bush. The illustration of the neoconservatives as responsible for the 
Iraq war leaves an important question unanswered: Was US President a puppet in 
Washington's decision-making process? If American foreign policy was significantly 
shaped by the neoconservatives after 9/11, Bush Junior could perhaps give the impression 
of an irresolute president. The underestimation of the role of the US President contradicts 
the position of scholars such as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay who argue that he is a 
strong and decisive leader. Daalder and Lindsay explain that Bush learned a lot about 
world affairs during his pre-election campaign and the first eight months of his 
administration. They subsequently dismiss the claim that the neoconservatives had 
captured his heart and mind (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). In parallel with them, in his 
book Fiasco, The Washington Post's military correspondent Thomas Ricks analyses the 
Iraq war and observes that 'blame must lie foremost with President Bush himself (Ricks. 
2006: 4). 
George W. Bush can be hardly considered as a marionette in Washington's decision-
making process. According to Richard Clarke, Bush started to become interested in 
investigating a potential relationship between the terrorist attacks and Saddam Hussein 
from the evening of 12 September 2001. On that day, US President told Clarke: 'See if 
Saddam did this' (Clarke, 2004: 32). Bush himself believes the details of Clarke account 
were incolTect but acknowledges that he 'might well have spoken to Clarke at some point, 
asking him about Iraq' (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 334). We also know from 
Bob Woodward that although Iraq was not the immediate pliority for the US President, 
this country had been on his agenda. As Woodward writes, on 16 September 2001 Bush 
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told Rice that the first target of the war on tenor was Afghanistan and added: 'We won't 
do Iraq now, we are putting Iraq off. But eventually we'll have to retum to that question 
(Woodward, 2004b: 26). 
A Lesson from History 
The support of the neoconservatives for the Iraq war does not entail that they were 
responsible for this military operation or that they led the Bush administration to it. Their 
influence on Amelican foreign policy after 9111 can be disputed because many other 
politicians and figures in the US - often higher ranked - endorsed the idea of Saddam's 
removal from power. Further to this, the conduct of US foreign policy in the afteln1ath of 
11 September arguably shows signs of a significant change and one based on the alleged 
neoconservative influence. Historical literature generally assumes that war and the great 
power system go hand in hand (Kennedy, 1987: 537). The favoured by the 
neoconservative group war on Iraq where a powerful country - the US - attacked a 
weaker one because the latter failed to comply with the demands of the former - in this 
case to disarm - can be hardly considered as a new foreign policy model in international 
relations and one invented by the neoconservative group. It can be traced back to the 
classic work of Thucydides. The neoconservatives do not hesitate to argue that they 
admire this historian. Irving Kristol, for example, notes that the favourite neoconservative 
text in foreign affairs is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war (Kristol, 2004: 36). 
Thucydides' history, which describes the war between Athens and Sparta from 431 
until 404 BC, constitutes maybe an archetype for power politics. It shows that states -
then cities-states or 'poleis' - act to enhance their own power (Glennon, 2003: 32). 
Scholar David Boucher explains that 'in the Athenian justification of imperialism, and 
the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides articulates the Athenian belief that the international 
sphere is devoid of the notions of justice and injustice'. In his view 'there is no national 
order in the relations between states and the order which exists is created and sustained 
by the powerful' (Boucher, 1998: 153). In particular, Athens attacked then the island of 
Melos after the leaders of the latter had refused to satisfy its demand and surrender. The 
following excerpt of the Melian Dialogue can perhaps mirror the foreign policy 
philosophy of great powers from the 5th century BC onwards and is relevant to the US 
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stance concerning the Iraq war in 2003. The Athenians encouraged the Melians to 
surrender by arguing: 
'For of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature 
wherever they have power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted 
this law nor when it was enacted were the first to use it, but found it in existence and expect 
to leave it in existence for all time, so we make use of it, well aware that both of you and 
others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing' 
(Thucydides, 1966, Book V. CIl-CV: 166-169). 
In parallel with Thucydides, the 16th century diplomat and theorist Niccolo Machiavelli 
argues in The Prince that power and security are paramount concerns: 
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite are good laws and good 
arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that 
where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion 
and shall speak of the arms' 
(Machiavelli, 1948, Chapter 12: 93). 
Thomas Hobbes also observes in Leviathan originally published in 1651 that the natural 
condition of man is a state of war (Donnely, 2000: 14). Hobbes illustrates this state of 
war by arguing: 'The Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no 
place. Where there is no Common Power there in no Law' (Hobbes, 1996, Chapter XIII: 
90). 
Preemption and Interventionism 
The doctrine of preemption often perceived as a revolutionary principle of the 
neoconservative philosophy, can be also questionably seen as a new element in US 
history. John Lewis Gaddis argues that this policy was followed by the US at the 
beginning of the 19th century (Gaddis, 2004: 12, 13). According to the distinguished 
historian the British attack and burning of Washington in August 1814 led John Quincy 
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Adams - first as Secretary of State and then as President of the US - to redefine his 
country's approach in world affairs (Gaddis, 2004: 12, 13). In order to ensure US 
security in the future he included components of preemption and unilateralism in it. It 
was on that basis that in 1818 General Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida, attacked 
Indian tribes and executed two Englishmen. John Quincy Adams told then the Spanish 
ambassador that the latter's country's failure to preserve order along the borderland led 
the US to act preemptively (Lefflyn, 2004: 23). 
Further to this, US President Theodore Roosevelt championed a policy of preemption 
with his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the early 20th century.15 Theodore Roosevelt 
stressed the need for his country to intervene in the Western Hemisphere under certain 
circumstances. He said in 1904: 
'If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it 
keeps order and pays its obligations, then it needs fear no interference from the US. Brutal 
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilizing 
society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western 
Hemisphere the US cannot ignore this duty' 
(Harbaugh, 1975: 190). 
For his part scholar Melvyn Leffler argues that US President Franklin Roosevelt had not 
eschewed the preventive use of force (Leffler, 2004: 23). 16 According to Leffler when 
Nazi submarines attacked the US destroyer Greer in September 1941 Franklin Roosevelt 
declared: 'this is the time for prevention of an attack'. US President explained then his 
thinking by arguing: 'when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he 
has struck before you crush him' (Ibid: 23). Condoleezza Rice also placed US preemptive 
foreign policy in a historical perspective while giving a speech in October 2002. US 
Secretary of State maintained that the US endorsed this policy in the second half of the 
20th century for security reasons. Rice argued: 'Preemption is not a new concept. There 
IS In December 1823 US President lames Monroe warned the Europeans not to interfere in the affairs ofthe 
Western Hemisphere. 
16 Scholars such as Lawrence Friedman argues that the term prevention better defines what is referred to as 
preemption (Friedman, 2004: 38) 
47 
has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it 
can address existential threats [ ... ] The US has long affirmed the right to anticipatory 
self-defense -from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula 
in 1994' (Rice, 01/10/02). 
Moreover, the roots of US interventionism in the international arena can be found in the 
early history of the country and not in the statement of the Project for the New American 
Century in 1998. Scholar Michael Cox argues that 'empire is not really new at all in US 
grand narratives' (Cox, 2004: 26). He explains that this concept was first employed by 
the US Founding Fathers 'to describe a political mission linked to a geographical 
aspiration in which liberty and continental expansion were intimately connected' (lbid: 
27). A potential influence of American exceptionalism can be also acknowledged in this 
political mission. This is the prevailing assumption among political scientists and 
historians of the US that the political system of the country and its people's values and 
beliefs are distinctive (Gonzalez and King, 2003: 34). Even as colonists the Americans 
believed that they were distinctive and that they could maybe produce an exceptional 
society by diffusing political power (Hoogenboom, 2006: 48). 
In the 19th century the US acquired or seized land in order to ensure its vitality. After it 
completed this mission, however, the country required a vision for the future. University 
of Wisconsin professor Frederick lackson Turner argued in 1896 that with the 
disappearance of one frontier 'it was now more important than ever to engage in a 
vigorous foreign policy that would extend Americas' influence to outlying islands and 
adjoining countries' (Cox, 2003: 24). The Spanish-American war of 1898 was a crucial 
point for US intervention in world affairs (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 5). Spain was 
then expelled from Cuba and the US showed that its national interest had transcended its 
borderline. As for the 20th century it was of course marked by the US involvement in 
World War I and 11. The sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania in 1915 and the attack at 
Pearl-Harbor in 1941 led the US to military intervene. In the Cold War era the US also 
played a significant role on the world stage. Its objective was Soviet Union's 
containment for almost half a century. Between 1989 and the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 Washington intervened again in various regional conflicts, as for 
example in Kosovo in 1999. 
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In this context, US foreign policy is maybe oversimplified if the supposed influence of 
the neoconservatives is overstated. The impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
should not be underestimated in the US administration's decision to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. Washington acted preemptively and used military force against 
Iraq in order to fight against terrorism and arguably because a few neoconservative 
politicians and intellectuals managed to promote their own foreign policy ideas. Its goal -
at least according to the administration of George W. Bush - was to eliminate weapons of 
mass destruction in order to prevent an attack on its soil and possibly to spread 
democracy in the Islamic world and the Middle East region. 
The Oil Factor 
It was not only the US need to fight against telTOlism and its willingness to bring the 
responsibles for the tenorist attacks to justice, which led Washington to invade Iraq. 
Additional factors should be taken into account. These factors also downgrade the 
argument that the group of the neoconservatives was alone responsible for the military 
operation against Baghdad advocating for revolutionary foreign policy ideas and 
persuading the Bush administration for their implementation. It can, for example, be 
argued that the war was about control of oil. This does not mean that the 
neoconservatives were not interested in this parameter. It can hardly be claimed, however, 
that the control of oil was a revolutionary issue in foreign policy or that the 
neoconservatives were the only ones in Washington group which paid attention to its 
importance for energy security reasons. 
We know that the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) set up by 
George W. Bush in 2001 and chaired by Dick Cheney discussed Iraq"s oil (Downey, 
2008: 17; Klare, 14/0812008). In parallel with this, Jim Holt reveals that under the draft 
Iraq oil law Wlitten by the US 'the Iraq National Oil Company would retain control of 17 
of Iraq's 80 existing oilfields' while it would leave the rest and any new fields to be 
discovered under foreign corporate control for 30 years (Ho It, 2008). Ron Suskind also 
focuses on oil as a crucial parameter of the invasion of Baghdad. Writing that Rumsfeld, 
Cheney and Wolfowitz were planning a war against Iraq from January 2001, he explains 
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that various documents were then prepared in order to map oil fields of the targeted 
country: In particular. Suskind asserted: 
'One document, headed Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts, lists companies from thirty 
countries - including France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom - their special ties, 
bidding histories, and in some cases their particular areas of interest. An attached document 
maps Iraq with markings for supergiant oilfield, other oilfield and earmarked for production 
sharing, while demarking the largely undeveloped southwest of the country into nine blocks to 
designate areas for future exploration'. 
(Suskind, 2004: 96). 
For his patt, Stephen Gowans attempts to demonstrate the preeminent importance of oil 
by concentrating on the social conditions in Baghdad after the invasion. He says that 
when chaos broke out in Baghdad US forces let gangs of looters and arsonists run riots 
through all the Ministers except for that of Oil, where archives and files concerning the 
Iraqi oiltields were mainly stored (quoted in Griffin, 2004: 94). 
Alan Greenspan, who was Federal Reserve Chainnan at the time Washington decided 
to invade Baghdad. also considered the oil factor as a significant reason for the Iraq war. 
Greenspan published a book in 2007 in which he explained that the removal of Saddam 
Hussein had been 'essential' to secure world oil supplies (Greenspan: 2007:531). In an 
interview he gave he tried to clarify this by saying that while securing global oil supplies 
was 'not the administration motive', he had presented the White House with the case for 
why the removal of Saddam Hussein was significant for the global economy (Woodward, 
17109/2007: A03). 
The impoltimce of oil for the US is not only related to economic profit but also 
geopolitics. For the American government, the exeltion of greater influence over the 
Persian Gulf might further strengthen its incomparable international power. Paul Rogers 
observes that the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf were of utmost importance because 
demand fi'om China and India continued to grow (Rogers. 2004). The US was largely 
concemed over the country's growing dependence on imported oil and especially from 
Saudi Arabia. Michal KJare also observed that the country relied in 2003 on imported oil 
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for 551% while this percentage was expected to rise to 65% in 2020. (Klare, 2003). And 
he continued: 'This dependency is the Achilees heel for American power. Unless Persian 
Gulf can be kept under American control, our ability to remain the dominant world power 
would be put into question' (Ibid). 
Beyond Iraq 
The analysis has demonstrated that the view which supports the idea of a large impact of 
neoconservatism on Washington's decision to invade Baghdad can be contested. What 
can thus be said is that this decision can arguably be attributed to the neoconservatives or 
at least only to the group. US foreign policy atter 9/11, however, is not only related to 
the Iraq war in spite of its increased significance. On the contrary, it is linked to a vatiety 
of issues, countries and regions. Therefore, an attempt to assess the impact of 
neoconservatism on US foreign policy should not only focus on the Iraq war. Bush's 
policy concerning other fronts of the 'Axis of Evil', for example questionably reflected 
the neoconservative philosophy. US President did not seek to promote regime-change 
policy in the case of Iran. The neoconservatives were in favour of such a policy in 
respect of Tehran (Boot, 2004). At the same time, Bush did not push for a regime change 
in North Korea. For example, in January 2003 George W. Bush emphasised that the US 
would not invade this state (Haley, 2006: 161). 
Foreign policy towards Russia and China continued to be based on the principle of 
realism as it was happening from 1 January until 10 September 2001. In terms of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict George W. Bush started gradually to endorse the idea of the creation 
of a Palestinian state attempting to put pressure on the Arabs to stop the use of violence 
(Gordon, 2003: 160). Subsequently, the US President started to push the Road Map for 
peace in the Middle East, cooperating with the European Union, Russia and the UN. In 
this case, as Max Boot saw it most neoconservatives could not be satisfied because they 
thought that such a plan would lead nowhere (Boot, 2004). In Foreign Affairs Col in 
Powell also outlined other aspects of US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September 
which were not on the agenda of the neoconservative group. He elaborated on the US 
intention to work on the basis of its alliances in the world. For example, it attempted to 
end strife in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo working as a partner (Powell, 
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2004: 27). It also sought to deal with new challenges, global in scope, such HIV/AIDS 
and the poverty of Africa (2004: 26). 
Crisis in the Group 
The beginning of the war on Iraq in March 2003 demonstrated the success of the US 
military. Its forces marched easily into Baghdad without facing serious difficulties. But 
could the military victory of the US be translated into a political one? In the aftermath of 
'Operation Iraqi Freedom' developments were not satisfactory. The guerrilla war, the 
continuing bloodshed, the increase of innocent victims and the possibility of a civil war 
were reminiscent of Vietnam. Noting the growing instability of Iraq, many 
neoconservatives, who had supported the war, could not but feel embarrassed. Leading 
American neoconservative, scholar Francis Fukuyama, decided to disassociate himself 
from the group. In his opinion, the ideology had evolved into something he could no 
longer support. As he explains, the reason was that the principles of neoconservatism in 
the post-Cold War era 'overemphasised the use of force and led logically to the Iraq war' 
(2006: ix). The disassociation of Francis Fukuyama from neoconservatism marked a 
crisis for the movement. 
Some neoconservative intellectuals, notably William Kristol, attacked Francis 
Fukuyama for his change of mind over Iraq. Kristol wrote The Weekly Standard that: 
'It would be nice to believe as Fukuyama does, that a long-term process of social evolution is 
under way that will inevitably produce liberal democracy [ ... ] Indeed, it would be nice if we 
lived in a world in which we didn't have to take the enemies of liberal democracy seriously [ ... ] 
It would be nice to wait until we were certain conditions were ripe before we had to act [ ... ] 
Unfortunately, that is not the world that we live in' 
(Kristol, 2006). 
There are also other examples of the crisis in the group of the neoconservatives. Several 
politicians resigned office. Douglas Feith stepped down from the Pentagon in January 
2005 for 'personal and family reasons' (BBC website, 27/01105). Lewis Scooter Libby 
was indicted on obstruction of justice and left the administration in October 2005. John 
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Bolton temporarily appointed as UN ambassador in Bush's second term, quitted his job in 
December 2006. He was unable to win Senate confirmation after Democrats gained 
control in the Congress in the mid-term elections of 2006. Finally, Paul Wolfowitz, who 
became chief of the World Bank after the US President was reelected, resigned in May 
2007. He was accused of a pay rise he arranged for his girlfriend who was an employee 
of the Bank. I? 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the supposed influence of the neoconservative group on George W. 
Bush from the period of his preelection campaign until the war on Iraq. Some 
neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle had tutored him before he 
became president. The beginning of his administration also saw some of them have 
positions in it. Nevertheless, they did not greatly influence Bush's his foreign policy 
approach before 11 September. His foreign policy before the attacks shows rather a 
realist approach. US President himself praised the virtue of realism in international 
politics giving a speech in 1999. Neither Iraq nor teITorism were issues of increased 
importance in the presidential campaif,l"n and during the first eight months George W. 
Bush was in power before II September 200 l. 
The terrorist atrocities of 9/11 meant the neoconservative agenda came to the forefront. 
The impact of the group on the US administration started gradually to become a 
debatable issue. The analysis shows, however, that the influence of the group cannot be 
assumed because of the military operations against Afghanistan and especially Iraq in 
March 2003. It was mentioned that neoconservative politicians had not been appointed in 
the top tier of the administration and subsequently their portrayal as a driving force 
behind the decisions of the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon was 
considered as underestimating the role of other figures who had been higher ranked. For 
example, former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld was regarded as favouring the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime from 1998. In parallel with him, politicians who 
had not advocated for a war against Iraq before the terrorist attacks, such as Condoleezza 
17 Richard Perle resigned a few days after the Iraq invasion in March 2003. 
53 
Rice strongly supported it in their aftermath. US President GeOl'ge W. Bush also put Iraq 
on his agenda only a few days after the telTorist attacks according to the 9/11 
Commission Rep0l1 and the account of Richard Clarke, It was therefore argued that an 
analysis of American foreign policy after 11 September 2001 might not necessarily have 
had the neoconservatives as its starting or fundamental point. 
Moreover. the 'revolutionary' character of US foreign policy after 11 September was 
contested, It was shown that the concept ofpreemption and interventionism were not new 
in the literature of intemational relations as well as in American histOlY and were not 
invented by the neoconservatives. It was also argued that Washington's decision to 
invade Iraq could arguably be attlibuted to role of the group because other factors - e.g. 
the need to fight against terror and the oil - were of increased significance for the Bush 
administration going beyond the interests of a few politicians and intellectuals. Finally, 
the chapter explained that although US foreign policy after, 11 September had been 
prioritised by the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, its analysis should include 
additional aspects where 110 neoconservative influence can be observed. 
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Chapter 4: The European and Media Dimensions 
Transatlantic relations are of utmost significance to the European Union. Shared 
historical experiences, commitment to democracy and the rule of law as well as common 
interests, for instance economic and political cooperation and cultural exchanges, can 
explain their importance (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 75). As President of the 
European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso puts it: 'this is the most important economic 
relation in the world' (EU website, 2007). The development of transatlantic relations 
certainly depends to a large extent on the evolution of US foreign policy. Given 
neoconservatism is intervowen into US foreign policy, this ideology cannot but be of 
interest to the EU. Washington's world affairs approach after 11 September, however, 
and especially, the war on Iraq, influenced negatively the transatlantic partnership. 
This chapter will discuss EU-US relations in a historical perspective focusing on their 
crisis in 2003. Although the governments of Britain, France, Germany and Italy were 
divided as to their foreign policies regarding the Iraq war, public opinion in the 'Big 
Four' of the EU was not fragmented. In other words, in spite of the failure of the political 
elites of above-mentioned countries to agree on a foreign policy agenda, European civil 
society found common ground. In this context, the attention will be turned towards the 
European media. Their role as a potential explanation for the transatlantic clash and as a 
basis for the creation of a European public sphere will be outlined. The chapter will also 
concentrate on the media themselves exploring the theoretical role of journalists and 
ways this research project can be structured. A framework for the comparison of media 
from different European countries will be given while problematic issues of the thesis 
will be explored and specific choices which had to be made will be explained. 
Allies Driven Apart 
During the Cold War transatlantic relations were marked by the strategic partnership 
between Western Europe and the US. From 1945 until 1989, Western Europe was 
dependent on US assistance in order to thwart the expansion of communism. (Kissinger, 
2002: 36). In this regard, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was 
crucial. NATO provided the basis for co-operation between the US and countries of 
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Western Europe during the Cold War. Their common interests ensured the anti-Soviet 
orientation of NATO. However, US-European relations have not always been 
particularly warm since 1945. There were internal divisions in the NATO in spite of the 
onset of the Cold War. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argue that, from its foundation 
the consensus of NATO was often stretched to breaking point because of its approaches 
towards regions outside Europe, notably the Middle East (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 19). 
The Suez crisis episode of 1956 is the obvious example whereby Britain and France co-
operated with Israel and attacked Egypt without the support of the USA. France's 
withdrawal from NATO integrated command structure in 1966 is an example of 
transatlantic tensions during the Cold War (Lundestad, 2003: 129).18 
During the Cold War the EU, which was then called as European Economic 
Community (EEC), had lacked any mechanism to handle external relations until the 
1970s (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996: 103). The launch of the European Political Co-
operation in the 1973 was the first significant attempt of the EEC to speak with one voice 
in the international arena. The promotion of peace in the Middle East, was a particular 
goal of the EEC's foreign policy. For instance, an initiative of the EEC was the signing of 
the Venice Declaration in 1980, which called for self-determination for the Palestinians. 
However, it was not until the beginning of the 1990s when the EU made its most 
significant efforts to act united in foreign affairs as an international security actor. 
The end of the Cold War was a turning point. Since 1989 and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the role of NATO has changed because of the demise of the Soviet Union. The 
new mission of the Organisation would be to participate in regional conflicts. 
Theoretically, Europe was less dependent on the USA and thus different strategic 
objectives and policies came to the forefront. The establishment of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 outlined EU's ambition to 
follow its own foreign policy. The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 1995, which 
marked the first attempt of the EU and the US to identify an inventory of objectives for 
closer co-operation on political and economic issues, also illustrated the Union's desire to 
act as a global leader (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 79; Piening, 1997: 110). During the 
18 French President Nicolas Sarkozy decided in June 2008 that France would rejoin NATO (Lasserre, Le 
Figaro, 18/06/08, Politique, p. 3) 
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administration of Bill Clinton, the US did not look unfavourably on EU's commitment to 
develop a CFSP (Lundestad, 2003: 257). Nevertheless, the policy efforts under CFSP did 
not differ in practice dramatically from EPC policy-making (White, 2001: 99). The 
experience in Bosnia in the 1990s demonstrated that the EU could little without US input 
(Forster and Wallace, 2000: 473). Furthermore, the crisis of Kosovo in 1999 highlighted 
the disagreement of between Europe and the US over the role ofthe United Nations (UN). 
The European allies, led by France, had then prioritised the importance of the UN. 
Since the beginning of the first term of the George W. Bush EU-US relations have not 
been marked by a spirit of solidarity. The main reason was the disappointment and 
frustration created within the EU over Bush's unilateralism (Mawle, 2004: 1). The 
unilateral policy of US President differed from the more co-operative one of Bill Clinton, 
as it has already been discussed in the second chapter. The terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 gave a new dimension, albeit briefly, to EU-US relations. The headline 
of Le Monde declared: 'Nous sommes tous Americains / We are all Americans' two days 
after the terrorist atrocities and was characteristic of most European media coverage 
(Colombani, 13/09/01). The EU's support for the US appeared to pave the wave for 
closer transatlantic relations. Not only did the Union express its solidarity with the US 
but it also cooperated in the subsequent military campaign against Afghanistan. NATO 
invoked for the first time in its history its Article V mutual defence clause. However, the 
spirit of solidarity started to loosen from the beginning of 2002, when George W. Bush 
made his 'Axis of Evil' speech. It predisposed the world to what would follow with the 
implementation of his military doctrine. European concerns for stability and aversion to 
war led many member states to oppose the military operation against Iraq in 2003 
(Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 156). When Washington decided to embark on a strategy of 
pre-emption and attack without UN authorisation, EU countries such as Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece and Sweden expressed their vocal opposition (The Economist, 
22/02/03: 41). Transatlantic relations entered a period of crisis and high tension. 
The EU did not show signs of cohesion in its opposition to the US but remained divided. 
While the Franco-German position at the UN was based on more patience and insistence 
on giving the UN weapons inspectors more time, several European countries led by 
Britain, Italy and Spain were prepared to send troops to Iraq. EU's internal division was 
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highlighted on 30 January 2003 when Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain and 
three future member-states, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland expressed in a 
joint statement their solidarity to the US (BBC web site, 30101/03). As a result, Europe 
seemed to ,be consisted of two branches, a new and an old one as US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld implied when he talked about 'old Europe' (Mowle, 2004: 1). 
Countries, which were in favour of the Iraq war, might be considered as being part of 
new Europe while those, which were against, might be seen as being part of the old one. 
Although the EU did not forge a common position before the war on Iraq, public 
opinion in member states was not divided as to its anti-American stance. Anti-
Americanism did not first come to the forefront with this war but has deep historical roots. 
As editor of Germany's weekly magazine Die Zeit Josef Loffe puts it: 'it is as old as the 
American Republic itself (Joffe, 2007: 95). During the Twentieth Century, and 
especially since the end of the Second World War, this developed as a result of concerns 
over growing American power, contempt for US culture and enmity for its military might 
and presence (Hollander, 1992: 369). After the collapse of the Berlin Wall anti-
Americanism increased because it could no longer be balanced by anticommunism as it 
had happened in the Cold-War era. It reflected the perception that the US, as the only 
superpower, 'was responsible for virtually all the world's problems and evils' (Rubin and 
Rubin,2004: 153). 
Polls organised by the Pew Research Institute in Washington indicate that from 1999 to 
2003, the positive image of the US fell from a rating of 83% to 48% in Britain, from 
62% to 31% in France, from 78% to 25% in Germany and from 76% to 34% in Italy 
(Pew Research Institute web site, 18/03/03: 1). It is noteworthy that even in countries 
such as Britain and Italy, where governments supported the war on Iraq, the majority of 
their populations did not endorse their leaders' policies. 51 % of the British people 
opposed the war. Fewer than a quarter of Italians (17%) favoured their government 
joining the US in the military operation (lbid: 1-3). In early February 2003 European 
public opinion began to express itself. The weekend of 15 February, one day after 
weapons inspectors spoke to the UN, saw some of the largest public protests in decades 
with nearly one million people in London, one to two million in Rome, 300,000 to 500, 
000 in Berlin and some 100, 000 in Paris. 
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Mediating the Rift 
Scholars argue that the media have potentially played a significant role in the 
development of the transatlantic rift. Columnist of The New York Times Paul Krugman 
argues that reporting prior to the Iraq was responsible for the differing way Europeans 
and Americans saw the world. Subsequently, he explains the divide on the basis of a 
'pervasive anti-American bias' in the European media, (quoted in Lehmann, 2003: 63-64). 
Similarly, former editor of Financial Times Richard Lambert argues that the European 
media have demonstrated signs of anti-Americanism for years. He believes the coverage 
of the US reveals something about the status of the transatlantic partnership, noting that 
the media reflect and reinforce the views of their readers (Lambert, 2003: 62-63). F:urther 
to this, insights can be offered concerning the way Europeans understand the US in the 
light of the political ideology ofneoconservatism. 
The transatlantic divide cannot of course be only attributed to the role of the media. 
There are other factors, which should be taken into account, when considering the 
negative view of the US in Europe. In the case of Iraq, European opposition to US war 
plans can be explained by various political motivations. German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroder based his re-election campaign on his opposition to Washington's decision to 
lead a military operation against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Hitchcock, 2004: 469, 
470). Schroder managed to be re-elected against the more pro-American Stoiber. French 
President's Jacques Chirac opposition reflected the country's feeling and Charles de 
Gaulle's longstanding desire for a more powerful Europe, which could act as 
counterweight or counterbalance to the US (Nicolaidis, 2006: 92; Shawcross, 2004: 77). 
From an additional perspective, the negative perception of the US in Europe derives 
from their differing position over the necessity of a war. The thesis of the so-called 
neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan is instructive because he emphasises on the 
differing philosophies of the two sides. In particular, Kagan argues that 'Americans are 
from Mars and European from Venus' and writes that while the US believes that security 
depends on the use of military force, Europe stresses the importance of law and 
international cooperation on the basis of Immanuel Kant's notion of perpetual peace 
(Kagan, 2003: 3). It should be mentioned that the thesis of Kagan has received criticism. 
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Scholars who disagree with him write that since 1945 many Europeans have had 
American views and many Americans European ones (Ash, 2006: 73; Nye 2006: 79). 
Thomas Mowle elaborates on three approaches analysing the divergence between the 
EU and the US, namely the realist, the liberal institutional and the epistemic one. The 
first approach advances hypotheses that focus on power, and therefore, on the dominant 
position of the US in the world. The second one stresses the role of international 
institutions suggesting that European institutions might encourage the adoption of a 
common policy based on multilateralism as opposed to the preferences of the US. The 
third approach, which is the epistemic one, concentrates on hypotheses based on cultural 
differences between the EU and the US. These cultural differences might lead the EU and 
the US to interpret their similar interests in different ways (Mowle, 2004: 17-33). 
Constructing the Reality and Setting the Agenda 
Given this research project will deal with media coverage, it is certainly connected to 
news production. Events, facts and developments do not have voice to speak for 
themselves but are reported by journalists. Their interpretation and depiction of the world 
can either mirror reality or be the product of a process of news construction. In a wider 
context, this dilemma reflects a potential clash between two theories of knowledge: 
empiricism and constructivism. Empiricists focus on the importance of experience. They 
believe that a real world exists and consider the human mind as 'tabula rasa' on the basis 
of the observation of John Locke in the 17th century. According to empiricists, the 
content of the human mind can only by formed through the senses and by experience. In 
principle, they investigate the social world as the natural one (Deacon et aI, 1999: 4). As 
opposed to empiricists, constructivists believe in subjectivity and in an understanding of 
the world through a cognitive process emphasising the crucial role of human agency. 
What they argue is that knowledge is the product of humans who interpret the world. 
Without necessarily endorsing a postmodernist view that reality does not exist, this study 
is grounded on the notion of constructivism, and therefore, as we will see, on the 
construction of the news by the journalist (Tuchman, 1978). 
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Considering constructivism, Eric Louw makes reference to Plato's Republic and his 
description of prisoners in a cave (Louw, 2005: 1_9).19 Plato's allegory has a tangible 
contemporary resonance when the media are paralled to the cave scene. The messages 
the media transmit can be as problematic for audiences as the shadows were for the 
prisoners in the allegory of Plato. In other words, consumers might only consider as real 
the messages constructed by the journalists and transmitted by the media. The reference 
to Plato's allegory and the notion of constructivism raise questions concerning the quality 
of information provided to the audience by the media as well as the latter's objectivity. 
The notion of constructivism implies that the scope for objectivity in the media is limited. 
Furthermore, different aspects of the function of journalism have to be outlined and 
separated. These vary from deeming the media as a 'watchdog' to considering them as a 
servant of the interests of the dominant elites. 
The consideration of the media as a 'watchdog' in Western liberal democracies relates 
to the ideal norms of professional journalism (Curran, 2005: 122,123). Its theoretical 
freedom and independence paves the way for more objective coverage. The main 
features of the concept of objectivity refer to the detachment and neutrality of the 
journalists while reporting, the lack of partisanship and other motives and the attachment 
to accuracy (McQuail, 1994: 145). As James Curran argues: 'true professionals check the 
accuracy of what is reported and are painstakingly neutral in the way in which the 
balance contending opinion' (Curran, 2002: 127). Nevertheless, even if professional 
rules are followed journalists can hardly be regarded as objective in their work. The 
cannons of professionalism do not necessarily guarantee that the media reflect objective 
reality (Curran, 2002: 128). Journalists are confronted with a plethora of information, 
which they have to select the news from. This interpretation is essential for newspapers, 
radio and TV channels because of specific space or time budget. On these grounds, 
19 In his allegory of the cave Plato descnbed a scene with a group of chained prisoners, a fire burning 
behind them and a walkway between the fire and the prisoners carrying various objects the shadows of 
which were cast on the wall of the cave. The chained prisoners could only see the shadows of the various 
objects and hear their echoes believing they were real. A prisoner was then released but he continued to 
believe that the shadows of the various objects were more real than the objects themselves because his eyes 
were blinded first by the firelight and then by the sunlight. When this prisoner started finally to be 
enlightened and realised that the real objects were not the shadows, he decided to go back and liberate the 
other prisoners. Nonetheless, when he went back to the cave his eyes became blind by the darkness and he 
could see less than the other prisoners. The other prisoners decided then to stay there and kill anyone who 
would seek to bring them to the surface (plato, Politeia, vivlio XII) 
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journalists have to emphasise and deemphasise on particular stories (Galtung and Ruge, 
1999). This selection of news certainly limits the chances of an objective coverage. As 
Michael Schudson puts it: 'the notion of objectivity in journalism appears anomalous' 
(Schudson, 1999: 295). 
The selection of news is an inevitable parameter of the journalistic work. Scholars 
identify specific factors, which lead or contribute to their choice. News selection by 
journalists cannot be easily described as a random reaction to random events (Golding 
and Elliott, 1979). In particular, a large number of media firms are corporations aiming 
at increasing their profits. This makes the relationship between firms and advertisers 
crucial for the economic survival and expansion of the former. Moreover, although most 
of radio and TV channels and newspapers claim to be non-partisan, they rarely escape the 
perception of a conservative or liberal bias. Journalists should also be seen as employees 
of firms, which control their hiring, firing and the news management as a whole 
(Bagdikian, 1999: 151). Although they are expected to follow the professional norms of 
journalism and to be objective, reporters and editors can be under pressure to include 
specific news stories or to give a particular political nuance in their piece of work.2o 
Concerning neoconservatism this is unquestionably a political ideology of the right. 
Therefore, a positive coverage could be expected in right-wing media. Journalists 
working for conservative media might theoretically show partiality for neoconservatism 
in their reports. By contrast, journalists working for liberal media might be expected to be 
negative. For this reason, media which cover both perspectives, will be selected for 
analysis, as it will be shown. 
Media scholars have employed models of political economy explaining news 
production (Gandy, 1982). Peter Golding and Graham Murdock make a significant point: 
they acknowledge the structured relations between owners and journalists (Golding and 
Murdoch, 1991). Golding and Murdock considered the widespread interplay between 
economic organisations and cultural, political and social life. Other models of political 
communication also dismiss the idea of objectivity in the media by considering them as 
exclusive servants of the dominant elites. This discussion has been greatly influenced by 
20 Not all journalists believe they should be objective in their work but must in some manner confront the 
widespread belief that they have to be so (Schudson, 1999: 291) 
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the 'manufacturing consent' thesis (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). According to this 
argument, pro-government propaganda is produced by the media and the independent 
flow of information is impeded. With particular emphasis on media influence over 
foreign policy, the 'indexing approach' to political communication is relevant. Here, the 
media remain a vehicle of the government but in the case of elite disagreement they can 
take positions which might affect foreign policy (Bennett, 1990). 
James Curran enumerates eleven main factors which encourage the media to support 
dominant power interests. These are state censorship, high entry costs to establish new 
media enterprises in the mass market and media concentration as there has long been 
partnership arrangements between leading companies. Additional factors include 
corporate ownership, mass-market pressures and advertising influence. Furthermore, after 
major considerations included, rise of public relations, news routines and values, unequal 
resources in media organisations and dominant discourses complete the list of those 
factors. All have the ability to influence and shape media perceptions (Curran, 2002: 
148-151). Finally, what can be argued is that journalists 'participate willy-nilly in 
slanting the news' (Entman, 1989: 37). It is for this reason that the notion of 
constructivisPl is considered useful in relation to this project. 
The theory of constructivism and the limits of objectivity can contribute to an 
understanding of the role of the journalists. Taken this, it should be also explored how 
the media can theoretically influence public opinion. Realising that the presentation of 
issues by the media can play a role in forming public attitudes and taking relevant media 
studies literature and political communication research into account, the concept of 
'agenda-setting' is of increased significance for the implementation of this project. 
WaIter Lipmann was the first who - without using the term 'agenda-setting' - argued that 
the press could connect the events that occurred in the world and the image of those 
events in the public's mind (Lipmann, 1922). A few decades later, Bernard Cohen 
pointed out: '[The press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about' (Cohen, 
1963: 13). The term 'agenda-setting' was first used by Maxwell E. McCombs and 
Donald L. Shaw in an article they published in the 1970s. (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 
176, 187). McCombs and Shaw dealt with the presidential campaign of 1968 and 
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undertook research on a sample of 100 undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
hypothesising that the mass media had set the agenda for each political campaign. They 
found that the media influenced the public on what issues to think about regarding the 
political campaigns. Since then, experimental evidence demonstrates that when news 
concentrate more on a particular issue, it is more likely that people consider that issue as 
more important. (Iyengar et aI., 1982). 
The traditional or first level of 'agenda-setting' refers to the capability of the media to 
set the order of importance of particular issues, and thus, raise the significance of those 
issues in people's mind steering public opinion. As Maxwell McCombs puts it, 'agenda-
setting is a theory about the transfer of salience from the mass media's pictures of the 
world to the pictures in our heads' (McCombs, 2004: 68). In other words, on the basis of 
the 'agenda-setting' hypothesis, issues reported by the media become part of the public 
debate as opposed to issues not reported. However, the first level of 'agenda-setting' 
does not concentrate on nuances of media coverage. Although the notion of traditional 
'agenda-setting' can explain why an object becomes salient in comparison to other 
objects in people's mind, it does not focus on 'attributes, those characteristics and 
properties that fill Qut the picture of each object' (McCombs, 2004: 71). Therefore, a 
second level of 'agenda-setting' has been developed which deals with specific aspects of 
media content and aims at outlining how the news agendas of attributes influence the 
public agenda (McCombs, 2004: 71 and 85). 
The second level of 'agenda-setting' is relevant to the concept of 'framing'. 'Framing 
essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described' (Entman, 1993: 52). The theory of 
constructivism becomes tangible while discussing about 'framing'. Constructing the 
news entails the placement of reality by the media into frame. To put it in a simple way, 
what does not appear on a newspaper page is considered as being out of frame. 
Concluding, the first and second levels of 'agenda-setting' are significant for a 
theoretical understanding of the mediation of neoconservatism by the media. The first 
level of 'agenda-setting' can unquestionably highlight why neoconservatism might 
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become salient in public's mind. This point can contribute to a detection of the impact of 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the coverage of neoconservatism by the media. 
Was neoconservatism in the period before 11 September as important as in the aftermath 
of the terrorist atrocities? This is a significant research question which has to be 
investigated. 
The second level of 'agenda-setting' and the concept of 'framing' can outline how the 
media discussed and presented neoconservatism. In this way, the topic of 
neoconservatism will be divided into specific themes and issues the coverage of which 
will be analysed. For example, it will be indicated which aspect of US politics was more 
relevant to the neoconservative ideology: US society or US foreign policy? It will be 
also shown which figures, instruments and principles were considered as neoconservative. 
With regard to US foreign policy, it will be additionally explored which countries were 
on the neoconservative agenda. Moreover, taking into account that neoconservatism has 
since 11 September proved to be a debatable issue, particular interpretations and 
judgements of the media will be sketched out. As it will be explained in detail, these 
interpretations and judgements of the media will principally refer to the impact of the 
neoconservatives on US foreign policy and to the extent to which they have been 
influenced by the political philosopher Leo Strauss. 
Although the notion of 'agenda - setting' seems appropriate for the implementation of 
this research project, criticism about this model of political communication is certainly 
acknowledged. According to critics of 'agenda-setting' there is no sufficient evidence for 
a causal connection between the various issue agendas to be shown (McQuail, 1994: 356). 
Everett Rogers and lames Dearing reviewed 112 empirical studies of the agenda-setting 
process and found out that 60% of those studied had supported a media agenda-public 
agenda relationship (1996: 92). Denis McQuail and Sven Windahl put into question 
whether researchers should look for direct effects from the media and challenge the 
potential intention attributed to the media. They also write about different kind of 
agendas, which are involved as those of institutions, political parties and governments 
(Mc Quail and Windahl, 1993: 106, 107). Additionally, Rogers and Dearing focus on the 
need for three different agendas to be distinguished: the priorities of the media, those of 
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the public and those of policy and work on the interaction of those agendas (Rogers and 
Dearing, 1996: 5,6). 
The Audience 
Having already explored the notions of 'agenda-setting' and 'framing', what should be 
also investigated is the extent to which public opinion can be theoretically influenced by 
the media. This is related to the antibodies, if any, of the audience while receiving media 
information. The question which has to be posed is the following: Is the audience 
autonomous to escape from the influence of the media or is susceptible to media 
messages? In his work Democracy without Citizens, Robert Entman developed a critical 
approach, which challenged the audience autonomy assumption. Entman elaborated on a 
model of interaction between the media messages and how the audience perceives them 
(1989: 77). This model of interaction concerning the impact of the media on public 
opinion is regarded as useful for this thesis. 
Entman points out that the media contribute but do not control the structure of publicly 
available information that shapes the political thinking of people (1989: 84). In this way, 
Entman expressed his opposition to the audience autonomy assumption which minimises 
the potential influence of the media on public opinion. In so doing, he dealt with two 
particular variants of the audience autonomy assumption. First, he did not agree with the 
idea that the audience thinks about communications selectively rejecting information it 
does not like. And second, he dismissed the idea that the audience understands so little 
that it only keeps its exi,sting belief and cannot be seriously influenced by the media 
(Entman, 1989: 76-85). 
Entman explains his point that the media only contribute to but do not control people's 
political thinking by drawing on information-processing research. He argues that people 
filter the information they receive and can often respond positively to media messages. 
In particular, filtering the received information implies that 'people have cognitive 
structures, called schemas, which organise their thinking. A person's system of schemas 
stores substantive beliefs, attitudes values, and preferences along with rules for linking 
different ideas' (Entman, 1989: 77). Therefore, people process the news 'according to 
routines established in [their] schema system' and can either store the information 
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changing beliefs or discard it (Entman, 1989: 78). Entman's argument goes beyond the 
autonomy model in what it concentrates on an additional aspect of media power. This is 
the possibility of exclusion of inferences by the media. By excluding some information, 
the media coverage can prevent the audience of acquiring new beliefs and knowledge. In 
Entman's words 'while audiences can ignore any conclusion that bothers them and stick 
to their existing beliefs, it is harder for them to come up with a new interpretation on their 
own, one for which the media do not make relevant information readily available' 
(Entman, 1989: 85). 
Entman's points about people's schemas, which filter the news, and the exclusion of 
inferences, which might prevent the public of thinking something different and new, 
seem appropriate to be applied in a project dealing with the mediation of a complex and 
obscure concept, such as neoconservatism. The discussion about schemas does not entail 
that people without an adequate knowledge background might not be able to read articles 
about neoconservatism and come up with their own interpretation. However, people 
reading those articles might be regarded as being part of an elite public opinion able to 
cope with their content. This observation can be reinforced by the nature of the 
newspapers accessed - exclusively quality newspapers - as we will see. Furthermore, if 
the exclusion of inferences by the media could prevent people of thinking something new, 
different media interpretations of neoconservatism at various periods would possibly 
influence their understanding of US foreign policy. This point is linked to the function of 
the first level of 'agenda-setting' and can also contribute to an understanding of the 
impact of 11 September for the coverage. 
Alternatives to Entman's model obviously exist in the literature of media studies. For 
instance, 'limited-effects' and 'powerful-effects' models suggest that the media have 
small and significant effects on a large number of people respectively (Severin and 
Tankard, 2001: 263, 264). However, the model of Entman provides a midway solution 
dealing with audience behaviour. In other words, his model could be seen as a golden 
mean. He rejects the idea of a mass audience and at the same, without endorsing the 
autonomy model, he recognises the fact that media audiences consist of human beings 
who can filter messages within certain cultural frameworks (Ang, 1995: 209-214, 
emphasis added). 
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Research Design 
Taking the above-mentioned observations into account, a framework for the collection 
and the analysis of the data has to be developed for this project. The research design will 
have two aspects: it will be comparative as well as longitudinal. The comparative 
research format aims at bringing the coverage of neoconservatism by the British, French, 
German and Italian media together and subsequently highlight the contrast of this 
coverage. This will be synthesised around the nationality and ideology of the 
newspapers. Thus, commonalities and differences of the coverage of neoconservatism 
will be outlined. 
Furthermore, the collection of data from each country's media within a longitudinal 
design format allows some insight into the time order of variables (Bryman, 2004: 46). 
In other words, a longitudinal design will contribute to an analysis of the coverage of 
neoconservatism at different junctures. In this way, shifts in this coverage can be 
explored. The longitudinal design format within which the data will be collected 
certainly requires limits for the period of coverage to be placed. The years 1993 and 2005 
are considered as such. These limits mark the beginning of Bill Clinton's administration 
and the end of the first year of George W. Bush's second term as US President. The 
analysis will cover a significant part of the post-Cold War period, which includes not 
only the aftermath of 11 September but also the first eight months George W. Bush was 
in power before the terrorist attacks and the eight years of Clinton's administration. The· 
year 2005 signals the beginning of the collapse of neoconservatism as it was explained in 
the previous chapter. 
The choice of neoconservatism and the case of the US media 
A significant point to be explained refers to the choice of neoconservatism as the key 
term of this project. This political ideology was selected for analysis for two reasons. 
The first is that it can refine the broad scope of a thesis dealing with the coverage of US 
foreign policy. Neoconservatism can be certainly considered as one of its parameters, 
especially in the aftermath of 11 September. The second reason is that its impact on 
George W. Bush's world affairs approach was highly debatable. On that basis the 
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analysis of the coverage of the political ideology can possibly lead to interesting 
conclusions as to the position taken by the media accessed. This could hardly happen 
with other foreign policy ideologies such as nationalism or realism. Nationalism and 
realism did not dominate the literature of international relations after 9/11 spreading 
contradictory views. The analysis of the representation of the neoconservatives by the 
media provides finally a good opportunity to explore how they illustrated the 'other'. As 
Roger Silverstone puts it: 'All of what we do, all of who we are, as subjects and actors in 
the social world, depends on our relationships to others: how we see them, know them, 
relate to them, care for or ignore them' (Silverstone, 1999: 135). 
Taken neoconservatism is interwoven into US politics a dilemma was to either confine 
the research to the European media or include American ones as well. US media were 
finally not used although no translation would have been required. The project could 
thus focus only on European representations of neoconservatism. In other words, without 
accessing the US media the thesis would be exclusively European-oriented and 
conclusions could be possibly put in the framework of the creation of a European public 
sphere. Professor of political thought at the University of Pennsylvania Anne Norton 
supported this view. In her opinion, the thesis had to concentrate on the European 
. f . 21 respresentatIon 0 neoconservatIsm per se. 
A European Public Sphere? 
As this thesis will compare the media coverage of neoconservatism in different countries 
of the EU it can be linked to the debate concerning the existence of a European public 
sphere. As it will be explained the notion of the 'public sphere is a highly controversial 
one. There are scholars who accept the idea of its existence. For instance, Peter Dahlgren 
writes: 'it is meaningful to speak about a public sphere that does exist today, but by any 
standard of evaluation it is in a dismal state' (Dahlgren, 2001: 35). On the contrary, 
academics such as Nancy Fraser put its empirical status into question and recognise only 
a normative one (Fraser, 1992: 136). 
21 The conversation between the author and Professor Anne Norton took place on the occasion of 'The 
Legacy of Leo Strauss' conference which took place in Nottingham in March 2006. 
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The concept of the public sphere was pioneered by Jiirgen Habermas (1989). It refers to 
the scope of citizens' interaction and includes all locations where ideas relevant to 
politics can be expressed and debated. It implies the possibility for people to come 
together and freely and openly discuss issues of common interest and concern. It also 
envisages that all citizens have equal access to communication which is independent of 
government censorship and can simultaneously constrain the agendas of the state 
(Bennett and Entman, 2001: 3). Habermas explored the historical formulation of the 
public sphere and argued that it began to emerge within the bourgeois classes of Western 
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Key places for the exchange of ideas 
the coffee houses of London and the French salons. Clubs, coffee houses, salons, 
pamphlets and other traditional locations for the exchange of ideas started to cede their 
preeminent position to the rising media industry. Within this context, the role of 
mediated communication plays a crucial role in the contemporary public sphere (Bennett 
and Entman, 2001: 5). The media became principal institutions of the public sphere as 
they can theoretically distribute the information necessary for citizens to enable them to 
make an informed choice at election time, shape the conduct of government by 
articulating dissenting views and provide as a whole an independent forum of debate 
(Curran, 1991: 29). 
The existence of a mediated public sphere has been the subject of much debate. This 
concept is difficult to realise and implement in modem societies. Colin Sparks argues 
that the media are only poor representatives of it (Sparks, 2001: 78). The real chances of 
citizens gaining political participation through the media are questionable. Nor do they 
necessarily offer adequate participation for people in political life. As Jim McGuigan puts 
its, 'there is no single public sphere to which we all have access and in which we all 
participate equally.' People have little power to influence what happens as 'big decisions 
are made at the higher reaches of public and business administration, behind closed 
doors' (McGuigan, 1996: 4). It is not expected that they treat official politics with the 
same passion they devote to their own personal lives (McGuigan, 2005: 435). 
Only limited room for public access to the dominant media is available and this is 
restricted to specialised channels or letter pages (Sparks, 2001: 78). Lower status social 
groups can be alienated from various forms of information (Fraser, 1992: 137). Poverty 
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can also deny access to communication resources (Brown, 2001: 224) In addition, the 
opinion-forming press tends to be the preserve of elites and the rise of subscription 
services has led to a lack of universalism and ended the monopoly of the free-to-air 
broadcasters (Sparks, 2001: 78). Further to this, according to John Downey a 
destabilisation of the public sphere can be expected 'as a consequence of increased use of 
new information and communication technologies' because cyberspace is not necessarily 
inclusive and participatory (Downey, 1999: 135). Habermas himself, who had seen the 
public sphere growing during an era which witnessed the initial spread of the press, 
observed its decay in the twentieth century. He attributed this decay to the rise of 
commercialism and public relations which resulted in limited rationality on the part of 
media and journalists. 
The media of Britain, France, Germany and Italy which will be used for this project do 
not of course constitute the European public sphere but can maybe partly represent it. Its 
possible existence is important because it relates to the so-called democratic deficit of the 
Union. The representation and democratic participation of European citizens within the 
Union has been problematic. The most recent expression of citizens' dissatisfaction with 
the leadership of the Union was highlighted by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
by the French and Dutch publics in 2005 and the Irish referendum which said 'no' to the 
Lisbon Treaty in June 2008. Citizens can be directly represented by the members of the 
European Parliament but not by the Commission, the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers. The dynamics and development of European integration have resulted in 
member-states gradually transferring some of their sovereignty to the EU. The political 
responsibility has been transferred to supranational bodies. It can then be argued this 
according to the 'orthodox view': 'the democratic deficit of the Union derives from the 
fact that the transfer of national parliamentary responsibilities to the governmentally 
appointed Commission and the intergovernmental Council has not been matched by a 
commensurate increase in the competences of the European Parliament' (Chrysochoou, 
1998: 31). 
According to the 'orthodox view', the lack of democracy in the EU depends on the role 
of the European Parliament. The democratic accountability of the Union might be 
enhanced if the powers of the body would be increased. Although the functions of the 
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Parliament have been expanded in the last years, the steady extension of its powers has 
only been partially successful in tackling the democratic deficit of the Union (Tsoukalis, 
2003: 37). The legislative process of the EU is still complex and largely non-transparent 
and the large majority of European citizens are distant from the decision-making centres 
of the Union (Tsoukalis, 2003: 34). Scholars argue that the resulting structure of 
European governance is considered as 'remote, opaque and inaccessible' (Grundmann et 
aI, 2000: 300). 
Exploring possible remedies leading EU specialist Loukas Tsoukalis has observed: 
'Direct elections to the European Parliament have not generated any Europe-wide debates 
on issues dealt by EU institutions; and such debates that have taken place have been 
confined to small sections of the political elite, experts and intellectuals. European 
construction remains an affair for the cognoscenti; the people are expected to follow' 
(Tsoukalis, 2003: 37). In particular, Tsoukalis goes beyond the need for institutional 
reform by suggesting that a forum, in other words of a common ground for interaction 
and intermediation between public authorities and people might be beneficial. There, the 
concept of a European public sphere is relevant because many consider its development 
as a prerequisite for democracy within the EU (Chrysochoou, 1998: 87; Closa, 1998: 75; 
Kantner, 2003: 213 in Machill et aI, 2006: 60). 
The potential creation of a public sphere is linked to the shaping of a European 
citizenship and possibly a greater common identity within a Union polity. The EU has 
promoted the formation of such a notion of citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty. 
This Treaty introduced a concept, which entailed, inter alia, the right to participate in the 
political life of member-states other than their own, to reside freely anywhere in the 
Union and to enjoy consular protection in any member-state's embassy in a third country. 
(Dell'Olio, 2005: 69; Tsoukalis, 1993: 37). Despite those provisions the chances for 
popular participation ofEU citizens has remained low. The significance of the creation of 
a European public sphere is that it could theoretically go beyond already existing 
attempts to counter the democratic deficit because the former might lead to a 
transnational demos witin the EU. This formation would be composed of members who 
would not be so fragmented and mutually alienated but would ideally have a new type of 
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collective identity. A politically aware transnational demos might be capable to direct its 
democratic claims to and via EU central institutions (Chrysochoou, 1998: 87 and 91). 
The creation of a European public sphere and a transnational demos are not easy tasks. 
The Union consists of different nation states which have their own culture and history. 
The strength of national identities has meant that few people identify themselves first as 
European citizens (Grundman, 1999: 125; Tsoukalis, 2003: 35). In addition, the EU has 
found itself in a process of transformation since its foundation and its territory often 
changes, as the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 outlined. However, although it cannot be 
considered as a state itself, the supranational elements in its structure show that it is an 
emerging democratic polity gradually moving beyond the boundaries of nation-states. In 
this case, the role of the media can be crucial. The media - along with cultural 
institutions and various events, rituals and narratives - have contributed to the 
construction of national identities (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). According to 
Benedict Anderson, the nation is 'an imagined political community' and the development 
of its identity of such a nation is tied to the spread of communication systems (Anderson, 
1983: 15). Within the context of the EU, the media can maybe play a similar and 
analogous role as the one they played in nation-states. In other words, it is theoretically 
possible for a European identity to be cultivated through the media, as it happened with 
nation-states. 
The process of globalization has strongly influenced domestic governance. Domestic 
polities are under pressure because of the increasing role of transnational and third sector 
actors (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 36). Their actions affect interests of states. 
Subsequently governments become willing to exchange some of their legal freedom in 
order to influence the actions of those actors as well (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 20). 
Globalization has contributed to a change to the meaning of the state and although it 
remains at the heart of world politics, Robin Brown notes: 'we need to modify our 
understanding of state from state as a country, that is assuming that state incorporates 
everything within the legal territory, to state as organisation' (Brown, 1995: 63). In 
other words, although states are not disappearing, their boundaries are being challenged 
(Brown, 1995: 64). Furthermore, the concept of identity cannot be considered as fixed 
but is being increasingly ongoing (Giddens, 1991). It has taken a global dimension and is 
73 
linked to that of citizenship. While citizenship has traditionally been conceptualised in 
tenns of membership of a given society, it has become potentially more global since the 
end of the Second World War and the foundation of the UN (Gurevitch et aI, 1991: 195). 
In addition the public sphere is not considered as being necessarily restricted to the 
nation-state (Habennas, 1989). Thus, in a changing economic, political and media 
environment marked by globalization, the creation of a transnational public sphere could 
help to engender more cosmopolitan political identities (Downey and Koenig, 2006: 166). 
A hypothetical European public sphere can be based on the synchronisation and 
homogenisation of national public spheres (Grundmann, 1999: 136).22 Thomas Risse 
notes that its ideal fonn would emerge if the same themes were discussed at the same 
time at similar levels of attention, frames of reference and patterns of interpretation 
across national media; and if a transnational community of communication emerged and 
a common discourse was used by both speakers and listeners within the EU (Risse, 2003: 
1). Phi lip Schlesinger also identifies three criteria for the creation of a European public 
sphere which would: a) involve the dissemination of a European news agenda, b) need to 
become a significant part of the everyday news-consuming habits of European audiences 
and c) entail that those living within the EU have begun to think of their citizenship, in 
part at least, as transcending the level of the member nation-states (Schlesinger, 1999: 
277,278). 
Several studies have been undertaken which have analysed the coverage of various 
issues by the EU media. The available evidence suggests that although the salience of 
EU specific topics is low, similar frames of reference prevail in media reporting (Risse, 
2003: 1). This research project can complement existing empirical studies. Its main 
difference is that it will not analyse the coverage of an EU topic per se but will deal with 
the coverage of a subject - neoconservatism - which is related to the external political 
developments on the other side of the Atlantic. Therefore a discussion about the 
'dissemination of a European news agenda' is not applicable in this thesis. However, it 
22 The idea of the existence of a pan-European public sphere irrespective of nation-states seems utopian 
because there are no continental-wide mass media which inform its demos as a whole (Grundmann, 1999: 
127). The absence of European-wide mass media can be partly explained by the different languages which 
inhibit communication between populations within the EU (Smith and Wright, 1999: 7). Although English 
is the most widespread language within the EU, it cannot be considered as a common language for EU 
citizens (Machill et at, 2006: 62). 
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will be noteworthy to find out if the coverage ofneoconservatism in the media ofthe 'Big 
Four' shows signs of synchronisation and homogenisation in a period which saw not only 
EU's split over its foreign policy but also high tensions in transatlantic relations. 
Comparing Different Media 
The selection of the EU member-states, the media of which would be accessed, is a 
significant issue of concern. Since its Eastern enlargement in 2004, the EU is composed 
of twenty-five countries and since the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 of two 
additional ones. Although it would be tempting to analyse the media of a high number of 
EU member states, this might exceed the limits of time budget for the implementation of 
this project. The media of Britain, France, Gennany and Italy were selected because they 
constitute for economic, historical and political reasons the stronger powers in the EU 
and can be regarded as its 'Big Four'. Moreover, these countries were chosen on the basis 
of the split of EU foreign policy before the war on Iraq. Such a selection can mirror its 
internal divisions, and mainly of its leading member states, over US foreign policy in 
2003. Concerning European countries, which supported the war, Spain could have been 
an alternative. However, Britain and Italy were preferred to Spain for historical reasons. 
The latter entered the Community in 1986 while the fonner in 1973 and 1958 
respectively. On the contrary, France and Gennany were picked because of their anti-
war front at the Security Council ofthe UN. 
Further to this, quality newspapers of the 'Big Four' were considered as an appropriate 
source for analysis. These certainly constitute elite, influential and opinion-fonning 
media, which may theoretically express an interest in a political ideology such as 
neoconservatism and take positions in its debatable issues. In addition, the variety of 
conservative and liberal newspapers that exists provides the chance for an analysis of the 
mediation of neoconservatism based on both perspectives. In other words, a careful 
choice of newspapers can offer a balanced approach in tenns of the political spectrum 
they cover. By contrast, it would be more difficult to distinguish either conservative or 
liberal TV channels in Britain, France, Gennany and Italy. 
Media markets in the 'Big Four', as in many other countries, have shown signs of 
similarity in tenns of their commercial liberalisation (Chada and Kavoori, 2005: 88, 89). 
75 
In the era of globalization, private competition is encouraged and large corporations have 
developed. Examples include companies Bertelsman AG and Time Warner as well as the 
corporations of Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi (McQuail, 1995: 153-164). 
International communication has changed. The development of new technologies was 
central to this evolution. Communication can more easily occur across international 
borders when millions of people can communicate with each other in real time 
irrespective of their national boundaries (Taylor, 1997: 22; Thussu, 2000). News 
organisations are less likely to be state-centric and have started to report from anywhere 
on the planet. The emergence of satellite broadcasting operations in the 1990s contributed 
to this shift (Brown, 2003: 89; McMillin, 2007: 11). 
For its part, the EU has acquired much influence concerning the creation of an 
audiovisual internal market and since the Treaty of Amsterdam, it has extended 
neoliberalism not only in the private but also in the public sector (Humphreys, 2007: 101, 
102). Its regulation of television services was established with the Television without 
Frontiers (TWF) Directive in 1989 (Harcourt, 2005: 9; Wheeler, 2007: 228). TWF was 
based on the free movement of European television programmes in the internal market 
and the requirement for TV channels to reserve transmission time for European works 
(EU website, 10/01108, Humphreys 2007: 93, 94). The Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive in December 2005 broadened the scope of EU regulations (Wheeler, 2007: 
228). Moreover, the policy initiatives of the EU were designed to provide viewers with 
news channels that could reflect their interests from a European perspective. Euronews is 
the most obvious example (Kevin, 2003: 39,40). Europa by Satellite, which is the EU's 
TV information service, offers related audiovisual material by satellite to media 
professionals. 
The European Union lacks a substantial press policy conceming issues of pluralism and 
concentration of ownership as opposed to its audiovisual one. As David Hutchison 
explains, the main reason is the opposition from media businesses (Hutchison, 2007: 191, 
200). In terms of professional regulation, the European Newspaper Publishers 
Association (ENP A) disagrees with the idea of a European enforced right-of-reply.23 The 
23 The European Newspaper Publishers Association claims to represent 5200 titles in 26 countries (ENPA 
website) 
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ENP A supports this practice only according to each EU member state. It also rejects 
initiatives of the Union concerning regulation of media pluralism (Ibid: 190, 191). 
Subsequently, the general differences in national media systems of the 'Big Four' should 
be taken into account. Literature in comparative media research can provide a useful 
theoretical framework. 
The work of Renate Kocher can be perhaps a staI1ing point. Her study attempts to 
compare British and GenTIan journalism and is based on interviews with journalists from 
both countries. Kocher's findings show that B1itish joumalism sees itself in the role of 
transmitter of facts while Gennan journalism tends to place a lot of value on opinion and 
less on news.24 It is interesting that only 16% of Ge1man journalists made the claim to be 
an instructor or educator in contrast to 74% of their British colleagues (Kocher, 1986: 
54). In parallel with Renate Kocher, Jean Chalaby has compared newsprint joumalism in 
the Anglo-American world and in France and has argued that Anglo-American 
newspapers contained more news and had better organised news-gathering services 
(Chalaby, 1996: 305). According to Chalaby, Ame1ican and British journalists have 
invented the modern concept of news. 
In the discussion of comparative methodology in media research the study of Daniel 
Hallin and Paolo Mancini is certainly influential. It is different from that of Jean Chalaby 
as it primarily aims at understanding the interplay between media and politics. Hallin and 
Mancini distinguish three models concentrating on media systems in 18 countIies 
although they acknowledge that these systems are not completely homogeneous. These 
are the polarized pluralist model, where France and Italy belong, the democratic 
corporatist one, where Ge111lany is placed, and the liberal one, where Britain can be found 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 217). The scholars focus on four dimensions comparing the 
above-mentioned models: development of mass press, political parallelism, joumalistic 
professionalism and the role of the state (Ibid. 218,219). 
The analysis of the development of mass press is significant because the rates of 
newspaper circulation vary across different countries. In 1999, for instance, newspapers 
2~ Likewise Hallin and Mancini along with' Hutchison argue that the British press emphasises on 
infon11ation and narrative rather than commentary as in other European countries (HaIlin and Mancini, 
2005: 229; Hutchison, 2007: 189). 
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were more popular in Gernlany (63%) than in Britain (49%), Italy (29%) and France 
(26%), while the fonner had the lead with 65, 5% in 2001 as well (Pippa, 2000: 21; EU 
website, 08/09/01: 6). That is to say that while press circulation is high in Germany, it is 
medium in Britain and low in France and Italy. As opposed to circulation figures, 
political parallelism, in other words party-press parallelism shows a degree of relative 
similality in the 'Big Four'. Theoretically, it should be lower in the polarized pluralist 
model and thus in France and Italy. Hal1in and Mancini explain, however, that even in 
Germany the political views of journalists are fairly strong con-elated with the orientation 
of the medium they work for (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 225). They also argue that 
Britain constitutes an exception within the liberal model. Its newspapers differ from 
those in the US because they remain partisan (Ibid: 229).25 
As for journalistic professionalism it is stronger in the democratic corporatist· and 
liberal models than in polatized pluralist one. Nevertheless, in this case - as it happened 
with political parallelism - differences in the 'Big Four' do not necessarily follow the 
theory of the three models. 27% of journalists in Italy, 15% in Britain and 7% in 
Gel111any report that 'pressures from editors and senior management' were an 'important 
factor' in their jobs (Ibid: 222). In France there was a strong reaction against 
instrumentalization of the press after World War II and journalists gained substantial 
control of many newspapers (lbid: 222). France lacks a national code of ethics as 
opposed to the other three states selected for analysis (Hutchison, 2007: 190). It is also 
noted that Gennany has established the right of reply while both this country and Britain 
have a Press Council. Concerning the role of the state there is a significant difference 
between countries of the polarized pluralist model and the democratic corporatist and 
liberal one. In particular, the role of the state has been strong in France and Italy. These 
two countries have the highest levels of press subsidy in the EU as opposed to Britain and 
Gennany (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 223, TunstaII, 2002: 231). 
The comparison of media content from different countlies is not a new idea in 
international communication studies. Three significant theories have been developed 
concerning the analysis of news exchanges (Archetti, 2008: 463, 464). The first one 
25 Colin Seymour-Ure argues that newspaper affiliations in Britain have made a virtue of being political 
rather than partisan (quoted in Wheeler, 1997: 78) 
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claims the existence of unidirectional communications flows among countIies 
(Nordenstreg and VaIis, 1974). It predicts that this flow of news should run from richer 
countries to poorer ones. Such a model, however, can hardly be applied in this project 
because all the media accessed are based in Westem industIialised countries. The second 
theory is based on globalization theory and supp0l1s the idea that news is becoming 
homogenised at a globalleve1 (Giddens, 1990). The third one is synthesised around and 
localization and advocates that news is diversified along national lines. These national 
lines are associated with political and cultural differences and diversities in joumalistic 
culture (Gurevith et. a1.1991). 
Christina Archetti conducted a comparative study of eight newspapers across the US, 
Italy, France and Pakistan and analysed the way they covered 9111 and its immediate 
aftennath (Archetti, 2008). Her data challenge some of strands the above-mentioned 
theoIies. Archetti's research shows that globalization exists not as homogenisation of 
content, but as an overcoming of time and space balTiers. That is because no universal 
way of interpreting the news was observed in her study. She also argues that 'a country's 
national interest and editorial policy at the level of the single newspaper is important in 
understanding what shapes news stories' (Archetti, 2008: 471). For their part, Hallin and 
Mancini acknowledge the importance of globalization in 'diminishing national 
differences in media systems' but disagree with the idea of a complete homogenisation 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 282, 295). 
Sources Accessed 
To make the research feasible and respond to the needs of time budget not more than two 
newspapers from each of the 'Big Four' respectively were used. The following eight 
quality newspapers were then selected for analysis: 
The Times and The Guardian (British press) 
Le Figaro and Le Monde (French press) 
Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Siiddeutsche Zeitung (Gennan press) 
If Corriere della Sera and La Repubb/ica (Italian press) 
The population of Britain is approximately 60,500,000 people. In this country the 
newspaper sector is to a large degree national. Every discussion about its press would 
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normally have media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch as a starting point. His News 
International owns since 1981 the conservative The Times/Sunday Times. However, from 
1997 they had abandoned their traditional support for the Conservatives, as Murdoch has 
been keen to promote relationships with governments that could threaten his media 
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empire. Blair was one such acquaintance (Wring, 2002). Murdochs's ownership of those 
newspapers and his particular relationship to the neoconservatives - as it has already 
been explained - facilitated their selection for the purpose of this project. These 
newspapers did not see the war on Iraq in a negative way. As a counterbalance for The 
Times/Sunday Times, The Guardian/Observer were used.26 These are controlled by non-
profit organisation Scott Trust. As opposed to Murdoch, who often appoints compliant 
editors, Scott Trust board selects its own ones with some journalistic input (Wheeler, 
. 1997:.77). The Guardian/Observer, which have a negative bias towards the Conservative 
Party and can be regarded as liberal newspapers, supply an analytical commentary on the 
news (Semetko, 2000: 365; Wheeler, 1997: 59, 65). They were opposed to the Iraq 
war.27 
France has a popUlation of approximately 61,000,000 people. In this country, the 
newspaper sector is national as well as regional. Two newspapers based in Paris but with 
national circulation were accessed. National newspapers as opposed to regional ones 
devote space to international affairs (Lamizet, 1996: 82). The conservative Le Figaro 
had been owned by Socpresse but has been acquired by the anns manufacturer Serge 
Dassault since 2004. The liberal Le Monde is owned by Le Monde SA.28 Raymond 
Kuhn writes that Le Figaro is not controlled by a political party but is clearly partisan in 
terms of its coverage of domestic politics. The paper shows strong sympathies for the 
Gaullist party. For its part, Le Monde has no organisational connection whatsoever with 
a political party aiming at adopting a non-partisan approach to political coverage. This 
does mean that Le Monde always avoid to be involved in party politics. The newspaper 
is committed to socially progressive and politically left of centre goals which are 
26In the first months of 2003, The Times/Sunday Times sold 616,308 and 1,639,130 copies per day, while 
The Guardian/Observer 386,585 and 430,546 ones respectively (Bell and Alden, 2003: 23). 
27 In the analysis only the titles: The Times and the The Guardian will be used. These will also refer to 
their Sunday papers. 
28 In 2003, Le Figaro enjoyed a circulation of 326,800 copies per day while Le Monde 324,400 ones (BBC 
website,25/11/04). 
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described by its founder Hubert Beuve - Mery as 'social liberalism' or 'liberal socialism.' 
Le Monde provides in depth coverage of national and international politics, with detailed 
background and highly analytic articles. It covers national and international affairs in a 
comprehensive and balanced way giving space to the views of all sides and attributing 
rationality to the readers (Kuhn, 1995: 73-74). Both Le Figaro and Le Monde were 
against the war on Iraq. 
Germany, with a popUlation of approximately 82,500,000 people, is a federal state. 
The federal structure of the country is reflected on its newspaper market which is to a 
large degree regional. The newspapers accessed are based in Frankfurt and Munich 
respectively but enjoy a national circulation. In particular, the conservative Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung is owned by the publishing firm of Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung 
GmbH while the liberal Siiddeutsche Zeitung by Siiddeutsche Zeitung GmbH (Hickethier, 
1996: 105; Meyn, 1999: 108-109).29 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung are the most influential 'papers of record' in Germany and polls have revealed 
that that they are 'journalistic opinion leaders'. Their coverage is most likely to have an 
impact on that of other mass media which tend to copy their agendas, arguments and 
frames (Weischenberg et aI., 1994 quoted in Hafez, 2000: 182). Professor of journalism 
Jim Willis also considers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Siiddeutsche Zeitung as 
serious influential newspapers (Willis, 1999: 91, 93). Both agreed with Germany's 
opposition to the war on Iraq. 
Finally, Italy has a population of approximately 58,000,000 people. The regional 
character of the country can be realised by the large number of newspapers, which are not 
national. In this case, the discussion might theoretically revolve around Italy's former 
prime minister and business cavaliere Silvio Berlusconi. However, it should be 
underlined that the media empire of Berlusconi is mainly related to television. He is 
more a television tycoon rather than a newspaper baron (Ginsborg, 2004: 51). His efforts 
to invest on the press are only concerned with 11 Giornale which is owned by his bother 
Paolo Berlusconi. According to Paul Ginsborg, however, Italy's major conservative 
newspaper is 11 Corriere della Sera and not 11 Giornale (2004:52). This was selected for 
29 In 2003, Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung sold 380',000 copies per day while Siiddeutsche Zeitung 
430,000 ones (Goethe Institut website). 
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analysis. If Corriere della Sera is Milan based, had been initially owned by the Rizzoli-
Corriere dell a Sera Group and wad sold in early 1980s to Agnelli-Fiat (Sartori, 1996: 
139). In parallel, the Rome based La Repubblica was accessed as a liberal newspaper.30 
This was created in 1976 as an Italian version of Le Monde and is owned by the Gruppo 
Editoriale L'Espresso (Sartori, 1996: 138). Although there was debate in Italy about the 
necessity of the war on Iraq, both If Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica were not in 
favour of this military operation. It is striking that leading editor of If Corriere della Sera 
Feruccio de Bortoli was pushed out of his job in May 2003. Journalists and opposition 
politicians attributed this resignation to his newspaper opposition to the war on Iraq 
(BBC website, 30/05/03). 
Electronic resources 
The popUlation of the research project refers to all -articles published concerning 
neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005 by The Times/Sunday Times, The 
Guardian/Observer, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Franfurter Allgemeine, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 
If Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica. All the articles accessed from the beginning of 
1993 until the end of 2005 were read for the purpose of the research. This was not 
particularly time-consuming as in many cases the tenn neoconservatism or its equivalents 
were used in the context of not more than one or two sentences. Articles which were 
totally devoted to neoconservatism could not often be found. However, there were 
exceptions in which journalists or columnists wrote comprehensive reports about this 
political ideology. 
What has to be clarified is that electronic resources were used. Lexis-Nexis 
professional and executive databases as well as online newspaper archive engines 
provided the basis for searching for the tenn neoconservatism or its equivalents. In 
particular, the search was refined according to the following tenns: neoconservatism, 
neoconservative, neoconservatives and neocons (British press), neoconservatisme, 
neoconservateur, neoconservatrice, neoconservateurs and neocons (French press), 
neokonservatismus, neokonservativismus, neokonservativ, neokonservative, 
30 In 2003 the circulation of 11 Corriere della Sera was 614,000 copies per day while that of La Repubb/ica 
583,000 ones (BBC website, 12111/04). 
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neokonservativen and neokons (Gennan press) and neoconservatorismo, 
neoconservatore, neoconservatrice, neoconservatori and neocons (Italian press). 
The use of electronic resources can be problematic. Their reliability IS not 
unquestionable. In this regard, the point of David Deacon is useful (Deacon, 2007). In 
his article, Deacon deals with the methodological implications of using digital newspaper 
archives. Specifically, he argues that the dependence on key words is problematic 
because it leads to the identifation of things rather than themes. He also points out that an 
another limitation of an electronic search is the loss of the visual dimension of news. 
Deacon contests the reliability of the results the electronic news archives produce. He 
notes that Lexis-Nexis can differ from a CD Rom database as to the volume of items 
occurred on the basis of a specific search. Deacon also comments on the possibility of an 
article produced by Lexis-Nexis to be dublicated and discusses about low and high level 
omissions (Deacon, 2007: 8, 10, 14, 17-21). 
The argument of Deacon is acknowledged and taken into account for the 
implementation of this project. Nonetheless, this thesis would be a non-starter from the 
beginning if electronic resources were not used. It would impossible to analyse the 
mediation of neoconservatism by the newspapers without digital search engines. The use 
of newspaper indexes might theoretically offer an alternative. This method would be 
time-consuming. Even if an index was used, as in the case of The Times, there would be 
still limitations. For example, their index does not mention equivalents of the tenn 
neoconservatism, as for example neocon and neocons. The argument of Deacon about 
the lack of visual elements of the news is also less important. What matters more is the 
way the media use this tenn and not the photos, pictures or caricatures. Further to this, in 
the case of the coverage of neoconservatism, the Lexis-Nexis database produced indeed 
dublicated articles as Deacon suggests. However, this problem can be overcome by 
checking the articles one-by-one. As concerns Deacon's observation about omissions, 
the high volume of articles can maybe remove this obstacle. The reading of a few articles 
more or less could not influence significantly the general tendency concerning the 
construction of neoconservatism by the media. 
A final point to me made refers to the relationship between printed and online 
newspapers. Safe conclusions on this issue cannot yet be reached. Contradictory views 
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as to the impact of internet newspapers on print ones exist. There are studies which show 
that digital news will soon be as important as printed ones. On the contrary, research also 
reveals that that effect of the internet on traditional newspapers is still slight (Ahlers, 
2006; Cao and Li, 2006: 123). 
News and Comments 
Theoretically, press analysis has to be divided in two parts. First, news items should be 
examined. And second comments have to be analysed or vice versa. This distinction can 
offer comparative conclusions about news reporting and opinion-making in the editorial 
board of newspapers. Nevertheless, the separation of news items from comments cannot 
be easily applied into practice in the case of the coverage of neoconservatism in the elite 
press of the 'Big Four'. The different structure of each of the eight European newspapers 
accessed can be identified as an initial reason. In newspapers with different sections it 
cannot be easily defined which items constituted news and which comments. 
The main reason, which would make such a distinction a problematic issue for this 
project is that in many cases the same journalists wrote both news and comments. A 
particular example from the coverage of Le Monde can be mentioned. Alain Frachon and 
Daniel Vernet were the authors of many articles about neoconservatism in the French 
liberal newspaper. They wrote in both the section of international affairs and that of the 
editorial board of Le Monde. An analysis based on the separation of news items from 
comments in different sections of the thesis might not avoid repetition. This does not 
mean that the specific position of articles in the newspapers will not be given. In most of 
the cases Lexis-Nexis database and online newspaper archives offered this information. 
Research Methods 
For the analysis of the data, both quantitative and qualitative techniques will be used. 
The research will be based on the logic of triangulation (Bryman, 2004: 454). The aim is 
to benefit from the strong points of both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
and to compare the findings of those methods. In this way, the possibility for cross-
checked conclusions to be reached is increased. What should be taken into account, 
however, is that the researcher who uses both quantitative and qualitative methods must 
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ensure that his or her ontological and epistemological positions will not compromise 
(Read and Marsh, 2002: 241). This project, as it has been explained, is synthesised 
around the notion of constructivism. The positivist approach that social reality is out 
there is not endorsed. By contrast, the fundamental assumption of the thesis is that social 
realities are continually constructed through routine social practices (Deacon et all, 1999: 
7). Therefore, the findings of the project will be seen as offering only one possible 
interpretation to the social phenomenon studied and will not be generalised (Read and 
Marsh, 2002: 241). In the case of the mediation of neoconservatism in the European elite 
media, the quantitative methods will be used as ancilliary to qualitative ones (Creswell, 
1994: 177). 
Quantitative Content Analysis 
The quantitative dimension of the analysis of texts and documents is certainly interwoven 
with content analysis. Bemard Berelson defines content analysis as 'a research technique 
for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication' (Berelson, 1952: 18). In other words, it aims at quantifying content of 
documents and texts in terms of predetermined categories. These can concern with 
themes, subjects and words. In this way, patterns of coverage can be outlined and the 
compartmentalisation or not of issues by the media can be highlighted. Quantitative 
content analysis is claimed to be a transparent research method. This is its greatest 
advantage. The consistency of the rules followed does not allow or at least limits 
subjective bias in the interpretation of the results. Although it is almost impossible that a 
coding manual does not reflect interpretation of the part of the coder on the basis of his or 
her interests, content analysis is an objective method of analysis (Bryman, 2004: 195 and 
197). The manner quantitative content analysis is conducted can be replicable. 
Quantitative content analysis, however, does not go into depth. It can give answers to 
predetermined straightforward questions but cannot enlighten a researcher concerning 
questions mainly revolving around 'why'. The coding manual, which is its basic research 
instrument can also prove to be problematic with 'naming', especially with regard to 
nations (Richardson, 2006: 17 -18). Furthermore, 'the manifest content of 
communication', which quantitative content analysis deals with, indicates that only the 
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apparent content of a document or text is of interest; by contrast the latent content is 
ignored. Further to this, the count of words can be possibly considered as an awkward 
tool of quantitative content analysis; the frequency a specific word is used does not 
suggest much if the meaning of the sentences in which this occurs is not taken into 
account. Quantitative content analysis does not pay attention to the context of language 
and render it meaningless or sterile (John, 2002: 218). 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
The shortcomings of the quantitative content analysis could be possibly overcome by also 
following qualitative research methods. An idea might be to interview British, French, 
German and Italian journalists. However, this was rejected because of the limits of time 
budget and the serious difficulties of arranging many interviews with various journalists 
in different locations. By contrast, qualitative content analysis was qualified as an 
appropriate technique. In this regard, some usage of Criticial Discourse (CDA) approach 
was useful. 
CDA concentrates on the relationship between power and language. Media language is 
examined as discourse while emphasis is given to the sociological meaning of the latter. 
In other words, the nature of language is of great significance as it is viewed as socially 
shaped and shaping. The concepts of power and ideology are central to the approach of 
CDA. According to Ruth Wodak, CDA implies a relationship between the text and its 
social conditions, ideologies and power-relations. It is concerned with social problems 
and with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures. Society 
and culture are dialectically related to discourse and language use may be ideological. 
Discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context (Wodak, 
1996: 17-20). 
CDA has produced a lot of research and different frameworks for analysis by various 
scholars. Possibly the Dutch text linguist Teun van Dijk and the British discourse analyst 
Norman Fairc10ugh could be considered as the leading theorists in the subject of CDA. 
Both van Dijk and Fairc10ugh work within the framework of CDA and their versions of 
CDA are to a large extent similar. Nevertheless, their individual approaches differ as to 
the nature of the central mediating dimension between discourse and society. Van Dijk 
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sees cognitive structures and mental models mediating between discourse and society and 
elaborates on a cognitive model. Fairclough focuses on discourse practices through 
which texts are produced and received. His work is considered as crucial for the 
implementation of this project because it deals not only with the reception of media texts 
by the audience but also with the factors which influence the relations between media and 
politics. Fairclough believes that van Dijk's approach has limitations because it does not 
concentrate on social relations and identities as well as on intertextual analysis 
(Fairclough, 1995: 30). 
Fairclough conceptualises discourse in terms of three dimensions, which he calls text, 
discourse practice and sociocultural practice. Discussing about texts first, what he argues 
is that the use of language can provide insights about social identity, social relations and 
systems of knowledge (Fairclough, 1995: 57-59). In this case, discourse analysis 
involves both micro and macro levels of text structure. The micro level of discourse 
deals with traditional linguistics. This can be problematic because for the reason that 
different languages are involve~ in the project. However, there are tools of analysis, 
which might be useful. An indicative list is given. CDA analysis principles will be based 
on the language of translation, which is English. 
Deconstruction of opposition's argument: it means that a particular strategy is 
followed which recontextualises the opinion of the opposition in order to 
highlight its deficiencies. 
Metaphor: it is a means of representing one aspect of experience in terms of 
another having ideological significance (Fairclough, 1989: 119). 
Narrative: it refers to the sequence in which events are presented. The questions 
asked are related to who, what, where, when and why.31 
Polarity: it is the choice between positive and negative (Halliday, 1985: 85). 
Presupposition: the analysis of a text has to be concerned not only with what is 
'there' in the text but with absences from the text (Fairclough, 1995: 106). 
31 It has been mentioned that only a few articles were published which exclusively dealt with 
neooconservatism. In most of the cases, the media discussed about this political ideology in a wider context 
or only mentioned the term. Thus, it was not possible for the qualitative content analysis to focus 
extensively on particular narrative schemata. For instance, the examination of themes such as the main 
headline, secondary headline and lead paragraph did not apply. The analysis of the coverage of 
neoconservatism was not similar to that of events, as for example wars or elections. 
87 
Source credibility can be regarded as a propaganda technique (Jowett and 
O'Donnell, 1999: 291). 
Vocabulary: the usage of specific words can reflect the representation of the 
world for a culture (Fowler, 1991: 82). Conclusions about emotions, judgements 
and evaluations can also be reached on the basis of particular semantic resources. 
Macro level of discourse goes further and examines notions such as topics and themes. 
This is the main point of interest for the implementation of the project because it goes 
beyond the limits of linguistic analysis per se. In this way, the nature of the coverage of 
neoconservatism can possibly be explored. 
The second and third dimensions of Norman Fairclough's analysis deal with the 
production and reception of media texts. By discourse practices, Fairclough means 'the 
ways in which texts are produced, by media workers in media institutions, and the ways 
in which texts are received by audiences, as well as how media texts are socially 
distributed' (Fairclough, 1995: 16). The analysis of discourse practices involves the 
examination of construction, interpretation and distribution of texts. In this case, 
Fairclough concentrates on orders of discourse and deals with 'discourse practices' of 
different social domains. He refers to the social and cultural goings-on of the 
communicative event. Aspects of sociocultural practice include factors which are 
interwoven with news production, as we have already seen. The wider cultural context is . 
also taken into account. Here Fairclough focuses more on the relation of discourse to 
power and ideology as well as value and identity (Fairclough, 1995: 57 and 62). 
A final but crucial point to be made is that although CDA and especially Norman 
Fairclough's approach go beyond quantitative content analysis, they also suffers from a 
significant deficiency. CDA is lacking in objectivity which has been considered as the 
main advantage of quantitative content analysis. It emphasises on words and not 
numbers. This entails that the interpretation of the data maybe reflects the researcher's 
point of view. Subjectivity seems inevitable and the analysis heavily relies on his or 
her's view about what is important. For instance, transcripts are subject to numerous 
readings (Devine, 2002: 206). Several researchers might produce different esults. 
Therefore findings based on qualitative research cannot be easily replicated. 
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Sampling in Qualitative Analysis 
A significant point for discussion refers to the sample which will be used for the 
qualitative analysis of this project. Such an analysis focuses on relatively small cases 
(Patton, 1990: 169). In this case, a choice of particular examples of the media coverage of 
neoconservatism had to be made because repetition could hardly be avoided if all the 
examples found were presented. In qualitative analysis, however, representativeness is 
not the main issue and this method mainly relies on the researcher's interaction and 
involvement with documents (Altheide. 1996: 24, 36). As qualitative research uses non-
probability samples the population of the study has to be selected purposively (Gobo. 
2004: 449). 
There are s~veral different strategies in purposive sampling. In this project, texts will be 
selected on the basis of typicality. The aim will be to present examples which can be 
considered as typical of the general coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite 
newspapers. As lenniferMason notes, qualitative researchers may argue that 'the 
relationship between the context and phenomena they have sampled, and the wider 
universe that they are intercstcd in, is an illustrative or evocative onc' (Mason, 2002: 126). 
This approach seeks to provide a flavour of the wider universe without making claims 
about how well it represents it (Ibid: 126). 
In pmts of the thesis analysing the coverage of the supposed neoconservative intluence 
on the Bush administration and that of Strauss, the examples used will be presented in 
two different categories. In this way, the media debate on neoconservatism will be 
outlined and examples either emphasising or deemphasising the alleged neoconservative 
impact and that of Leo Strauss will be included in the discussion. The work of Peter 
Anderson and Tony Weymouth, which examines how the British press viewed both 
positive and negative developments of the European Olientation of Britain, provides a 
useful practical example of the coverage of debatable issues by the media (Anderson and 
Weymouth, 1999). 
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Translation 
Finally, another important methodological issue of this project is concerned with the 
translation of three European languages into English. The translation, which is required 
to be done by the author, cannot guarantee that common ground will be found. 32 
Translation is linked to cultural social and political real ties. Therefore, not only technical 
but also cultural knowledge is required for producing a text in another language (Snell-
Hornby, 2000: 25, emphasis added). 
In our time, however, the process of translation is influenced by that of globalisation. 
Cultural boundaries in the EU change because of social and political integration EU 
(Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 327). Sociopolitical changes create the need for new text 
types. The intensive intercultural communication within the Union has resulted in what 
can be defined as the hybrid text (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 325). Hybrids reflect 
specific textual features which might clash with target language conventions in terms of 
vocabulary, syntax and style (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 325). Christina Schaeffner and 
Beverly Adab observe that 'in the process of establishing political unity, linguistic 
expressions are levelled to a common (low) denominator' and note that EU texts are 
usually based on reduced vocabulary, meanings that tend to be universal and reduced 
inventory of grammatical forms (Schaeffner and Adab,1995: 327). 
A number of research projects have already faced the problem of translation but have 
been implemented with success. These also can constitute a basis for the thesis. For 
example, The European Journal of Communication offers articles which compare the 
content of different media of the continent. Reiner Grundmann, Dennis Smith and Sue 
Wright attempted to analyse the coverage of the Kosovo war in the European elite press. 
For the purpose of their research, they selected one British, one French and one German 
newspaper: Financial Times, Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Grundman 
et aI, 2000). Furthermore, John Downey and Thomas Koenig dealt with the mediation of 
the Berlusconi- Schultz case in the European media. They collected and compared data 
32 This research project is based on the author's knowledge of English, French, German and Italian. He has 
used these four languages during his postgraduate studies at King's College London and Loughborough 
University, Institut Europeen des Hautes Etudes Intemationales of Nice, Rostock Universit1H and 
Universita degli Studi di Roma-La Sapienza. The common ground of the translation is based on the Greek 
nationality of the author. 
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from different European countries such as Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland by using the Lexis-Nexis database (Downey and Koenig, 
2006). 
Similar research projects have been carried out in the Joan Shorenstein center, politics 
and public policy of Harvard University. Ingrid Lehmann endeavoured to explore 
differences in reporting and published opinion in the US and Germany in the period 
before the beginning of the war on Iraq. Lehman used two newspapers and evening news 
programms from each country respectively: The New York Times and Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, the NBe Nightly News and Die Tagenschau (Lehmann, 2005). In 
parallel with that, Jacqueline Jones examined if America and old Europe reconciled 
after the war on Iraq by analysing the way reporting in both continents covered the 
outcome of the 2004 presidential elections. The newspapers she accessed included 
Washington Post, New York Times, The Times, The Guardian, Le Figaro, Le Monde, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt ( Jones, 2005). 
The above-mentioned examples outline that the language difference of various 
newspapers and TV programmes did not constitute an obstacle for researchers to conduct 
comparative studies. Given this a research project such as the mediation of 
neoconservatism in the elite press of the 'Big Four', is not an exception in which foreign 
languages have to be translated into English. In the final account, the methodological 
problems of translation can be overcome by the need for a comparison of the content of 
the media in Britain, France, Germany and Italy. 
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Chapter 5: Publishing on Neoconservatism 
A research project, such as the mediation of neoconservatism in the European elite media, 
provides a large amount of press coverage. To this also contributes the long period of 13 
years, which will be analysed. In this regard the development of a framework, which can 
offer insights about the pattern of coverage, might be useful. The following chapter aims 
at responding to this need as it looks at the mediation of neoconservatism by the 
European elite press from the perspective of a quantitative analysis. Its goal is to make 
comparisons on the basis of the nationality and political spectrum of the selected 
newspapers and draw conclusions about the synchronisation of the media coverage in 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy. 
Quantitative analysis can be effectively used, if research questions are precisely defined 
(Bryman, 2004: 184; Deacon et aI., 1999: 117). In this case, what has to be explored is 
the interest shown by the media in neoconservatism. Specifically, the questions are 
formulated as follows: Which newspapers were fastest in generating an interest in 
neoconservatism? And, in which periods did the newspapers focus more on 
neoconservatism? 
What should be underlined is that no effort has been made for a categorisation of 
themes relevant to neoconservatism. In most of the cases, themes overlap and the coding 
schedule might not be satisfactorily completed. Theoretically, their categorisation could 
be based on the distinction of either neoconservative principles or specific countries the 
the group wanted US foreign policy to focus on. However, principles, as for instance 
democracy promotion, regime change and war-based foreign policy might often be 
mentioned in the same article. In parallel with that, the same problem would come to 
surface with several countries ofthe Middle East as neoconservative foreign policy is to a 
large extent oriented towards this region. Examples include Iraq, Iran, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria. Further to this the analysis of the chapter will not seek to find out the 
specific neoconservative figures which got more voice in the European elite media. This 
question certainly falls within the sphere of interest for the thesis. However, it will be 
explored in the chapter about the 'Leo-Cons'. That section will identify who were the 
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'Straussians' the media focused more on. Neoconservative politicians and intellectuals 
are mainly Straussians. Thus, repetition would be unavoidable. 
The Interest of the Media 
The first point to be explored is the amount of interest the European media paid to 
neoconservatism. In other words, what has to be outlined is the attention devoted by the 
European elite newspapers to neoconservatism on the basis of the volume of articles they 
published. Their total number from 1993 until 2005 for each newspaper is as follows: 
Table 1: Number of articles published about neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005 
Newspaper Title Number of Articles 
The Times 301 
The Guardian 297 
Le Figaro 320 
Le Monde 472 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 434 
Suddeutsche Zeitung 294 
11 Corriere della Sera 410 
La Repubblica 332 
Total: 2860 
Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were the newspapers which published 
more about neoconservatism in the period of coverage. On the contrary, the volume of 
the articles of The Times and The Guardian was the lowest. 
As concerns the nationality of the newspapers, figure 1 sketches out the percentage the 
national newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy took out of the total coverage 
of neoconservatism. In this case, the British press (598 cases) published less articles 
compared to the French (792 cases), the German (728 cases) and the Italian one (742 
cases). As a whole, the newspapers of the last three European countries show a balance 
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in tenns of the articles they published about neoconservatism from the beginning of 1993 
until the end of2005. 
Figure 1: Nationality of the Newspapers 
D British Press 20.8% 
11 French Press 27.6% 
D German Press 25.45 % 
D Italian Press 26.04% 
In respect of the ideological family conservative newspapers (1465 articles) dealt with 
neoconservatism to a slightly larger degree than liberal ones (1395 articles). However, 
the different amount of articles published is, not remarkable as Figure 2 sketches out. 
Figure 2: Ideology of the Newspapers 
o Conservative newspapers 
51.22% 
[] Liberal Newspapers 48.77% 
The above-presented findings can only offer an initial and general outline of the interest 
shown by the media in neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005. They cannot provide, at 
this early stage, a basis for safe conclusions. Furthennore, what is worth is to explore the 
specific junctures when the selected European elite newspapers focused more extensively 
on neoconservatism. 
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Reporting a Media Phenomenon 
A line graph is a convenient graphical technique in order to compare the volume of 
articles published at different periods of time. The below-produced line graph (figure 3) 
outlines the interest shown in neoconservatism by the European elite newspapers from 
1993 until 2005. 
Figure 3: Usage ofthe term neoconservatism or its equivalents from 1993 until 2005 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
TI = The Times 
GU = The Guardian 
FI = Le Figaro 
MO = Le Monde 
FR = Frankfurter Allgemeine 
SU = Siiddeutsche Zeitung 
CO = Corriere della Sera 
RE = Repubb/ica 
,;''< 
--+-- TI 
-~GU 
FI 
-of:- MO 
--*-FR 
-e-SU 
-+-eo 
-RE 
All the newspapers started to publish more extensively on neoconservatism from 2003 
onwards. It seems that before 2003 neoconservatism had not been on the agenda of all 
the European elite media, at least to a large extent. On these grounds, the the interest 
shown in this political ideology since 2003 can initially be connected to the evolution of 
US foreign policy from the same year onwards and especially to the war on Iraq. More 
light on this question will be shed in the next section. 
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Going back to the line graph of figure 3 this c~n certainly provide the basis for further 
discussion. The next step of the quantitative analysis will be grounded on a division on 
the phase from 1993 until 2005 to sub-periods. The objective is the finding of potential 
plausible explanations for the volume of articles published. 
Before 11 September 
As it was explained in Chapter Two, 11 September was a turning point for US foreign 
policy and the neoconservative position came to the forefront within the framework of 
the war on terror. At this stage, it is interesting to investigate if the attacks played a role 
for the coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite newspapers. This question 
will now be answered in terms of the volume of articles published before and after this 
event. Table 2 indicates the number of articles published by each newspaper from 1 
January 1993 until 11 September 2001. 
Table 2: Number of articles published about neoconservatism from 1993 until 11 September 2001 
Newspaper Title Number of Articles 
The Times 8 
The Guardian 5 
Le Figaro 5 
Le Monde 28 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 115 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung 74 
If Corriere della Sera 126 
La Repubb/ica 52 
Total: 413 
The British and French elite press - to a larger degree Le Figaro compared to Le Monde -
seemed to have ignored the term neoconservatism and its respective terms before 11 
September. On the contrary, this did not happen with the German and Italian newspapers. 
, 
In particular, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 11 Corriere della 
Sera, and La Repubb/ica had published extensively on neoconservatism even before the 
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atrocities. As to the German and Italian elite media the two conservative papers dealt 
with conservatism to a higher degree compared to the liberal ones. The centre-right 
political spectrum of both Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 11 Corriere della Sera 
might be considered as a possible reason for their focus on neoconservatism. 
The German and Italian newspapers 
It has been hypothesised that the high volume of articles published after 11 September 
and especially since the beginning of 2003 by all the newspapers can be attributed to the 
connection ofneoconservatism to US foreign policy. However, the fact that only German 
and Italian media focused on this ideology before the attacks maybe entails that they had 
other reasons for publishing extensively on it, which were not necessarily linked to 
Washington's world affairs approach. Before elaborating on potential motivations of the 
newspapers in these two countries, it might be helpful to represent their detailed coverage 
ofneoconservatism from the beginning of 1993 until 11 September 2001. The line graph 
of figure 4 demonstrates the volume of articles published in this period. The German 
newspapers show a relative symmetry in the distribution of articles they published. On 
the contrary, 11 Corriere della Sera and La Repubb/ica focused more on neoconservatism 
in the period from 1994 until 1996 (92 and 39 articles respectively) compared to the other 
years from 1997 until 11 September 2001 (34 and 13 articles respectively). 
Figure 4: The coverage of neoconservatism in the German and Italian elite newspapers from 1 
January 1993 until 11 September 2001 
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The symmetrical interest shown in neoconservatism by the German newspapers can 
possibly be explained because of its specific meaning for the political history of the 
country. The term is relevant to the debate started among German intellectuals in the 
1980s. This was synthesised around the importance of the history of the country, and 
especially of the role of Nazi past and the Holocaust for the construction of the German 
identity. The left school of intellectuals absolutely condemned the Nazi past. As 
opposed to them the right one was not prepared to forget this past and discuss it 
necessarily negatively. The intellectuals who belong to the latter school are also known 
as neoconservatives (Muller, 1989: 33-41). 
Subsequently, neoconservatism refers maybe to the debate started after the unification 
of Germany over the orientation of the new foreign policy of the country. Since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, intellectuals, who led what is known as 'Neue Rechte' or 'New Right', 
were sceptical about its European orientation and challenged this model, which was 
advocated and implemented by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Heilbrun, 1996: 82). They 
were also prepared to attack the influx of immigrants in Germany (Heilbrun, 1996: 82). 
The 'New Right' recommended that Germans had to regain a national self-confidence 
and that the country should have followed a more assertive foreign policy as opposed to 
the cautious one of its Western part during the Cold War (Rittberger, 2001: 15, 16). 
As concerns If Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica the attention they paid to 
neoconservatism from 1994 until 1996 maybe reflects the developments of Italy during 
these three years. These are linked to the entrance of Silvio Berlusconi to the political 
arena of the country. Berlusconi's centre-right Forza Italia was founded on 26 January 
1994 and in the same year it already won the elections (Frattini, 2004: 40). It did not 
manage, however, to remain in power for five years. In 1995, the Italian Parliament was 
dissolved because the Northern League ofUmberto Bossi left Berlusconi's government. 
1996 was another year of elections in Italy, which brought Romano Prodi and his 'Olive 
Tree' party to power (Bull and Newell, 2005: 77). 
The entrance of Berlusconi to the Italian political scene and the power of Forza Italia 
changed the character of the Italian centre-right. In particular, he led a coalition 
consisting of the National Alliance (AN), former Christian Democrats and the Northern 
League (Bull and Newell, 2005: 56). Berlusconi's leadership could not easily be 
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challenged, at least theoretically, as the power of his party was overwhelming and its 
allies faced strategic difficulties (Bull and Newell, 2005: 56, 57). Therefore, the 
cooperation of the AN, the fonner Democrats and the Northern League with Forza Italia 
was necessary for their political survival. Within this context, it can be possibly argued 
that the changes of the centre-right in the country might have led to the beginning of a 
debate about its new orientation. In such a debate neoconservatism was maybe relevant. 
The Early Bush Presidency 
Furthennore, a significant point to be explored is if articles about neoconservatism 
appeared in the European elite newspapers during the first eight months George W. Bush 
was in power. On that basis, it can be concluded if the change of the US administration 
in 2000 influenced the coverage of this ideology by the selected European newspapers in 
tenns of the volume of articles published. Table 3 shows the number of articles found 
from 1 January 2001 until 11 September of the same year. 
Table 3: Number of articles published from 1 January 2001 until 11 September 2001 
Newspaper Title Number of Articles 
The Times 0 
The Guardian 2 
Le Figaro 3 
Le Monde 0 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 15 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung 8 
If Corriere della Sera 0 
La Repubblica 3 
Total: 31 
It is obvious that the European media did not show a great interest in neoconservatism in 
the first eight months of the Bush administration. The Gennan elite newspapers 
published more articles than the British, French and Gennan. However, it cannot be 
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argued that the George W. Bush's electoral win was a crucial point for their coverage of 
this political ideology. It was explained that Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung had published on neoconservatism at a symmetrical level from the 
beginning of 1993 until the end of 2000. A continuation of this tendency can be also 
observed in the first eight months of Bush's Junior administration. 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September did not significantly influence the number of 
articles published on neoconservatism. If their content has started to change immediately 
since 9/11, remains a question, which will be answered in the chapters devoted to the 
qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, as the line-graph of figure 3 presented, it was the year 
of 2003 which was the critical point for the explosion of articles. Table 4 indicates s the 
number of articles found in the period from 11 September 2001 until 2005. 
Table 4: Number of articles published per year from 12 September 2001 until 2005 
2001 after 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
9/11 Total: 
TI 0 1 29 126 137 293 
GU 3 5 34 101 131 274 
FI 3 2 79 111 123 318 
MO 5 31 146 136 126 444 
FR 21 12 99 99 89 320 
SU 14 18 57 75 64 228 
CO 0 4 91 112 77 284 
RE 3 4 103 108 65 283 
Total: 49 77 638 868 812 2444 
In the period from 12 September 2001 until 31 December 2002 there is a slight increase 
of articles published by some of the newspapers. Le Monde, for example, published 36 
articles about neoconservatism from the day after the attacks until the end of 2002, while 
it had only published 28 pieces from 1993 until the day of the terrorist attacks. However, 
this period was not remarkable in terms of the volume of articles found as opposed to the 
one which followed since the beginning of2003. The below-produced bar chart (figure 5) 
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indicates the number of articles published from 1993 until 2002 and from 2003 until 2005 
respectively. 
Figure 5: Volume of articles containing the term neoconservatism or its equivalents 
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The bar-chart of figure 5 shows that in the period of the three years from 2003 until 2005 
all the newspapers published a significantly higher number of articles about 
neoconservatism compared to the previous ten years (1993-2002). In order to highlight 
the increase of articles from 2003 until 2005, their percentage out of the total coverage of 
the political ideology can be given for each newspaper separately. The Times published 
97.0%, The Guardian 96.3%, Le Figaro 97.8%, Le Monde 86,4%, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 66.1%, Suddeutiche Zeitung 66.6%, 11 Corriere della Sera 68.3% and La 
Repubblica 68.3% of their articles after 2003. 
Le Monde has the lead in tenns of the quantity of the articles it published about 
neoconservatism after 2003 (408 cases) while Le Figaro follows (313 cases). Siiddeutshe 
Zeitung published less articles (196) compared to the other European newspapers. The 
particular attention paid to neoconservatism by Le Monde can be possibly attributed to 
the research done on this subject by two of its editors. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet 
are the authors of a book entitled Messianic America: The Wars of the Neoconservatives 
(L'Amerique Messianique: Les Guerres des Neoconservateurs). 
As a whole, the volume of articles in terms of newspaper nationality was as follows: 
British press: 578 articles 
French press: 721 articles 
- German press 483 articles 
- Italian press 556 articles 
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From the perspective of the ideological family of the newspapers an almost equal number 
of pieces can be observed. Conservative newspapers published 1172 articles while liberal 
newspapers published 1166 articles. 
Towards Iraq and After 
Concentrating on the period from 2003 until 2005 the line-graph of figure 6 outlines the 
coverage of neoconservatism per month. There seems to be a degree of synchronisation 
of the media coverage. In particular, there are four months when most of the European 
elite newspapers focused largely on neoconservatism. These months are March 2003, 
November 2004, March 2005 and September 2005. There are maybe different factors 
which can explain the increase of articles published in these months. 
The European elite newspapers published a lot of articles about neoconservatism in 
March 2003. The plausible reason, which explains their stance is the war on Iraq. On 20 
March the US troops invaded Baghdad. As it was explained in the second chapter the 
neoconservatives were in favour of such a military operation envisaging the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein's regime. Given this it is not surprising that the invasion of this country 
constitutes possibly the main reason the elite press of the 'Big Four' published more 
extensively on the political ideology in March 2003. 
A reasonable explanation the European elite media focused on neoconservatism in 
November 2004 can also be identified. The US presidential elections took place in this 
month. This event can possibly justify the attention paid by the media on 
neoconservatism in this month. For the selected newspapers the future of the Bush 
administration and its neoconservative members might be an issue of great interest. The 
presidential elections of 2004 could mark either the beginning of a new era under John 
Kerry or the continuation of George W. Bush's 'hegemony'. In this context, a discussion 
about neoconservatism, its impact during the first term of the US President and its 
potential future role was maybe on the agenda of the European elite media. 
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Figure 6: Usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents from 2003 until 2005. 
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An interesting point to be investigated is why the European elite newspapers largely 
dealt with neoconservatism in March 2005. What can be argued is that this month 
provided a good opportunity for a discussion for the new international environment, 
which had started to be created in the Middle East, and the role of the 
neoconservatives. The Middle East was showing for the first time after the invasion 
of Baghdad on 20 March 2003 signs of transformation. The desire of the 
neoconservatives to bring democracy to the world could not but link them to this 
development. The debate was revolved around the credit they deserved. 
Signs of democratisation could arguably be seen at different fronts in the Middle 
East. In Afghanistan, in October 2004 the people of the country had the chance to 
vote democratically for the first time in their life. What is worth-mentioning is that 
not only Afghan men but also women did so. Mr. Karzai became the leader of the 
country. In parallel with that, in the occupied territories the situation was similar. 
The Palestinians had the opportunity to vote democratically for their leadership. After 
the death of Yasser Arafat, Mahmud Abbas became the elected chairman of the 
Palestinian Authority. He stressed the importance of peaceful problem solving and 
condemned suicide bombing as opposed to his predecessor. For his part, Prime 
Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon announced his intention to evacuate all settlers from 
Gaza and the Northern West Bank (Makovsky, 2005: 52). 
Further to this, the elections, which took place in Iraq at the beginning of 2005 
could be perhaps considered as an initial reward for the US administrations's decision 
to invade Baghdad in March 2003 and liberate the country from the tyranny of 
Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people were able to cast a vote and elect a government, 
although no progress was achieved concerning the instability of their country and the 
bloodshed continuation. In addition, the assassination of Rafik Hariri, who was 
former primer minister of Lebanon, gave the people of the country the opportunity to 
protest against Syria. George W. Bush emphasised on the need of Syrian armed-forces 
to withdraw from Lebanon (Ajami, 2003: 27). As a result, the pro-Syrian government 
in the country resigned. Moreover, in March 2005 there was also a discussion about 
elections taking place in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia. 
The debate started in March 2005 about the potential democratic transformation in 
the Middle East and the credit the neoconservatives deserved can be confirmed by the 
content of magazines and journals such as The Economist and Time. In its front page 
in the week between 5th and 11th March 2005, The Economist dealt with the issue of 
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democratisation of the Middle East. Its main title was: 'Democracy stirs in the Middle 
East'. In this regard, The Time published an article which was entitled: 'When 
History Turns to a Corner' (Duffy, 14/03/05: 20). The same also happened with 
Foreign Affairs two months later. The main headline of the volume which was 
published in May/June 2005 was: An Arab Spring? For instance, Bernard Lewis 
argued in his article: 'The creation of a democratic political and social order in Iraq or 
elsewhere in the Middle East will not be easy. But it is possible, and there are 
increasing signs that it has already begun (Lewis, 2005: 51). 
Finally, the reason the European elite newspapers published more extensively on 
neoconservatism in September 2005 compared to other months cannot be easily 
identified. The German elections took place in September 2005. Theoretically, this 
event might have been the reason for the increased interest shown by the selected 
newspapers in this political ideology. In other words the German elections might 
have contributed to the beginning of a debate about the potential neoconservative 
character of the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Angela Merkel and 
that of her policy program. Nevertheless, it is not certain that these constituted an 
obvious reason, which can justify the high volume of articles published in September 
2005. Looking at the previous line-graph of figure 6, it is interesting that not an 
analogous interest was shown by the media before similar events in other European 
countries. For example, the British elections of May 2005 did not lead to the increase 
ofthe volume of articles published about neoconservatism. 
Another factor which can maybe justify the focus on the selected newspapers on 
neoconservatism in September 2005 refers to the internal developments of the US. 
The attention of the European media might have turned towards the US in this month 
because of Hurricane Katrina and its devastating consequences. This hit the country in 
the last days of August 2005. September of the same year was the month the US 
government had to assess the catastrophes and respond to the needs of the victims. 
The failure of George W. Bush to take responsibility in the immediate aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina might have led the European media to comment on his weaknesses 
and also compare his performance with that in the field of international politics 
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(Bennett et aI, 2007: 64,65; The Economist, 17/09/05: 13).33 In this case, a focus by 
the newspapers on the war on Iraq and the neoconservatives, who had supported it, 
could be possibly expected. 
The Ineocons' 
An additional point to be explored is when the European elite newspapers started to 
use the abbreviations 'neocon' or 'neocons'. A reply to this question can offer 
insights as to the easiness shown by the media in their usage of the term 
neoconservatism or its equivalents. This analysis was conducted having 2003 as its 
basis because it was this year which marked the explosion of articles published. It 
should be mentioned in the search of the archives of German press the abbreviations 
'neokon' and 'neokons' were also used. The below-produced bar chart presents the 
results (figure 7). 
Figure 7: Volume of article containing the abbreviations 'neocon' and 'neocons' 
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The bar-chart of figure 7 indicates that the European elite newspapers used the 
abbreviations 'neocon' or 'neocons' to a large extent in the years 2003, 2004 and 
2005. Only a few cases appeared, from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2002, in 
which the above-mentioned abbreviations had been evoked by the media. It seems 
that the European elite media have been particularly familiar with neoconservatism 
since 2003. The British (316 cases) and Italian elite press (371 cases) were keen on 
discussing the neocons. This finding is striking especially for 11 Corriere della Sera 
and La Repubblica, noting that the abbreviations are not Italian based. Frankfurter 
33 Lance Bennett, Regina Lawrence and Steven Livingstone described as such the reaction of the US 
administration to Hurricane Katrina: 'The government was on vacation during Katrina[ ... ]Mr Bush 
was on his ranch and apparently did not wish to be disturbed until aides assembled a video of news 
coverage of the disaster and pressed him to watch the highlights. Vice President Cheney was also at 
his personal retreat. Rice was seeing shopping in New York' (Bennett et aI, 2007: 64,65). 
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Allgemeine Zeitung and Suddeutsche Zeitung also used them but to a less extent (60 
cases). The German language is not a a latin-based one and this can maybe explain 
the fact that these newspapers did not largely used the abbreviation 'neocon' or 
'neocons' 
The case of the French elite press (25 cases) seems more interesting. Le Figaro and 
Le Monde were more cautious in using the abbreviations 'neocon' and 'neocons'. 
This finding can hardly lead to the conclusion that French elite newspapers were not 
interested in neoconservatism and were not familiar with it. It was sketched out that 
both dealt to a large extent with neoconservatism, especially from the beginning of 
2003 until the end of 2005. The potential reason for the reservation of these 
newspapers as to their use of the abbreviation is maybe linked to the traditional 
interest of the French people to defend their own language. Gaullism is applicable in 
modem France and can be deemed as an intellectual liberty for the protection of the 
country (Sarkozy, 2006: 271, emphasis added). As an example, it can be mentioned 
that in March 2006, President of France Jacques Chirac stormed out of a session 
during the EU summit when a French official spoke English and not French (BBC 
website, 24/03/06). As The Economist puts it France is known for 'linguistic 
chauvinism' and 'the French have long considered their language to be more than a 
tool of communication: it is an embodiment of culture, identity and independence' 
(The Economist, 19/01/08). 
Conclusion 
The quantitative analysis of the articles accessed from the beginning of 1993 until the 
end of 2005 produced significant results. It was shown that it was the year of 2003 
when all the European elite newspapers started to largely concentrate on 
neoconservatism. This observation is reinforced by the broad usage of the 
abbreviations 'neocon' and 'neocons' with the exception of the French elite press. It 
was also clarified that the terrorist attacks of 11 September as well as the beginning of 
the first term of George W. Bush in January 2001 did not influence the coverage of 
neoconservatism by the newspapers from the perspective of the quantitative analysis. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that in the period before 2003 the German and Italian 
newspapers had the lead in terms of the number of articles published. By contrast, the 
French elite press, and especially Le Monde have dealt more extensively with 
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neoconservatism since the beginning of2003. In this case, the newspapers of Britain, 
Germany and France followed but still with a high volume of articles produced. In 
parallel with that, no particular differences were observed in terms of the ideological 
family of the newspapers accessed. 
Media coverage of neoconservatism III the 'Big Four' showed SIgnS of 
synchronisation only in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. During this period not only 
did the selected newspapers focus largely on this political ideology but they did also 
publish more extensively at common junctures: March 2003, November 2004, March 
2005 and September 2005. On the contrary, in the period before 2003 media 
coverage had not been synchronised. The European newspapers had shown a 
different interest in neoconservatism, which had varied according to each title. Their 
potential readers might not turn their attention to it at the same time and to the same 
extent during the period from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2002. 
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Chapter 6: Before 11 September 
The next step of the project is to analyse the qualitative nature of articles published in 
the period of 13 years covered. This will be divided in two parts: from 1 January 
1993 until 11 September 2001 and from 12 September 2001 until 31 December 2005. 
This chapter will focus on the former. Its aim is to explore how the selected 
newspapers used the term neoconservatism or its equivalents regardless of the US war 
on terror and the foreign policy of Bush Junior. Although the quantitative analysis 
outlined that it was the beginning of 2003 and not the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks when the media started to concentrate largely on neoconservatism, 
9/11 can constitute a dividing line. On that basis, it will be shown if this event 
influenced the way they interpreted neoconservatism. Potential changes of the 
meaning of the term and different uses of it before and after the atrocities will also be 
outlined. For the purpose of the analysis a categorisation based on specific themes 
will be made. 
It is interesting that in the period before 11 September when neoconservatism was 
not a sine qua non parameter in the literature of international relations the selected 
European newspapers showed a partial understanding of an abstract phenomenon. 
Their coverage was often fragmented and foreign policy was not the main context in 
which the political ideology was discussed. The following analysis will present 
various examples of the newspapers accessed in order to highlight their interpretation 
of neoconservatism in the pre-ll September era. It will be shown that only in a few 
cases the coverage - as to the figures of the group and the principles of the ideology -
was similar to the general academic consensus on the meaning of the term. 
American Domestic Perspectives 
In the period before 11 September the selected European print media associated 
neoconservatism with US politics. They mainly dealt with domestic issues when 
referring to it. As it will be shown, a consensus was observed as to the discussion of 
the political ideology in the context of US domestic politics. The selected newspapers, 
however, referred arbitrarily to various figures attributing them the label 
'neoconservative'. In some cases this political ideology was represented by the view 
of its different adherents individually. In other ones it was presented as being 
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consisted of a group of people that is to say that of a specific entity with concrete 
ideas and positions. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, endeavoured to find a definition for 
the neoconservatives as a whole and presented them as former leftists who had 
become critics of the left since the 1970s. It also asserted that they 'came mainly 
from a Jewish or Catholic mileau 1 sie kamen meist .lus einem jiidischen oder 
katholischen Mileu' (Z611er, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 04/05/94, Feuilleton: 38 
and Ritter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05104/00: N5). The Times agreed as to 
the former aspect. Christopher Hitchens quoted from Jacob Heilbrunn and argued that 
a strand of the conservative thought could be the neoconservatives who 'are mainly 
secular and Jewish ... and were intellectual authors of Reaganism.' (Hitchens, The 
Sunday Times, 29/12/96, Features). Figures illustrated as neoconservative by the 
media were in some cases linked not only to the era or Ronald Reagan but also to that 
ofMargaret Thatcher (Vignolo, 11 Corriere della Sera, 01107/95, Partiti: 6). 
Most of the newspapers ignored figures of the second generation of the group while 
they only rarely mentioned some of its first one. For instance, Irving Kristol was 
linked to neoconservatism by only three ofthe eight European elite newspapers before 
11 September: The Times, Siiddeutsche Zeitung and 11 Corriere della Sera.34 Rare 
mentions of other 'original neoconservatives' were found. For example, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and 11 Corriere della Sera portrayed Norman Podhoretz as 
neoconservative. 35 Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and James Q. Wilson were also 
illustrated as such by The Sunday Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.36 In 
parallel with them, Allan Bloom and Francis Fukuyama were linked to the group 
according to Siiddeutsche Zeitung (Bodecker, 12/07/94 and Michalzik, 11102/94). 
Further to this, the selected European newspapers did not concentrate on specific 
instruments, as for instance think tanks, which can be arguably associated to the 
political ideology. Exceptions were found in the coverage of Frankfurter Allgemeine 
34 The Times portrayed Irving Kristol as a neoconservative writer (Letwin, 26/05/94) and also as 'the 
father of neoconservatism.'(Stelzer, Business, 08/03/98). Siiddeutsche Zeitung illustrated him as the 
founder of The National Interest to the pages of which many influential neoconservatives contributed 
(Steinberger, 05/02/01, Feuilleton). Il Corriere de/la Sera considered him as guru of the 
neoconservatives, (Il Corriere de/la Sera, 24/08/95, Stampa). 
35 See: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22/04/95, Feuiletton; Jager, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
23/11100, Feuilleton: 53; Annunziata, 11 Corriere de/la Sera, 21110/93, Donne: 9. 
36 Andrew Sullivan noted that Nathan Glazer was a 'leading neoconservative' (Sullivan, The Sunday 
Times, 25/05/97, Features). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which also portrayed him along with 
Daniel Bell and James Q. Wilson as neoconservative (Reuter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
21109/00:12; Kaube, Frankfurter A llgemeine Zeitung, 10/05/99, FeuilletQn: 51). 
109 
Zeitung and 11 Corriere della Sera. The fonner considered Commentary and the latter 
The New Republic and The Weekly Standard as neoconservative journals respectively 
(Higer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13/09/00: 53; Annunziata,II Corriere della 
Sera 21/10/93, Donne: 9; 11 Corriere della Sera, 12/09/95, Politica Interna: 8). 
The newspapers of the 'Big Four' also portrayed many other personalities as 
neoconservative. Most of these figures do not belong to either the first or the second 
generation of the group as described in chapter 2. A variety of examples can be given. 
Scholar ledediah Purdy (The Guardian, 08/03/00, Feature Pages: 16), political 
philosopher Edmund Burke (Patrick, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/06/01, 
Geistenwissenschaften: N5) and political theorist and editor of the City Journal ofthe 
Manhattan Institute Myron Magnet were depicted as neoconservative (Helmore, The 
Observer, 22/04/01: 2 and Menden, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 24/04/01: 18). In addition, 
the same label was given to professor of journalism Marvin Olasky (Steinberger, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 05/12/01, Feuilleton: 15), politician Barry Goldwater, (Caretto, 
11 Corriere della Sera, 15/01100, Elezioni: 11), political scientist Charles Murray 
(Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 02/11194, Razzismo: 27) and the founder of the 
Heritage Foundation Paul Weyrich (Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 17/02/00, Varie: 
14). 
Newt Gingrich 
Amid different illustrations of figures as neoconservative ones by the media, Le 
Monde and to a much larger extent the Italian elite newspapers associated the political 
ideology to Newt Gingrich and the US internal political developments in 1994. This 
was a turning point for the American Congress. On 8 November, for the first time in 
forty years, the Republicans gained control of both the House of Representatives 
(230-204) and the Senate (52-48). Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich was the 
figure who led the Republican revolution in the Congress ending the Democratic 
domination was (Grant, 2004: 48). He was a rival for the Democrats and Bill Clinton 
who had been in power in the US since the beginning of 1993. Gingrich's leadership 
in Congress was marked by his opposition to the policies of Clinton and the 
impeachment of the President. It is worth-mentioning that Madeleine Albright 
characterises as 'political uprising' the political activity of Gingrich and recalls with 
frustration Gingrich's indifference to meet herself, US Secretary of State Warren 
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Christopher, US Secretary of Defence General Shalikashvili and National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake in February 1995 (Albright, 2003: 175). According to the 
assistant advisor to President Clinton Sidney Blumenthal, Gingrich saw 'himself as 
the equivalent of a president' (Blumenthal, 2003: 124). 
Le Monde noted that Newt Gingrich was the figure who launched his 
neoconservative revolution against Clinton in 1994 (Cojean, Le Monde,16/05101). 11 
Corriere de/la Sera focused on the domination of the moderate left in American 
Congress for 42 years and attributed its end not so much on the historic republicans as 
to the neoconservatives of Newt Gingrich. (Caretto, 10/11194, Elezioni) This 
newspaper also emphasised on the impact of Gingrich on the American political life 
by using the phrase: 'the neoconservative America 1 l' America neoconservatrice' of 
Newt Gingrich (Farkas, 11 Corriere de/la Sera, 04/03/95, Varie: 35). La Repubb/ica 
considered him as the president of the House of Representatives and the stage of the 
neoconservatives (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 22/12/95: 13). 
11 Corriere della Sera was the more representative newspaper as to the 
neoconservative portrayal of .Newt Gingrich. It portrayed him as: 'the leader of the 
neoconservative counterrevolution 1 capo dell controrivoluzione neoconservatrice and 
'neoconservative Lenin' (Caretto,11 Corriere della Sera, 11111/94, Politica Intema: 9, 
Caretto, 11 Corriere de/la Sera, 31101194, Anni: 29; Caretto, Il Corriere de/la Sera, 
15111195, Economia: 9; Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 13/06/95, Politica Intema: 9). 
It also saw him as 'Ayatollah', 'Khomeini', and 'prophet' of the neoconservatives 
(Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 05112/94, Guerra: 11, Caretto, Caretto, 11 Corriere 
della Sera, 31101195, Anni: 29; 11 Corriere della Sera, 08110/95, Varie: 5).37 
11 Corriere de/la Sera and La Repubblica also depicted many of the colleagues of 
Newt Gingrich as neoconservative. The conservative newspaper illustrated US Vice 
President under George H. W. Bush Dan Quayle as such and also noted that Secretary 
of Education under Reagan William Bennett was 'the guru of the neoconservatives' 
(Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 16/09/94: Politica Intema: 7). It depicted the 
Republican Senator Phil Gramm as 'the flag-bearer of the neoconservatives 1 alfiere 
dei neoconservatori ' (Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 25102/95, Varie: 9) and 
considered former Texas Representative Steven Stockman and religious broadcaster 
Patrick Robertson as neoconservative (Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 25104/95, Reati: 
37 For its part Le Monde portrayed Gingrich as 'the herald of neoconservatism / heraut du 
neoconservatisme (Kaufmann, Le Monde, 24/06/95). 
III 
20; Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 26/04/95, Reati: 14; and Caretto, 11 Corriere della 
Sera, 19/11195, Varie: 9). For La Repubblica the Republican Senate Minority Leader 
Bob Dole, who competed with George H. W. Bush in the Republican primaries of 
1988, was labeled a neoconservative (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 22/11195: 2). 
It is also interesting that 11 Corriere della Sera presented Rupert Murdoch as an ally 
of Gingrich, who helped him to launch The Weekly Standard in 1995: 
'Gingrich has a powerful ally, the media magnate Rupert Murdoch, who launched 
yesterday the new pOlitical magazine Standard in order to help him ... Standard could be 
the intellectual forge of the neoconservatives, a vehicular of electoral propaganda I 
Gingrich ha un potente alleato, il magnate dei media Rupert Murdoch, che per aiutarlo ha 
ieri lanciato la nuova rivista politica Standard ... Standard dovrebbe essere la fucina 
ideologica dei neoconservatori, un veicolo di propaganda elettorale ' 
(11 Corriere della Sera, 12/09/95, Politica Intema: 8). 
The significance of the portrayal of Newt Gingrich is that it largely influenced the 
way the Italian elite newspapers mainly understood neoconservatism before 11 
September. As it will be shown 11 Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica synthesised 
in many cases the political views of the political ideology around this figure. 38 This 
point does not refer to Le Monde. Although the French newspaper depicted in some 
cases former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich as a 
neoconservative politician it did not limit its references to the political ideology only 
to this figure. 
The particular interest shown by 11 Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica in Newt 
Gingrich can be possibly explained because of a similarity they saw between the new 
wave of conservatism he inspired in the US and that led by Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. 
As it will be discussed these newspapers saw a potential genesis of neoconservatism 
in Italy in the 1990s. The cavaliere was generally keen on developing US political 
marketing strategies in his own country. We know from scholar Giapietro Mazzoleni 
that the 1994 electoral campaign in Italy showed signs of Americanisation in terms of 
Berlusconi's apparition on the political stage, his style of presentation and the wealth. 
Forza Italia also had 'much more in common with the electoral machines of US 
38 See the 'European politics' section in this chapter 
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presidential candidates' because of its loose links with voters and volatile structures 
(Mazzoleni, 1996: 200). 
In the context of this Americanization, economic and political commentator Alan 
Friedman argues that Berlusconi aped the 'Contract with America' presented by 
Gingrich and proposed to the people of his country a similar plan, which was called 
'Contract with the Italians' (Friedman, International Herald Tribune, 16/02/95). With 
the 'Contract with America' Newt Gingrich aimed at providing the Republicans with 
a common manifesto. 39 If this was successful, it could offer the Republicans a 
mandate for party unity and legislation (McKeever and Davies, 2006: 217). Likewise, 
Silvio Berlusconi wanted maybe to strengthen the centre-right coalition in Italy, as the 
previous chapter suggested, in order to facilitate the implementation of his policy 
agenda.4o 
Economic Policy 
The selected newspapers did not largely agree as to the figures they attributed the 
label 'neoconservative' . However, their coverage as to the principles of· 
neoconservatism in domestic policy context showed signs of homogenisation. The 
accessed newspapers, with the exception of The Guardian and Le Figaro were 
motivated by various problems of the American society while dealing with 
neoconservatism. They focused on issues such as injustice, poverty and 
unemployment by presenting various perspectives, inter alia the neoconservative one. 
The following examples will outline their general consensus as to the opposition of 
the neoconservatives to the active involvement of the state and their economic 
priorities. The case of The Times is examined separately as it maybe reflects a 
potential ideological bias. 
Le Monde underlined the objection of the neoconservatives for a big state: 'the 
neoconservatives ... were pleading for a minimal state / les 
39 Former US President Bill Clinton comments on the 'Contract with America: '[Gingrich] boldly 
asked the American people to give the Republicans a majority saying: If we break this contract, throw 
us out. We mean it. The contract called [inter alia] for a constitutional balanced budget amendment 
and the line-item veto, which enables the President to delete specific items in appropriations bills 
without having to veto the entire legislation' (Clinton, 2005: 621) 
40 The main points of the program of Forza Italia included deregulation and liberalisation of the 
economy, more privatisation in the state sector and reduction of bureaucracy (Mack Smith, 2003: 488). 
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neoconservateusr. .. plaidaient pour l' Etat minimal'(Ferenczi, Le Monde, 22/06/96). 
This newspaper also commented on their inclination to deal with social problems by 
focusing on their concern for the increased criminality but not for an extended social 
security. Cecile Prieur and Marie-Pierre Subtil wrote: 
'In France, security has become the priority of the government but only after it has been 
previously degraded to the level of physical (or criminal) security, arbitrarily separated 
from the salary, social, medical or educational one. This theme derives directly from the 
American neoconservative institutes I En France, la securite a ete promue priorite 
gouvernementale mais seulement apres avoir ete au prealable ravalee a la seule 
securite physique (ou criminelle) arbitrarement separee de la securite salariale, sociale, 
medicale ou educative. 
neoconservateurs americains' 
CeUe thematique provident directement d'instituts 
(Prieur and Subtil, Le Monde, 07/12/99). 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that the neoconservatives were against the 
concept of 'welfarisation which had been a custom in America since the 1970s / 
Welfarisation, die in Amerika seit den siebziger Jahren ublich ist' (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/02/93, Geistenwissenschaften: 5). Siiddeutsche Zeitung also 
agreed with this position. It presented the neoconservative change of the 1980s as 
contradictory to the classic welfare and social state. In parallel with that, it saw the 
neoconservatives as being in favour of the deregulation of the economy (Ditmar, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 13/03/93; Habermas, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 27/02/99, 
Feuilleton). 
The Italian elite newspapers followed a similar approach. For instance, It Corriere 
della Sera attempted to summarise their position for the US society by focusing on 
three aspects: less taxes, more federalism and ignorance of welfare services (Ugo, 
27/01195, Politica Interna: 27). 41 For its part, La Repubb/ica critisised the 
neoconservatives that they constituted a movement against the poor people (Colombo, 
La Repubblica, 17/01101: 14). In this regard, the newspaper also elaborated on their 
philosophy. According to Newt Gingrich: 'If we make the poor people to count on 
health care at the expense of the state they will never have a motivation to find a job / 
Se abituiamo i poveri a poter contare sulle cure mediche a carico dello stato non 
41 See also: Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 03/01196, Lavoro: 7 
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avranno mai nessun incentivo a trovarsi un lavoro' (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 
22/12/95: 13). In this article it is maybe connoted that the neoconservatives believed 
in the primacy of the individual over social groups. Therefore, state assistance is 
arguably not necessary.42 
Antonio Polito went further in an article he wrote for La Repubblica in March 1995 
in which he attempted to compare neoconservatism to Marxism. Polito noted that the 
similarity between Marxism and neoconservatism was that both ideologies maintained 
that part of the inequality could not be cured in the existing political system of 
democracy and mixed economy. Nevertheless, while the Marxists advocate for a 
change of the actual system, neoconservatives find it is necessary to live with 
inequality. (Polito, La Repubblica, 31/03/95: 1). La Repubblica also focused on the 
main economic interest of the neoconservatives which was perceived to be related to 
the stock market. As Arturo Zampaglione put it: 'Wall Street is the place of departure 
and arrival of the neoconservative revolution / Wall Street e il luogo di partenza e 
d'arrivo della rivoluzione neoconservatrice' (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 31/12/95, 
Mondo: 12). The same newspapers gave an additional dimension of their economic 
policy which should be based on passive internationalism and denationalisations 
(Pirani, 05/03/95, La Repubblica, Cultura: 38). 
As for The Times it also dealt with the economic policy of the neoconservatives. 
The approach of this newspaper, however, differed from that of the other European 
ones. The Times presented and explained an optimistic view summarising the 
neoconservative philosophy. This was based on Irving Kristol's assumption that the 
economic system of capitalism would not lead to social unrest and demands for 
protectionism because of the high level of affluence of the American society. In 
particular, Irving Kristil asserted: 
'In our capitalist society income inequality is swamped by even greater social equality. So 
high is the general level of affluence that only experts can deduce a person's economic 
42 In another article La Repubblica maintained: 'the social problems do not seem to alarm the 
neoconservatives[ ... ], who rather ask for a retum[ ... ], to a government less interventionist and less 
generous, in order to emphasise on capitalist individualism / 11 malessere sociale non sembra 
preoccupare i neoconservatori[ .. ], che anzi chiedono un ritomo[ ... ], an un govemo meno invadente e 
meno generoso, in modo da valorizzare l'individualismo capitalista'(La Repubblica, 27112/95: 14). Le 
Monde agreed and presented the imporatce for an individual responsibility as a neoconservative belief 
(Kaufmann, Le Monde, 18/02/95). 
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status from his clothing; anyone can buy an expensive car, paying in installments [ ... ] The 
spectre of class war has faded away' 
(Kristol, The Sunday Times, 08/03/98). 
Although an ideological bias in favour of neoconservatism can be observed, this was 
the only article of the newspaper which dealt with this political ideology in relation to 
economics before 11 September. Thus, no safe conclusions can be reached. 
Is It Neoliberalism? 
The coverage of the above-presented economic features of neoconservatism by most 
of the selected European newspapers, can give the impression that this political 
ideology was a synonym for neoliberalism. David Harvey notes that neoconservatism 
is consistent with the neoliberal agenda as - inter alia - to the maintenance market 
freedoms, and the rise of individualism and private enterprise (Harvey, 2005: 82). In 
this regard, the media referred to similar economic principles and focused, with the 
exception of The Times, on their extension into the field of welfare by outlining the 
low degree of state intervention. However, there was a specific distinction in the 
coverage which can distinguish neoconservatism from neoliberalism: that the former 
is against moral permissiveness (Harvey, 2005: 82). Most of the European 
newspapers saw the neoconservatives as seeking to restore a sense of moral purpose 
by focusing on various values the adherents of the political ideology had on their 
agenda. 
Some newspapers, for example, dealt with neoconservatism in relation to 
affirmative action and agreed on its opposition to it. The Observer presented this 
opposition by noting that 'creeping multi-culturalism is a dangerous road to take' (The 
Observer, 22/04/01, News Pages: 2). Frankfurter Allgemeine asserted that 
neoconservative intellectuals were in favour of a colour-blind America (Klingenstein, 
10/07/01, Neue Sachbiicher: 46). Siiddeutsche Zeitung was explicit and portrayed 
them 'as enemies of affirmative action / Feinde der affirmative action' (Steinberger, 
05/02/01, Feuilleton: 15). 1/ Corriere della Sera concentrated on feminism. In an 
article Lucia Annunziata published she quoted from Norman Podhoretz and noted that 
he attacked the feminist campaign because in his view it puts the normal seduction 
and the initiative of the male into question (Annunziata, 1/ Corriere della Sera, 
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21110/93, Donne: 9). The same newspaper presented the neoconservatives as 
supporters of white superiority (CarettoJI Corriere della Sera, 02/11194, Razzismo: 
27). 
In parallel with affirmative action there was consensus in the media as to the desire 
of the neoconservatives for a return to traditional values. 43 For instance, The 
Guardian described their concern for the downgrading role of the family in modem 
society. The newspaper presented their view by asserting: 'treating one-parent 
families the same as two-parent families has caused a generation of children to fail. 
It's an enormous mistake to believe that all happy families are the same.' (Edward, 
The Observer, 22/04/01, News Pages: 2). Le Monde was also explicit and asserted that 
the neoconservatives had started since the 1980s a crusade in order to control the 
morality and sexuality of the Americans (Le Monde, 14/02/99, Editorial). Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung noted that the neoconservatives focused on the importance of the family and 
local authorities and condemned the moral decline of America. According to the 
neoconservatives this could be attributed to social pathologies such as crimes, 
violence, extra-marital births, abortion of teenagers, maltreatment of children, 
dependence on drugs, alcoholism, analphabetism and promiscuity (Steinberger, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 05/02/01, Feuilleton: 15).11 Corriere della Sera maintained that 
the neoconservatives were not in favour of gay rights. It explained that on the basis of 
their philosophy the marriage is only defined as the legal union between a male and a 
female. (Caretto,11 Corriere della Sera, 15/05/96, Matrimonio Sesso: 11). 
Finally, in the context of the support of the neoconservatives for traditional values 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung gave an additional dimension. It concentrated on 
religion. The German conservative newspaper asserted that the neoconservatives 
protected the religious right (Bahners, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/06/01, 
Geistenwissenschaften: N5). 
US Foreign Policy 
Neoconservatism and US foreign policy were not on the agenda of the European elite 
press before 11 September. This happened not only during the period Bill Clinton 
43 For a general discussion about the support of the neoconservatives for traditional values see: Le 
Monde, Grundberg, 15/08/99; Lazare, Le Monde, 20/10/00, Societe; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
15/02/99, Politik: 2; Annunziata, I1 Corriere della Sera 08/09/93, Donne: 25 
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was US President but also in the eight months of George W. Bush's administration 
before 11 September. Many newspapers completely ignored US foreign in their 
coverage of neoconservatism and only a few articles appeared in which the political 
ideology was linked to world affairs. Figures of neither the first generation nor the 
second one of the group were mentioned. 
The selected newspapers used the term in relation to different goals of US foreign 
policy during the Cold War and in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
As for the latter it is interesting that there was an absence of articles discussing issues 
like terrorism and neoconservative views for countries such as Iraq and Iran. An 
exception was acknowledged in the coverage of 11 Corriere della Sera which 
portrayed the 'neoconservative' politician Newt Gingrich to be in favour of a US 
military intervention against Tehran in 1996 if Iran would not close its training camps 
for terrorists (Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 05/08/96, Politica Estera: 5). The 
following analysis will present examples found concerning neoconservatism and US 
foreign policy before 11 September. 
Le Monde and Frankfurer Allgemeine Zeitung used the term in relation to the Cold 
War era. Daniel Vernet refered to the foreign policy philosophy of the group and 
compared the neoconservative principles to those of realists like Henry Kissinger. In 
particular, he mentioned that the neoconservatives wanted to impose the American 
democratic values in order to reveal their power vis-cl-vis the Soviet Union. By 
contrast, Henry Kissinger saw East-West relations as an opportunity to establish 
friendly relations. (Vernet, Le Monde, 27/10/00). For its part, Frankfurer Allgemeine 
Zeitung approached neoconservatism in a different way and dealt with the view of its 
adherents concerning the UN in the 1980s and their impact on US President Ronald 
Reagan. The German newspaper illustrated Reagan as treating the international 
organisation with reluctance because of the influence of the neoconservatives 
(Frankenberger, Frankfurer Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/06/93: 12). This was the only 
case a newspaper had dealt with the neoconservative position regarding international 
institutions in the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
As for the post Cold War era The Times and 11 Corriere della Sera published 
about neoconservatism and US foreign policy. The British newspaper discussed 
this theme within the context of the Russian elections and the Yeltsin-Zyuganoc 
face-off in 1996. Andrew Sullivan distinguished the neoconservatives as one camp 
of Washington's foreign policy which advocated for a hardline approach towards 
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Russia. The other camps were the non-interventionists, the new nationalists, and the 
Kissingerites. Sullivan noted: 
The neoconservative hawks are still getting over the cold war, when their liberal anti-
communism enjoyed its finest hour. Unfortunately, the new Russia fails to meet their 
emotional and political needs. There is no dangerous ideology of the scale of Marxism-
Leninism in Moscow to galvanise their intellectual fervour, merely a decadent Russian 
nationalism with strains of anti-Semitism. Still, the neoconservatives have clearly been 
right to cavil at war crimes in Chechnya and to be irritated by Russia's occasional 
prickliness in the Balkans. They have also been shrewd in noticing that Russia's bullying 
in the Caucasus suggests a new imperialism in central Asia that the West should keep an 
eye on. Nevertheless, it is still unclear why the Russian belly is of vital interest to the 
West especially in comparison with Eastern Europe. And so the neocons continue to 
argue, without particular traction like an old car that refuses to start' 
(Sullivan, The Sunday Times, 26/05/96). 
Il Corriere della Sera gave an idea of the preference of the neoconservatives for 
unilateralism in the international arena in the 1990s. The newspaper dealt with their 
opposition to the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to the 
journalist Ennio Caretto, the group saw GATT as harmful for US sovereignty (Caretto, 
11 Corriere della Sera, 17111/94, Commercio: 19). 
Other Themes 
In the period before 11 September the selected European newspapers referred to 
neoconservatism not only discussing developments in the US but also describing 
events, figures and political parties in other parts of the world. As opposed to the 
former case, however, in the latter one the media used the term either arbitrarily or 
indirectly without giving further explanations. In other words, it was presupposed 
that the readers might be able to understand why each figure, political party, issue or 
event was considered as neoconservative and what this could maybe imply 
(Fairclough, 1995, 105-109). Further to this, the selected European newspapers 
constructed the political ideology in various different ways. With a few exceptions, 
as in the case of German intellectuals, a general dissensus in media coverage was 
observed. This was largely based on their nationality or the specific newspaper title. 
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German Intellectuals 
Three European liberal newspapers, namely Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Le Monde and La 
Repubb/ica and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung used the term 
neoconservatism when referring to the intellectual debate concerning the importance 
of the Nazi past for the construction of the German identity. A second aspect of this 
debate was the potential European orientation of the country after its reunification. 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubb/ica were analytical in their coverage while Le 
Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung used the term without giving particular 
explanations. In this regard, the former set of newspapers labelled as 'new right' and 
'neoconservative' the scholars who attempted to legitimate the German Resistance 
and did not consider the day of the capitulation of the Third Reich as a liberation day 
for Germany (Lamprecht, Siiddeutsche Zeitung 08/05/00: 11; La Repubblica, Tarquini, 
22/04/95, Mondo: 15). These intellectuals were also presented as being cautious for 
the Europeanisation of the foreign policy of Germany after the reunification of the 
country. (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Gorkow, 14/09/93; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 05/01/94, 
Politica Estera: 12). 
The European newspapers attributed to a wide range of intellectuals the label 
neoconservative without necessarily explaining its meaning. The historian Ernst Nolte, 
who had presented Nazism as a reaction and continuation of the mass killings of the 
Bolsheviks, is a fugure the elite media mainly portrayed as sush (Weill, Le Monde, 
24/11/95; Tarquini, La Repubb/ica, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 
03/05/95, Cultura: 34). Dramatist Botho Strauss, historian Rainer Zitelman and the 
widow of Willy Brandt Brigitte Seebacher- Brandt, whom La Repubb/ica saw as the 
muse / musa of the neoconservatives, constitute additional examples (Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, Kultur, 22/04/95; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15; Tarquini, 
La Repubblica, 26/04/94, Cultura: 39). 44 In parallel with them, Writer Ernst Jiinger 
44 German neoconservative intellectuals were criticised by those of the left school for showing signs of 
neo-Nazism in their work. According to the widow of Willy Brandt, however, that kind of signs could 
not be found in their studies (Tarquini, La Repubblica, 30/03/93: Cultura: 35; Tarquini, 26/04/94, 
Cultura: 39). As for Botho Strauss Le Monde wrote that the neoconservatives had assembled around his 
neoheideggerian manifest (Adler, Le Monde, 27/02/99). Siiddeutsche Zeitung illustrated his work 
Ithaka as a neoconservative one (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 22/05/96). See also: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 12/03/99, Feuilleton: 45 
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was illustrated as 'prophet 1 prophete 'of neoconservatism (Mohr, Le Monde, 
20/02/98). 45 
European politics 
The selected newspapers of the 'Big Four' associated neoconservatism in a few cases 
to their own political developments. Although, they did not extensively focus on this 
connection, a use of term in national context can be partly observed while an 
ideological difference in the coverage is also noted in the Italian media. With 
reference to British politics The Guardian used the term indirectly discussing the 
Third Way. Andrew Marr noted: 'The Third Way can be described, so far, only by 
what it is not. It isn't messianic, high-spending old socialism and it isn't ideologically 
driven, individualist neoconservatism' (Marr, The Observer, 26/07/98: 21). As 
concerns French political affairs, Le Monde anticipated in 1995 the evolution of a 
neoconservative ideology from within the classic right of the country but did not 
comment extensively on that diagnosis (Chobeau, Le Monde, 11102/95). 
The German elite newspapers also mentioned neoconservatism referring to the 
political arena of the country. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that according to 
young socialists the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had set up the same 
domestic affairs programme with that of the neoconservatives (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/10/95, Politik: 4). Siiddeutsche Zeitung often used the term in 
order to describe the policy of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the 
Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU). For example, the leader of the Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS) Lothar Bisky was presented to advise his colleagues to 
attempt to create an alternative to the neoconservative policy (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
18/01197, Politik). This newspaper also wrote that the German Minister of the 
Interior Otto Schilly was a neoconservative (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 11108/00). 
The selected Italian newspapers did not constitute an exception as to the association 
of neoconservatism to domestic politics. For example, 11 Corriere della Sera noted 
that a climate ofneoconservatism started to be creating in Italy in 1993 (Fumagalli, 11 
45 Examples of other intellectuals who were considered as neoconservative include writer Hans-Jiirgen 
Syberberg, Hans Mommsen, Klaus Rainer Rohl, Heimo Schwilk, Herbert Kremp, Ansgar Graw, 
Heribert Fleissner and Heinz Brill (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Koch, 08/12/95, Feuilleton: 45; 
Silddeutsche Zeitung, Lamprecht, 08/05/00: 11; La Repubblica, Tarquini, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15 and 
Tarquini, 05/01/94, Politic a Estera: 12) 
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Corriere della Sera, 13/02/93, Lavoro: 15).46 The newspaper also presented Silvio 
Berlusconi as dreaming for cooperation with the Italian neoconservative bourgeois 
(Ostellino, If Corriere della Sera, 15/08/97, Politica Interna: 13). Nonetheless, 
although If Corriere della Sera approached this political ideology in a neutral way, La 
Repubblica was rather critical. In a context of a negative discussion of the economic 
policy of Berlusconi it quoted from Romano Prodi and asserted: 
'Prodi sees that a particular form of Thatcherism is being circulated in Italy, a strange 
political product which synthesises the neoliberalism ... which is in reality the parody of the 
political programmes of the neoconservatives I Prodi vede in Italia circolare una forma 
particolare di thatcherismo, uno strano prodotto politico che sintetizza un 
liberalismo ... che in realta El la parodia di programme politici neoconservatori' 
(Buzzanca, La Repubblica, 21103/95: 9). 
The conservative If Corriere della Sera might have seen Berlusconi's entrance in 
the political arena of Italy with sympathy and could have envisaged a good future for 
country with his centre-right policy plans and political programme. On the contrary, 
La Repubb/ica possibly considered Berlusconi as a rival for Romano Prodi, the Olive 
Tree Alliance (Ulivo) and the centre-left. It maybe wanted to express its concern 
about the genesis of the new wave of conservatism the cavaliere brought. Despite 
their ideological bias, If Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica, constituted a forum 
of debate about a political ideology - neoconservatism - which maybe impacted on 
Italian politics. This is an interesting finding as it refers to a period when serious 
questions had been posed for the quality of democracy in the country. The reason was 
Berlusconi's political interference in the media sector (Marletti and Roncarlo, 2000: 
229).47 
A final point to be made is that the selected elite newspapers used the term 
neoconservatism or its equivalents in order to illustrate other European political 
46 Il Corriere della Sera also associated the Italian politician Lamberto Dini with neoconservatism 
(Caro, If Corriere della Sera, 29/12/95, Politic a Intema: 6) 
47 The television system, dominated by the RAI, which is state-regulated public-service broadcaster, 
and the privately owned Fininvest - later Mediaset, has undergone dramatic changes since 1994 
(Mancini et aI., 2000: 103, 104). Following his electoral victory in 1994, Berlusconi endeavoured to 
strongly influence political communication through the public sector of television broadcasting; the 
appointment of a new council for the administration of the RAI was the most characteristic example 
(Marletti and Roncarlo, 2000: 229, Ricolfi, 1997: 138). 
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parties or figures beyond the limitis of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. For 
example, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung portrayed the Prime Minister of the Chech 
Republic Vaclav Klaus and his Civic Democratic political party (ODS) and the 
Homeland Union political party of Lithuania as neoconservative. 48 Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung depicted the Spanish leader Jose Maria Aznar and the members of his 
political party as such (Kassenbeer, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 30/05/95). La Repubblica 
considered the Austrian politician Jorg Haider in this way (Tarquini, La Repubblica, 
0411 0/96: 10). 
Asian Politics 
Some of selected European newspapers also referred arbitrarily to neoconservatism 
discussing about politics in Asia. Three of them, namely The Times, Le Monde and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung observed signs of this political ideology in China. 
Politician Zhu Rongyi, philosopher Li Zehou and the New Party of Taiwan (NP) were 
considered as neoconservative (Sheridan, The Sunday Times, 31108/97; Ming, 
22/11100, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton: 73; Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung,14/03/96, Politik: 2 ). For its part, Le Monde associated the problems of the 
Chinese society such as unemployment, reduction of the wealth and insecurity with 
neoconservatism (Bobin, Le Monde, 03/11199). 
In parallel with China, Japan was another case where the term found resonance. In 
1993 the conservative Liberal Democratic Party of the country (LDP) failed to win a 
majority and a coalition of new parties was established. Le Monde noted that one of 
them, namely the Renewal party was formed by neoconservatives, who attempted to 
present themselves as reformists (Le Monde, Pons, 18111194). Other parties which 
were considered as neoconservative include the Buddhist party Komeito, New Party 
of Hosokawa and the New Party Sakigake (Le Monde, 26/06/94; Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 22/07/94, Zeitgeschehen: 12; Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 19111193: 
Politik). Politicians labelled as such are Ochiro Ozawa, Morihiro Hosokawa and 
Tsutomu Hata (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24/02/94, Politik: 6; Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung 14/06/95). 
48 See: Kohler, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28/01103, Politik: 3; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
13/04/93: 5; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/05/93: 7 
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Miscellaneous 
Neoconservatism was also arbitrarily linked to a plethora of different phenomena by 
the media. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , Siiddeutsche Zeitung, and La Repubblica 
used the term in relation to jazz music. In this case, the label neoconservative was 
attributed to musicians who did not seek to forget the tradition of jazz but to follow it 
(Ricci, La Repubblica, 27/12/94: 32). A musician of this category was perceived to 
be Wynton Marsalis. Frankfurer Allgemeine Zeitung noted that Marsalis played the 
trumpet of Jazz in a neoconservative way (Frankfurer Allgemeine Zeitung,15/04/01, 
Medien: 38). Siiddeutsche Zeitung depicted him as leader of the neoconservative 
music experience (Dombrowski, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 26/08/98, Feuilleton and 
Heilbrun, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 26/01/01, Feuilleton: 17). 
Le Figaro and Siiddeutsche Zeitung linked French author Michel Houellebecq to 
neoconservatism (Le Figaro, Le Fol, 13/03/01, Kunisch, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
28/10/99, Feuilleton: 20). The former focused on his book Les Particules 
elementaires (The Elementary Particles). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung considered the architecture of Berlin as neoconservative (Wefing, 
09/03/01, Feuilleton: 44; Woflgang Stock, 27/08/95, Feuilleton). For its part, The 
Guardian used the term to describe the creation of new films about the Second World 
War. (Dyer, The Guardian, 20/08/98). Le Figaro linked neoconservatism to science 
and wrote about the fear of its adherents for its progress as it maybe constituted a 
threat for the humanity and should be controlled (Jannoud, Le Figaro, 09/09/99). The 
same newspaper also considered the Journal Strategie et Management as 
neoconservative (Hauter, 31/01/00). 
Le Figaro also used the term in relation to the revolutionary protests of May 1968 in 
France. In particular, approximately thirty years after May 1968, this newspaper 
reexamined the stance of those who had participated in the events. The result was that 
some of the protesters had regretted for their attitude a posteriori. Le Figaro 
attributed the repentance of some of the protesters of May 1968 to a kind of 
neoconservatism. An article published on 19 March 2001 pointed out: 
'If the leaders and the ideologues of May 1968 claimed to be against the old 
establishment, anti-democratic and anti-consumerists, the repentance of the most 
popular of them would be obviously similar to neoconservatism I Si les meneurs et les 
ideologues de Mai 68 se voulaient anti-vieux, anti-democratiques et anti-consumeristes, 
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la repentance des plus connus d'entre eux ressemble furieusement a du 
neoconservatisme' 
(Le Figaro, 19/03/01: 20,21; de Belot, Le Figaro, 19/03/01). 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung linked neoconservatism to art and considered as 
neoconservative the accusation that it is banal, boring or hermetic in modem society 
(Basting, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/01199, Geistenwissenschaften: N5). 
This newspaper also asserted that John Charmley was a neoconservative historian 
because he put the international picture of Winston Churchill into question when he 
noted that he was responsible for the loss of the Empire in his book Churchill: The 
End of Glory (Stuchtey, 01106/94, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Geistenwissenschaften: N5). La Repubblica used the term when referring to the 
attitude of the men who do not contribute to housework by not helping their wives (La 
Repubblica, 17/01197, Commenti: 2). 
Conclusion 
In articles published in the pre-l1 September era, neoconservatism did not constitute a 
synonym for US foreign policy. On the contrary, the European elite media mainly 
discussed neoconservatism in relation to American domestic affairs. This was the 
only point they found common ground as to its meaning. All the newspapers, which 
covered this issue, agreed that the neoconservatives advocated for a minimal role of 
the state. This implied that they focused on the importance of the individual 
responsibility and strongly rejected the idea of a welfare state. Despite this common 
denominator, differences in media coverage are acknowledged concerning the specific 
figures who were connected to neoconservatism. For instance, only Le Monde, 11 
Corriere della Sera and La Repubb/ica synthesised it around the initiative and 
leadership of Newt Gingrich. 
With the exception of US domestic politics the European elite newspapers did not 
agree on a common definition of neoconservatism. The construction of its meaning 
took miscellaneous approaches in the period before the terrorist attacks. The wide 
range of its different interpretations could vacillate between politics and art. It could 
include not only the godfather of the political ideology Irving Kristol but also jazz 
musician Wynton Marsalis. It could entail not only the views of a number of political 
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figures for the American society but also the stance of the French intellectuals who 
regretted for their attitude in the events of May 1968. A few national and ideological 
differences, as for example in the case of the Italian media, were observed in the 
coverage while the word was often used arbitrarily. 
Further to this, there was a lack of specific arguments or analytical texts which 
accompanied the term. For example, the print media attributed the label 
neoconservative to many political parties of Europe and Asia without defining what 
this meant for their programme and political stance. Neoconservatism could hardly 
give the impression that it was a movement with specific common goals. It was rather 
the view of a specific figure depicted as neoconservative by the media and not the 
position of a group of people which led the newspapers to deal with it. The European 
media rarely used plural to write about a group's belief, and even in the case they did 
so it remained unclear who the neoconservatives were. It can be perhaps argued that a 
reader of the eight European elite newspapers accessed in the period before 9/11 
might not be able to understand what the particular decoding of the term was. 
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Chapter 7: The Aftermath of 9/11 
The analysis of the pre-ll September material showed that neoconservatism had been 
covered by the European elite press as a political ideology without particular 
reference to international politics. The accessed media did not pay attention to the 
position of neoconservative politicians and intellectuals concerning foreign affairs, 
although international relations literature had done so before 9/11. The main objective 
of the following chapter is to deal with the shift in the content of articles published in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. In the first instance, Chapter 5 provided 
evidence for the different content of articles in the post-Il September era 
demonstrating the high interest of the accessed newspapers in neoconservatism from 
9111 and especially from the beginning 0[2003 onwards. 
This chapter aims at going further and will explore how the selected newspapers 
framed neoconservatism and constmcted the meaning of the political ideology. Its 
main objective is to explore if the selected print sources interpreted neoconservatism 
in a similar way and to conclude if a homogenisation in content of coverage can be 
observed. Having the results of the quantitative analysis as a starting point the chapter 
will first deal with the peliod from 9/11 until the end of 2002 and will then 
concentrate on that from 2003 onwards. The findings demonstrate that it was after the 
beginning of 2003 when the accessed newspapers showed a high degree of similarity 
in their understanding of neoconservatism. In spite of a few differences, which will be 
outlined. there is a general consensus in the media discourse as to the interpretation of 
the ternl and its principles as well as an agreement concerning the members and 
instmments of the group. 
The Road to the Iraq War 
In the immediate aftermath of 11 September neoconservatism did not largely impact 
on the agenda of the selected newspapers. The period from the terrorist attacks until 
the beginning ofthe US entanglement in Iraq in March 2003 was a transitional one for 
the coverage of the political ideology. Some of the newspapers - to a higher degree 
liberal than conservatives ones - started to express an interest in neoconservatism in 
relation to US foreign policy. Specifically they used the term in the context of 
Washington's world affairs approach and its war on terror in articles published in both 
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their news sections and editorial boards. Le Monde was the first newspaper to do so. 
In October 2001, the French newspaper referred to the neoconservative counsel in the 
Bush administration, Richard Perle and illustrated him as considering more important 
for the US the elimination of al-Qaeda than the capture itself of Osama bin Laden 
(Frachon, Le Monde, 29/10101). 
In December 2001 it was the turn of The Guardian to distinguish neoconservatism 
as a specific foreign policy ideology in the Bush administration. The newspaper saw 
its adherents as supporting the idea of a war against Iraq after the successful military 
campaign against Afghanistan (Alterman, The Guardian, 15112/01). The selected 
German and Italian elite newspapers used for the first time the term in relation to the 
US war on terror in March, September and November 2002 (Berthold, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 11109/02; Raulff, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20103/02; Caretto, 11 
Corriere della Sera, 22/09102; Caracciolo, La Repubblica, 05111102). However, it 
was not until the beginning of 2003 when The Times and Le Figaro started to do so. 
In the period from 12 September 2001 until March 2003 the accessed newspapers 
did not focus on the position of the neoconservatives concerning the war on 
Afghanistan. This can be perhaps explained because of the general support of the EU 
and NATO for this US-led military operation which would not make a particular 
reference to the view of the group worthwhile. Further to this, the media did not refer 
to neoconservatism in relation to George W. Bush's 'Axis of Evil' speech in January 
2002. As a whole - in spite of some early signs of associating neoconservatism with 
US foreign policy - the newspapers did not concentrate on the supposed role of 
members of the group in promoting the Iraq war in the transitional period for the 
media coverage, from the terrorist attacks until the beginning of 2003. This 
contradicts their stance after the outbreak of the war as the following analysis. will 
show. 
The Neoconservative Revolution 
The Iraq war was the springboard for the increased media interest in the foreign 
policy philosophy of the neoconservatives. From January and February 2003 onwards 
the selected newspapers largely dealt with neoconservatism as a parameter of 
Washington's world affairs approach and constructed it in a similar way. They 
represented the political ideology as a movement and either concentrated on members 
128 
of the group as a specific entity or they personified it by referring to specific 
politicians and intellectuals. Journalists also showed a familiarity in using the term as 
they often utilised the abbreviation 'neocon' in their articles. 
It can thus be argued that the media expressed a high interest 111 treating 
neoconservatism as an international relations theory in the aftern1ath of the terrorist 
attacks of 11 Septcmber 200l. This contradicts their stance in the pre 9/11 era. The 
chosen newspapers did not follow the approach of politicians and scholars such as 
Madeleine Albright, Al Gore and Noam Chomsky as wcll as most members of the 
group who are not keen on refen'ing to the political ideology. On the contrary, they 
focused on it by attributing the label 'neoconservative' to various politicians and 
intellectuals. by using the tenn in a routinised way even in atiicles which did 110t 
discuss US world affairs approach and by analysing various aspects of the group's 
foreign policy philosophy. 
Personifications 
In the aftennath of 11 September and cspecially from 2003 onwards the accessed 
newspapers interpreted neoconservatism in a remarkably accurate way according to 
the relevant literature of intemational relations. In this period the content of Chapter 
2 and 3 found resonance on the coverage as opposed to the pre-ll September era. 
This said it was not surprising that US politicians and intellectuals known as 
'neoconservative' in books and academic journals were also illustrated as such by the 
media which in no case contested this label when they. The newspapers mentioned 
figures of both the first and second generation of the neoconservatives while they 
largely concentrated on the latter. 49 In this regard it is interesting to give some 
examples with partiCUlar phrases accompanying the adjectival complement 
'neoconservative' or its equivalents. 
Richard Perle, for instance, was presented as 'notorious neoconservative', 'and 'the 
most famous / le plus cel(~bre' of the neoconservatives (Simms, The Times, 27110/04, 
Features: 20; Krauze, Le Monde, 27/03/03, International). He was seen as 'ultrahawk 
49 Figures illustrated in media reportage as neoconservative of the first generation were: Daniel Bell; 
Nathan Glazer, Jean Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz while of the second one were 
politicians Elliott Abrarns, John Bolton, Eliot Cohen, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalizad, Lewis Scooter 
Libby, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz. They also contain intellectuals such as Max Boot, David 
Brooks, Charles Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Lawrence Kaplan, William Kristol, 
and Joshua Muravchik and Daniel Pipes. 
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and ideologue of the war on Iraq 1 superfalcone e ideologo della guerra contro l'Iraq' 
and 'and one of the first inspiring figures of the war on Iraq 1 uno degli ispiratori del 
movimento dei neoconservatori americani ... e tra i primi ispiratori dell a guerra 
all 'Iraq' (Caretto, If Corriere della Sera, 16/12/03, Varie: 13; Caretto, If Corriere 
della Sera, 22/08/03, Politica Estera,).5o 
Paul Wolfowitz was one of the prominent neoconservatives the European elite 
media dealt with. He was depicted as 'a high priest of [Bush's] Administration's 
neoconservative cadres, and a driving force behind the war in Iraq', 'leading light 
among the neoconservatives in the Administration' and as 'the darling of the neocons' 
(Duncan, The Times, 04/04/05, Business: 37; Baker, The Times, 29110104, Overseas 
News: 40; Baxter, The Times, 29105105, Overseas News: 24). He was also presented 
as 'the most remarkable of the neoconservatives 1 le plus remarquable des 
neoconservateurs' and as 'a leading figure of neoconservatism within the 
administration 1 une des figures de proue du neoconservatisme dans l'administration' 
(Chaliand, Le Figaro, 16/03/04, Debats et Opinions: 18; Vernet, Le Monde, 13/09104). 
Additional e~amples of his portrayal include: 'superstar of the neocons 1 Superstar der 
Neokons' and 'neoconservative architect of the Iraq war 1 neokonservativer Architekt 
des Iraks Kriegs' (Mejias, Frankfurter Allgemeineine Zeitung, 20109104, Feuilleton: 
34; Siiddeutsche Zeitung 31/03/05, Meinungsseite: 4).51 
Characteristic lexical items used by the European elite media for the 
neoconservative portrayal of Robert Kagan were the following: 'the most articulate of 
America's neocons' and 'one of the creators of the American neoconservative 
movement 1 un des createurs de la doctrine neoconservatrice' (The Observer, 15108/04, 
Review Pages: 17; Rocard, Le Figaro, 28/05104, Debats et Opinions). He was also 
seen as 'one of the thinking masters of the American neoconservative school 1 un des 
maitres a penser de l'ecole neoconservatrice americaine' and as 'spokesman 1 Porte-
parole' of neoconservatism (Frachon, Le Monde, 11/02/03; Vernet, Le Monde, 
28/05104, Documents Etats-Unis).52 
so For the neoconservative portrayal of Richard Perle in other newspapers see for example: Burkeman, 
The Guardian, 15103/03, Home News: 5; Girard, Le Figaro, Debats et Opinions, Editorial, 20108/03; 
Riib, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24/03/04, Zeitgeschehen: 12; Komelius, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
Meinungseite, 15104/03: 4; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagioa 11106/04: 1. 
SI For the oeocooservative portrayal of Paul Wolfowitz see for example: Woollacott, The Guardian, 
27/02/04, Leader Pages: 28; 'Komelius and Hujer, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Politik, 30/10104: 6; Riotta, 11 
Corriere della Sera, 27/10103, Guerra: 11; Stagliano, La Repubblica, Politica Estera, 20/11104: 10. 
52 For the oeoconservative portrayal of Robert Kagao see for example: Gove, The Times, 16/05103, 
Features: 4; Hassner, Le Monde, Page Voe, 02/02/05; Wulf, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Feullettoo, 05/10104: 
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Examples of the neoconservative illustration of William Kristol by the media 
include: 'the godfather of the Washington neocons' and 'neoconservative guru' 
(Charter, The Times, 13/10/05, Overseas News: 45; Sullivan, The Times, 09110105, 
Features: 4). William Kristol was also deemed as 'one of the leaders 1 un des chefs de 
file', as 'neoconservative spokesman 1 neokonservativer Wortftihrer' and as 'one of 
the most influential neoconservative intellectuals in Washington 1 ein der 
einflussreichsten neokonservativen Intellektuellen in den USA (Lesnes, Le Monde, 
12/05105; Habermas, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 06/06/05, Feuilleton: 15; Koydl, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08/05102, Themen aus dem Ausland: 9).53 Along with William, 
Irving Kristol, who had also been associated with the political ideology before 9111 by 
some of the newspapers, was represented as 'godfather', 'father 1 pere', one of 
the' intellectual fathers 1 geistigen Vaters' and 'mastermind 1 Vordenker' of 
neoconservatism (The Sunday Times, 24/08/03, Features, News Review: 4; Vernet, Le 
Monde, 25105105, Chronique International; Muller, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
10/01105, Feuilletton: 34; Kreye, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 16/09/04, Literatur, 16/09/04: 
16). 
If the neoconservative illustration of the above-mentioned politicians and 
intellectuals by the media was expectable, their portrayal of other figures not 
identified as such by scholars might be more interesting. Specifically the attention is 
turned towards Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. These politicians have ties to 
neoconservatism but are not considered as members of the group. On the contrary, 
scholars illustrate them as nationalists as chapter 2 suggested. The qualitative 
analysis showed that the selected European newspapers did not label them as 
neoconservative. In some cases the media also elaborated on the distinction between 
neoconservatism and nationalism. For example the Italian liberal newspaper La 
Repubb/ica asserted on its first page that Donald Rumsfeld could not be associated 
with the former political ideology (Rampini, La Repubblica, 19/09/03, Prima Pagina: 
14; Wefing, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feulletton, 29/06/04: 35; Fertilio, n Corriere della Sera, 
09/11103, Varie: 33; Rampini, La Repubblica, Politic a Interna, 15/12/03: 20. 
53 For the neoconservative portrayal of William Kristol, see for example: BIumenthal, The Guardian, 
27/01105, Leader Pages: 26; Girard, Le Figaro, Debats et Opinions, Editorial, 20108/03; Riib, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26/10103, Politik: 8; Kreye, Siiddeutsche Zeitimg, Politik, 24/12/04: 1; 
Ostellino, Il Corriere della Sera, 04/07/03, Politica Estera: 1; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 
15106/03: 1) 
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1).54 In parallel with Cheney and Rumsfeld the media approached US President 
George W. Bush in a similar way and did not see him as a neoconservative.55 
The European elite newspapers also depicted other figures of US politics as 
neoconservative. Although they found common ground as to the members of the first 
and especially the second generation of the group, in this case various newspapers 
portrayed different individuals as such. These include, for instance, former adviser to 
President Ronald Reagan Michael Horowitz (Baxter, Sunday Times, Overseas News, 
27/02/05: 26), former director of CIA James Woolsey (Vaisse, Le Monde, 23/03/02), 
President of the US Committee on NATO Bruce Jackson (Le Figaro, 16111/04: 6; 
Zecchini, Le Monde, 07/10/03), vice-President of the American Enterprise Institute 
Danielle Pletka (Le Figaro, 05/1112004: 4), senator John Sununu (Caretto, 11 Corierre 
della Sera, Politic a, 01107/03: 2) and Bush's counsel Ed Gillespie (Caretto, 11 
Corriere della Sera, 26/01104, Elezioni Presidenziali: 11) 
The Neoconservatives as an Entity 
We know that many neoconservatives disagreed with the idea of a neoconservative 
movement. As Chapter 2 mentioned members of the group argue that their ideas are 
often contradictory. For their part, the European elite newspapers accessed did not 
find themselves in a dilemma. As opposed to the period before the terrorist attacks, 
the way they treated neoconservatism in the post-ll September era can maybe give 
the impression that this political ideology constituted a movement with specific 
common goals and principles. This argument can be reinforced by the wide use of 
plural in media references to neoconservative beliefs as it will be shown. 
Neoconservatism's equation with a movement in media coverage can be hardly put 
into question as various credible sources also used the term attributing particular 
54 Only a few exceptions are acknowledged. For instance, in a comment written by Mary Ann Sieghart 
for The Times, the newspaper considered both US Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld as neoconservative politicians (Sieghart, The Times, 10/12/04, Features: 20). The Times also 
portrayed Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld as neoconservative quoting from George Soro& (Billen, 
The Times, 03/02/04, Features: 8). Further to this Sarah Baxter asserted: 'Cheney and Libby were at 
the vanguard of the hardcore group ofneocon advisers' (Baxter, The Sunday Times, 30/10105, Features: 
21). An exception was also found in La Repubblica when Washington correspondent Vittorio Zucconi 
associated Donald Rumsfeld with neoconservatism (Zucconi, La Repubblica, 23/03/03, Prima 
Pagina:l). 
55 An exception includes an article published by The Times. This newspaper reported that according to 
George Galloway MP, George W. Bush was a neoconservative. In particular, Galloway said: 'I have 
no expectation of justice from a group of Christian fundamentalist and Zionist activists under the 
chairmanship of a neocon George Bush who is pro-war' (Bone, Overseas News, 17/05105: 29). 
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importance to it. For instance, significant figures of European politics referred to it 
in articles they wrote or interviews they gave concerning US foreign policy. The 
most striking example comes from Siiddeutsche Zeitung. Hans-Werner Kilz, Heribert 
Prantl and Urlich Schafer conducted an interview with Gerhard Schr6der, who was 
then chancellor of Germany. In this interview, Schr6der spoke about a 
neoconservative ideology. (Kilz et aI., Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 02/10104: 7). Not only 
Schr6der but also other politicians did so. For example, 11 Corriere della Sera 
conducted an interview with the vice-President of the European Convention Giulano 
Amato who talked about the neoconservatives using the abbreviation 'neocons' (di 
Vico, 11 Corriere della Sera, 16/03/04, Elezioni Politiche: 8).56 
The interest of the European media in the neoconservative 'movement' led most of 
them to investigate its historical roots. This also contradicts the content of articles 
before 11 September. After 9/11 the media generally agreed on the early origins of 
the political ideology. They saw the early members of the group as leftists and 
liberals who were disenchanted with the Democratic Party and turned towards the 
right. They also noted that many members of the group had become involved in 
politics for the first time during Ronald Reagan's administration. The following 
extract offers an example of the way the media elaborated on the origins of 
neoconservatism. In particular, its roots: 
'lie mostly on the left. The original neoconservatives - also nicknamed Socialists for 
Nixon - were anti-communist leftists and liberals who became alienated from the 
Democratic Party when it endorsed the anti- Vietnam war candidate George 
McGovern for President in 1972. Appalled by what they saw as the refusal of liberals 
to defend their values and confront totalitarianism in the guise of Soviet power, the 
neoconservatives drifted to the right, contributing to a broader political realignment 
that swept Ronald Reagan to power. Many took jobs in the Reagan administration 
and found a permanent home in the Republican party in the process' 
(Clark, The Guardian, Comment and Debate'Pages, 21111105: 28).57 
56 Former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine also did so in a comment he wrote for Le Figaro 
(Vedrine, Le Figaro, 16110/04: 13). 
57 For a discussion about the origins of neoconservatism see: Simms, The Sunday Times, Features, 
Culture: 43; Buruma, The Guardian, 17/09/02, Features Pages: 5; Laurent, Le Figaro, 16/10/04; 13; 
Vaisse, Le Monde, 23/02/03; Frachon and Vemet, 16/04/03; Vaisse, Le Monde, 10/09/04, Essais Etats 
Unis; Kimmage, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Femlletton, 22/10/04: 44, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 10/01105, Feuilletton: 34; Rampini, La Repubblica, 14/05/04, Cultura: 39. 
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Instruments 
Chapter 3 suggested that the neoconservatives had endeavoured to promote their 
views by giving speeches, lectures and interviews as well as by publishing pieces of 
work either in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. Although this 
issue had not been of interest for the media in the pre-ll September era, in the 
aftermath of the attacks they largely focused on instruments, which were perceived as 
being used by the members of the group in order to propagate their ideas. These 
included specific think tanks, journals, newspapers or TV channels. We know from 
contributing editor to The Weekly Standard David Brooks that the leading 
neoconservative magazines are The Weekly Standard, The Public Interest and 
Commentary (Foreign Policy, January/February 2004: 29). Resident scholar of the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Joshua Muravchik also notes that this think tank 
along with the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) are often described as 
constituting the command centre ofneoconservatism (Commentary, September 2003: 
26). The selected European newspapers largely agreed as to the neoconservative 
illustration of the above-mentioned instruments. They mainly focused on The Weekly 
Standard, the PNAC and the AEI. 
The Weekly Standard, for instance, was illustrated as the 'bible 1 Bibel 1 bibbia' of 
the neoconservatives (Burkeman, The Guardian, Foreign Pages, 23/09/03: 12; Winter, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 04/10105: 39; Matteo, 11 Corriere della Sera, 15107/05: 6; La 
Repubblica, 19/09/03:1). It was also seen as neoconservative 'bastion', 'the central 
instrument of the neoconservative movement 1 Zentralorgan der neokonservativen 
Bewegung' and as its 'real executive instrument 1 vero organo dirigente' (Frachon, Le 
Monde, 27/06/03; Geyer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23/06/03: 37; Muller, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung 25101/05: 13; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 
15106/03:1).58 
As concerns the PNAC The Times discussed about its Statement of Principles in 
1997 and deemed it as a 'neocon manifesto' (Billen, The Times, 19110104: 4). Le 
Figaro asserted that this think tank was founded 'in order to promote a world 
leadership of the US 1 pour promouvoir un leadership mondial des Etats-Unis' 
S8 For the media linkage between The Weekly Standard and the neoconservarives see also: Baxter, The 
Sunday Times, 14/08/05, Overseas News: 22; Borger, The Guardian, Foreign Pages, 23/09103: 12; 
GeIie, Le Figaro, Special Katrina, 10/09105; Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 20103/04, Politica Estera; 
Menichini, La Repubblica, Politic a Estera, 04/03/05: 17. 
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(Charnay, Le Figaro, 18/09/04, Actualite: 46). Siiddeutsche Zeitung referred to the 
'neoconservative' PNAC: 'which talked about a massive armament and a march 
against Baghdad / das einer massiven Aufriistung und einem Marsch gegen Bagddad 
das Wort redete' (Wernicke, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20/10/05, Meinungsseite: 4).59 As 
for the AEI this was illustrated as: 'anthemion / fleuron', 'study centre / centre d' 
etudes', 'headquarters / Hauptquartier' and 'representative / un esponente' of 
neoconservatism (Jarreau et aI., Le Monde, 18/09/03, Horizons; Vernet, Le Monde, 
23/01105; Rub, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26/10/03, Politik: 8; Di Feo, 11 
Corriere della Sera, 03/10/02, Politica Estera: 10).60 
The newspapers accessed also illustrated other instruments as neoconservative. 
Most of them dealt with Fox News. For example, The Times noted: 'Fox News, still 
the new kid on the block, pursues a ruthlessly neocon agenda' (Appleyard, The 
Sunday Times, 02/01105, Features, Culture: 14).61 Siiddeutsche Zeitung and 11 
Corriere della Sera considered The Washington Times and The Washington Post as 
neoconservative. (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 16/02/03: 6; Caretto, 11 Corriere della Sera, 
31101104: 13). As for the latter this is an interesting point. Although it is known that 
intellectual Charles Krauthammer contributed to this newspaper with comments, this 
is not perceived as being consistently neoconservative in the literature of international 
relations. Other foundations which were illustrated as such by some ofthe print media 
include the Heritage foundation (de Barochez, Le Figaro, 19/04/04; Fontaine, Le 
Monde, 30/03/03, Analyse and Caretto, 1/ Corriere della Sera 14110/03: 5) and the 
Hudson Institute (Krauze, Le Monde, 18110/03). 
Attributes 
In their interest in neoconservatism after 9111 all the selected newspapers focused 
extensively on various aspects of its world affairs approach. In most articles issues 
related to the political ideology overlapped. In spite of the risk of repetition in some 
59 For the neoconservative illustration of the PNAC, see also: Billen, The Times, Features, 13/07/04: 6; 
Meacher, The Guardian, Leader Pages, 06/09/03: 21; Reynie, Le Figaro, D6bats et Opinions, 15/04/03, 
'Objectif Saddam', Le Monde, Horizons, 11104/03; Schwarz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01103/03, 
Politik: 4; Flottau, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Politisches Buch, 17/01105: 15 , Rampini, La Repubb/ica, 
Politica Estera, ,07/04/03: 13. 
60 For the media association of the neoconservatives with AEI, see also: Borger, The Guardian, 
Foreign Pages, 23/09/03: 12; Roy, Le Figaro, 03/01104, D6bats et Opinions; Steinberger, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, Feulletton, 13/09/04: 13; Zucconi, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 23/03/03: 1) 
61 For similar examples in other newspapers see: The Guardian, Pappe, 28/11105: 31; Jarreau, Le 
Monde, International, 03/10/02; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 15106/03: 1 
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cases an identification of themes could be made. The next section will explore the 
way the media constructed the foreign policy philosophy of the group on the basis of 
specific categories. A general consensus is observed as to the principles of the 
neoconservatives and the countries they mainly focused in their analysis of US 
foreign policy. It will be demonstrated that there is a common interpretation of the 
political ideology as wel1 as a 'European frame' - among others - in the construction 
of the political ideology. Fmiher to this, it will be shown that the newspapers did not 
endorse the ideas of the 'movement' and often commented ironically on it. 
Going Alone 
The chosen European print media agreed on the desire of the neoconservatives to 
follow the path of unilateralism in the international arena. The group was portrayed as 
ignoring multilateral institutions, as for instance the UN. It was also depicted as being 
hostile to the option of international negotiations. A plethora of articles were found 
which considered unilateralism as a fundamental parameter of the neoconservative 
philosophy. The Guardian, for instance, asserted: 'Global cooperation [is] struggling 
under the tsunami of US neoconservatism' (Toynbee, The Guardian, 31112/04, 
Leader Pages: 20). Here the use of word 'tsunami' maybe connotes the severe 
consequences ofthe 'movement's policy for the application of international law. The 
French conservative newspaper Le Figaro also offers a characteristic example. 
Professor ofHarvard University Stanley Hoffman argued: 
'for the neoconservatives the US became so powerful that there would be no need to look 
at the limits imposed on them by the international law I Pour les neoconservateurs, I' 
Amerique serait devenue tellement puissante qu'elle n'aurait nul besoin d'observer les 
limites que lui impose le droit international' 
(Messarovitch, Le Figaro, 05/11104, Debats et Opinions: 13). 
In this regard Le Monde explained in detail the position of the neoconservatives 
concerning multilateral institutions as the UN. Jan Krauze noted that for the group: 
'The UN is not any longer in a position to treat the essential security questions and is less 
than ever the arbiter of international legality. As member of the political council of the 
Pentagon and famous hawk Richard Perle puts its, the UN is certainly always useful, very 
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useful but for health, culture and agriculture issues. For serious issues, for the great 
dangers to be confronted, the time from now on will be right for the coalitions of 
volunteers, formed around the US I L'ONU n'est pas plus en mesure de traiter les 
questions essentielles de securite, elle est moins que jamais I'arbitre de la legalite 
internationale. Certes, comme le dit Richard Perle, membre du Conseil politique du 
Pentagon et faucon iIIustre, les Nations Unies sont toujours utiles, tres utiles meme, pou 
la sante, la culture, I'agriculture. Pour les choses serieuses, pour affronter les grands 
dangers, I'heure est desormais aux coalitions des volontaires regroupees autour des 
Etats-Unis' 
(Krauze, Le Monde, 24/03/03). 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung also referred to the philosophy of the neoconservative 
politician Richard Pede and asserted: 'If an alliance does not serve our interests any 
longer, then it is dead / Wenn eine Allianz nichts mehr nutzt, dann ist sie tot' 
(Komelious, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 22/04/02, Die Seite Drei, p. 3). In parallel with that, 
the same German newspaper highlighted the antipathy of the group for the UN when 
it commented on a speech of Bush Junior in its General Assembly in September 2002: 
'Only the presence of the President at the UN committee should have been painful for 
the neoconservatives in Washington / Allein die Prasenz des Prasidenten im UN-
Gremium muss die Neokonservativen in Washington geschmerzt haben' (Komelius, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 14/09/02, Meinungseite: 4). A similar example as to the view of 
the neoconservatives for the UN was found in 11 Corriere della Sera which 
maintained: ' Iraq does not need a UN legitimation / L'Iraq non ha bisogno di 
legittimazione dall'Onu' (Caretto,11 Corriere della Sera, 17/04/03, I1 Consigliere: 11). 
For its part, La Repubblica concentrated on the necessity for an efficient functioning 
of the UN after the failure of its Security Council before the war on Iraq and asserted: 
, A reform is necessary and urgent at this particularly difficult moment for the now 
multiform international society epecially after the foundations themselves of the 
multilateral system have so often been put in question by unilateralists and neocons who 
refuse to share global responsibilities and act in breach with all international 
organisations I una riforma e necessaria ed urgente soprattutto nel difficile trapasso che 
affronta la societa internazionale diventata ormai multiforme, specie poi quando il 
fondamento stesso del sistema multilaterale e rimesso in causa ogni giorno da 
137 
unilateralisti e neocons che negano la condivisione delle responsabilita globali e baUono 
in breccia tuUe le organizzazioni internazionali' 
(Salleo, La Repubblica, 19/04/05, Commenti: 21). 62 
Promoting Democracy by War 
All the European newspapers accessed portrayed the neoconservatives as wanting to 
promote democracy in order to export the American values in the world. In so doing 
the neoconservatives were illustrated as being interested in the creation of a safe 
world environment for their country. Their perceived objective was to seek regime 
change. This could be achieved by military means as it happened in the case of 
'Operation Iraqi Freedom'. The neoconservatives were mainly associated with the so-
called doctrine of preemption in world affairs and the policy of nation-building. 
The Times, for example, maintained that the project of the group envisaged the 
transformation of the Middle East and the creation of democratic regimes in the 
region. These would start to be established and expand like dominos having the case 
of Iraq as a beacon. (Maddox, The Times, 2511 0105, Overseas News: 36 and Billen, 
The Times, 19/10104, Features: 4). Such a policy in their belief would guarantee peace 
in the world Le Figaro reported (Germon, Le Figaro, 18110104, Debats et Opinions: 
14). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung focused on the desire ofthe neoconservatives for 
'an interventionist, hard and military based US foreign policy and asserted: 
'Neoconservatism ... propagated for a totally new foreign policy, sort of overlap of both 
models of idealism and realism, which ... will spread democracy and peace by military 
means if necessary I Neokonservatismus ... propagierte eine ganzlich neue 
AuBenpolitik, eine Art Kreuzung der beiden Prototypen Idealism us und Realismus, 
die ... Demokratie und Frieden notfalls mit militarischen MiUeln verbreiten will' 
(Sattar, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2711 0104, Die Gegenwart: 5).63 
62 For similar examples as to the association of unilateralism with neoconservatism see: CrackneII and 
AlIen-Mills, The Sunday Times, 23/01l0S, Home News: 1; RideII, The Times, Features: 03/04/03: 20; 
Lambroschini, Le Figaro, 14/01104, International; Roche, Le Figaro, Debats et Opinions, 05/11/04: l3; 
Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeineine Zeitung, 19/03/03; N3; Riotta, 11 Corriere della Sera, 
OS109/03, Guerra: 6; Bonnani, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 27/03/04: 1. 
63 For similar examples concerning neoconservatism, democracy and the use of military force see: 
Burkemann, The Guardian, lS/03/03, Home Pages: 5; Vernet, Le Monde, 10/03/04, Page Vne; 
Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Ansichten, 20102/0S: l3; Klingenstein, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 01111103, Feuilleton: 37; Flottau, Silddeutsche Zeitung,l3/04/04, Meinungseite: 4; 
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The selected print media perceived the neoconservative agenda as concentrating on 
specific countries. Iraq was considered as their first military target. The newspapers 
focused extensively on the support of the group for an invasion of this country. It has 
been already mentioned that neoconservative politicians such as Perle and Wolfowitz 
and think tanks line the PNAC had been deemed as advocating for this military 
operation. The fact that the neoconservative group had been in favour of 'Operation 
Iraqi Freedom' often became a stereotype in the media. With respect to that The 
Observer can provide an example. This newspaper published an article dealing with 
former owner of The Daily Telegraph Lord Black, a business colleague of Richard 
Perle. Black's admission to charges of fraud in a Chicago court and his cooperation 
with Perle were the pretext it remembered the neoconservatives and asserted: 'The 
latest news from Chicago is a further reminder of the fact that criminality has never 
been a stranger to the neocons, and their agenda, which included the invasion of Iraq' 
(The Observer, 02/10/05, News Pages: 28). 
Beyond Iraq, Iran and Syria were examples the media concentrated on in order to 
explain the strategy of the group. Here it was also depicted as favouring the option of 
a US attack against both countries. For instance, The Times explored the specific 
plans of the neoconservatives concerning Tehran and suggested that according to their 
view 'the West must surgically strike at Iran's hidden nuclear facilities and robustly 
challenge Iranian state-sponsored terrorism' (Toolis, The Times, 19/11105, Features: 
27). As for Syria Le Monde presented the position of the group by quoting from 
Charles Krauthammer. The French newspaper asserted: 
'it is necessary to change Damascus in order to change [the Middle East] region. These 
are our principles, which brought us to this moment, after Afghanistan and Iraq. They 
should now guide us towards Damascus, passing by Beirut I il faut changer Damas pour 
changer la region. Ce sont nos principes qui nous ont amenes a ce moment-la, apres 
l'Afghanistan et l'lrak. lis doivent nous guider maintenant a Damas, en passant par 
Beyrouth' 
(Lesnes, Le Monde, 09/03/05, International). 
Nye, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20/12/2005, Themen des Tages: 2; Mieli, If Corriere della Sera, 17/07/03, 
39; Schlesinger Arthur Jr, If Corriere della Sera, 18/10/03, Politica Estera: 35; Bonanni, La Repubblica, 
09/06/04, Politica Estera: 16. 
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For its part La Repubblica was also explicit: as to the neoconservative policy towards 
both Iran and Syria. 64 Federico Rampini noted: 
'On 21 March of this year [2003], three days after the beginning of the war on Iraq, [the 
neoconservatives] preannounced the next stops: regime change in Iran and Syria I " 21 
marzo di quest' anno, tre giorni dopo I' inizio della guerra in Iraq ... [1 neooconservatori] 
hanno preannunciato le prossime tappe: cambio di regime in Iran e Siria' 
(Rampini, La Repubblica, Politica Estera, 07/04/03: 13). 
Although the media focused on the neoconservative position on three Middle East 
countries, they ignored another one although it had been placed in the 'axis of evil' by 
President Bush in January 2002: North Korea. No articles were found discussing the 
view ofthe group concerning Pyongyang. 
The afore-mentioned examples indicate that the selected newspapers constructed as 
belligerent the philosophy of the group. They perceived as expansionist the foreign 
policy the neoconservatives advocated for and often regarded them as radical 
ideologues, who sought to use force for moral reasons and not only because of US 
security concerns. In many cases the political ideology was also linked to imperialism. 
The Times, for instance, illustrated the neoconservatives as 'Bolsheviks' and 
'jihadists' discussing the arguments of the camp of John Kerry before the US 
presidential elections of 2004 (Jenkins, 30/10104, The Times, Features: 28).65 The 
same newspaper spoke about a 'neocon mafia'. In this case Simon Jenkins 
commented on the memoir of Britain's ambassador to Washington Sir Christopher 
Meyer but used his own words and not those of the author (Jenkins, The Times, 
20/11105, Features, Culture: 41). 
The neoconservatives were also portrayed as: 'warriors in the White House', 'war 
hungry' , 'muscular Wilsonians 1 harte Wilsonianer' and 'war-based civilians 1 
kriegeriesche Ziviliste' (Macintyre, The Times, 02/10104, Features: 28; Read, The 
64 For similar examples as concerns the neoconservative position for Iran and Syria see: Matthew Paris, 
The Times, 22/11105, Features: 27; The Guardian, 08/11105 Leader pages: 34; Girard, Le Figaro, 
International, 05/05/04: 3; Lambroschini, Le Figaro, 14/01104, International; Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 19/01105, Politik: 5; Kornelius, Silddeutsche Zeitung, 08/09/04: 2; Romano, If Corriere della 
Sera, 20/06/03 
65 The term Bolsheviks refers to those who led the communist revolution of 1917 in Russia while that 
of jihadists is related - according to the rhetoric of the West - to the group of Muslim terrorists who 
intend to destroy America and its allies. 
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Observer, 19/06105: 18; Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Geistenwissenschaften, 19/03/03: N3; Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 09/09/02, Feuilletton: 11). 
They were also seen as 'moral crusaders' and 'imperial strategists' (Billen, The Times, 
19/10104, Features: 4; Drayton, The Guardian, 28112/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 
26). In parallel with these words which accompanied the term neoconservatism or its 
equivalents Le Monde quoted from Paul Wolfowitz who had said about his country: 
'[As a) Moral nation, we exercise our power without conquest desire, we sacrifice 
ourselves for the liberty of others I [Comme une) Nation morale, nous exer90ns notre 
puissance sans volonte de conquete, nous nous sacrifions pour la liberte des autres' 
(Frachon, Le Monde, 11102/03). 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung noted that the neoconservatives compared the American 
Empire with that of ancient Rome. (Flottau, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 14111103, 
Meinungseite: 4). 11 Corriere della Sera reported that the neoconservatives had 
spoken about a benevolent American empire by considering their country as a unique 
superpower (Caretto, 22/09/02, Favorevole: 10). It also published an article of 
historian Arthur Schlesinger Junior who asserted: 'The neoconservatives are visionists 
who want to remake the world in America's image I I neoconservatori sono dei 
visionary che vogliono rifare in mondo secondo l'immagine americana' (Schlesinger 
Arthur Jr, 11 Corriere della Sera, 17/10103, Politic a Estera: 35). Likewise La 
Repubblica included a comment of another scholar, Joseph Nye who noted that 
neoconservative writes such as Max Boot had expressed their support for a US 
administration over foreign countries following the model of Great Britain in the 19th 
century.66 
Supporting Israel 
In their interest in the view of the neoconservatives for the Middle East the selected 
newspapers concentrated on the relationship between the group and Israel. 
Neoconservative scholars, as chapter 2 suggested, do not contest their support for this 
country. The chosen print media agreed with this approach, saw Israel as an ally of 
the group and framed the group as defending the interests of this country. The Times, 
66 For the media association of neoconservatism with war, morality and imperialism see for example: 
West, The Times, 28/06/05, Features: 19: Colley, The Guardian, 17/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 
32; Frachon and Vernet, Le Monde, 19/09/02; Vernet, 30/11105, International Chronique; 
Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Ansichten, 20102/05: 13; Caretto, Il Corriere della 
Sera, 22/09/02: 10. 
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for example, spoke about a neoconservative 'love for Israel' (Kaletsky, The Times, 
13/05104, Features: 24). It pointed out, however, in another case that this country had 
not been their only interest: 'the neocons are by no means exclusively preoccupied 
with the Middle East and the defense of Israel' (Simms, 27/10/04, The Times, 
Features: 20). For its part The Observer, observed: 'The [neoconservative] articles of 
faith include the notion that the interests of Israel and America are indivisible' (The 
Observer, 01109/02, News Pages: 16). 
Le Monde noted that some of the neoconservatives had been close to the Israeli right. 
Yet it did not use a sweeping language and underlined that not all of them had been 
close to it (Frachon and Vemet, Le Monde, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses). 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung referred to neoconservatives 'who mixed up the strategic 
facilities for Israel with the national Interest of the USA 1 die die strategischen 
Bedingungen Israels mit dem nationalen Interesse der USA verwechselten (Tim B. 
MUller, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 25101/05, Feuilleton: 13). La Repubblica was explicit 
and asserted that a fundamental feature of the foreign policy philosophy of the group 
was their 'support 1 appoggio' for this country (Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima 
Pagina, 15106/03: 1). 
The selected newspapers linked the interest of the neoconservatives in defending 
Israel to their desire to export democracy in the Middle East. They illustrated the 
group as wanting to protect this country by hoping to create - as we saw - free regimes 
in the region and not by seeking to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The following 
examples will indicate the fundamental parameters of the neoconservative approach 
as represented by the media. These include a policy of isolation for the Palestinians, a 
freeze of negotiations for the creation of their own state until they renounced 
terrorism, and a justification ofthe hard-line policy oflsrael. 
The Guardian published an article of politics fellow at St. Edmund Hall in Oxford 
and former PLO representative Karma Nabulsi. Nabulsi argued that the 'myth' of 
Yassir Arafat as an obstacle to the Middle East peace process 'gave the 
neoconservative hawks in the US administration the opportunity to redesign the 
Middle East in harmony with the views of their ally Israel' (Nabulsi, The Guardian, 
1511112005, Comment and Debate Pages: 32). In this case it is connoted that the 
neoconservatives sought to isolate Arafat because of his supposed support for 
terrorism and terrorist organisations such as Hamas. 
142 
Further to this Le Figaro conducted an interview with Professor of political science 
Gilles Kepel who argued that the neoconservatives wanted to redesign the Middle 
East 'in order to mainly assure the security of Israel / afin d'assurer une fois pour 
toutes la securite d 'Israel' and did not pay attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Girard, Le Figaro, 02/09/04, Debats et Opinions: 12; Girard, Le Figaro, 07/04/04: 
10). Likewise Le Monde noted that the neoconservatives: 'construct their policy in 
the region on the basis of the continued existence of Israel / construissent leur 
politique dans la region en fonction de la perennite d'Israel' (Le Bars, Le Monde, 
29/10/04, International). The same newspaper also asserted that their logic was: 'to 
remove hostile regimes to Israel from the region / debarasser la region de regimes 
hostiles aux Etats-Unis et a Israel (Addi and Geze, Le Monde, 03/08/04).67 
For its part Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung concentrated on the ambition of the 
neoconservatives for positive repercussions of the war on Iraq and maintained: 
'After a regime change in Baghdad Iraq will become a model for Near and Middle East, 
kind of a Mesopotamian city upon a hill the shine of which will probably unfreeze the 
(frozen) Arab-Israeli conflict I Nach einem Wechsel des Bagdader Regimes werde der 
Irak zum Modell fOr den Nahen und Mittleren Osten werden, zu einer Art 
mesopotamischer Stadt auf dem Hugel, deren Schein wohl auch den vereisten israelisch-
palastinensischen Konflikt auftauen' 
(Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/02/05, Politik: 13). 
Finally, 11 Corriere de/la Sera offers an example of the way the neoconservatives 
assessed the foreign policy of Israel. It presented Richard Pede as considering 'more 
than legitimised / piu che leggitima' the fact that former Primer Minister of the 
country Ariel Sharon had retaliated against the Palestinians (Caretto, 11 Corriere de/la 
Sera, 22/08/03, Politic a Estera: 6). 
In this context another point to be explored is if the media referred to the group in 
relation to the Jewish ethnicity of some of its members. Neoconservative intellectuals 
such as Max Boot criticise European news outlets like the BBC and Le Monde for 
using the term as a synonym for a Jew (Boot, Foreign Policy, January/February 2004). 
67 In this regard 11 Corriere della Sera published an article of Arthur Sclesinger Jr. He also noted that 
according to Paul W olfowitz a democratised Middle East might become less hostile to Israel 
(Schlesinger, I/ Corriere della Sera, 18/10/03, Politic a Estera: 35). 
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For its part Le Monde offers a response to Boot. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet 
argue: 'Le Monde never wrote or implied something like that I Le Monde n' a jamais 
ecrit ni insinue rien de tel' (Frachon and Vemet, Le Monde, 02/02/04, Horizons 
Analyses). 
The analysis of the coverage shows that some of the newspapers rarely dealt with 
the ethnicity of the neoconservatives. Sarah Baxter, for instance, noted that 
'neoconservative' former adviser to President Reagan Michael Horowitz is a Jew 
(Baxter, The Sunday Times, 27/02/05, Overseas News: 26). Alain Frachon and Alain 
Vemet maintained the same for Richard Pipes, father of Daniel (Frachon et Vemet, Le 
Monde, 16104/03, Horizons). Likewise Robert Sole noted that Paul Wofowitz is a 
Jew (Sole, Le Monde, 05/05/03, L'Ombre des Mots). Furthermore, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung started a paragraph as follows: 'The neoconservatives many of 
whom were Jews ... I Die Neokonservativen, von denen viele Juden waren .. .' 
(Kimmage, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Politik, 22/10104: 44).68 In this case the 
newspaper did not assert that all members of the group are Jews. Using the word 
'many' it avoids a possible generalisation. 
As a conclusion what can be argued is that although a few references to the ethnicity 
of the neoconservatives could be found in the selected newspapers these cannot justify 
the point made Max Boot. A potential reader of the selected newspaper might in 
some cases be informed about the Jewish ethnicity of members of the group. 
Nonetheless this does not entail that the neoconservatives were represented as a 
synonym for a Jew; The connection between members of the group and their ethnicity 
was made so arbitrarily in the media discourse that this point would not have been 
examined in the thesis ifMax Boot had not commented on it. 
Antipathy for Europe 
Another aspect of the neoconservative world affairs philosophy the media covered 
refers to the view of the group for the EU. This 'EU t1-ame' goes partly beyond the 
content of the literature on neoconservatism as this does not largely focus on the 
position of members of the group towards Europe and regarding transatlantic relations. 
In this case a European sensitivity of the accessed print sources can be perhaps 
68 Siiddeutsche Zeitung spoke about 'Jewish neoconservatives 1 Iiidischen Neokonservativen' quoting 
from politicians Marshall Whitmann (Koydl, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08/05102, Themen Aus dem 
Ausland: 9). 
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acknowledged. Although the context of their news and editOlial accounts might not be 
the same - as the case with Le Figaro and Turkey's EU membership will highlight -, 
they agreed as to the philosophy of the neoconservatives. That is because the chosen 
newspapers portrayed the neoconservatives as dismissing the idea of a strong 
European Union. Their perceived antipathy for Europe was mainly concerned with 
France as the following examples will highlight. The group was also illustrated as 
being in favour of an EU split especially over foreign policy issues in order to prevent 
its emergence as a global political actor in the international arena with a potential to 
compete with the US. The main interest of the 'movement' was considered to be the 
remaining of America as the sole superpower in world politics without needing to 
compete with international bodies such as the EU. 
The Times, for instance, elaborated on the different approach between American 
neoconservatives and European politicians. The newspaper noted that when French 
President Jacques Chirac spoke for the need of Europe to be: 'an equal partner with 
the United States on the world stage [he contradicted] the neoconservative view of 
America as the only superpower imposing its values on the rest of the world' 
(Webster, The Times, 19/11104, Home News: 22). Further to this, it asserted: 'For 
American neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Europe has lost its moral compass 
and France its moral fibre' (Mount, The Sunday Times, 04/07/04, Features, Culture: 
52). It is noteworthy that the antipathy of the group for France was in another case 
taken for granted. This happened in an article Rod Liddle wrote discussing the life of 
people in Corsica. In this case the journalist remembered suddenly the 
neoconservatives by pointing out: 'They hate the French here [in Corsica] more than 
does a neocon Republican senator' (Liddle, The Sunday Times, 30/05/04, Features, 
Homes: 19). 
The Observer was explicit commenting on the book DC Confidential of former 
British ambassador to Washington Sir Christopher Meyer. It asserted that the 
neoconservatives: 'see a strong Europe as a threat to American hegemony' (Stephen, 
The Observer, 13/11/05, Review Pages: 15). In parallel with that, in a comment 
fonner French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine wrote for Le Figaro he noted that the 
neoconservatives were blaming the Europeans for providing no response to the 
problems of the world (Vedrine, Le Figaro, Debats et Opinions, 16/10/04: 13). The 
same newspaper· concentrated in March 2004 on a potential improvement of 
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transatlantic relations should John Kerry won the US presidential elections a few 
months later. Scholar Bruno Tertrais wrote: 
'Europe had a dream. John Kerry is elected president of the US and, as if by magic, it 
finds again the US it loves. Goodbye neoconservatives and fundamentalists, war-based 
hyperpower and enterprise of reshaping the world. We welcome a new supposedly pro-
French president - having passed part of his infancy in Bretagne, we close the Bush 
parenthesis and we will be getting back to normal transatlantic relations I L'Europe a fait un 
reve. John F. Kerry est elu president des Etats-Unis et, comme par enchantement, elle 
retrouve l'Amerique qu'elle aime. Adieu, neoconservateurs et fondamentalistes, 
hyperpuissance guerriere et enterprise de remodelage du monde. Bienvenue a un 
president suppose pro-frangais, ayant passe une partie de son enfance en Bretagne, 
fermons la parenthese Bush et retrouvons le cours normal des relations transatlantiques' 
(Tertrais, Le Figaro, 11103/04, Debats et Opinions: 13). 
Tertrais noted in his article that a possible election of Kerry might not necessarily 
ensure a better future for transatlantic relations. However with the afore-presented 
excerpt he outlined the illusion of Europe as he explained. The use of the term 
'goodbye' is emotional and implies an imaginary European relief for the potential 
departure of the neoconservatives from the US administration. 
Le Figaro also dealt with the view of the neoconservatives on a future adhesion of 
Turkey in the Union. It interviewed senior research fellow at CERI Jacques Rupnik 
who portrayed them as 'the most fervent partisans of Turkey's accesion in the EU 1 
les plus fervents partisans de I'adhesion de la Turquie cl l' UE' (Bollaert et aI, 
10/05/04, Le Figaro, Debats et Opinions: 12, 13). 69 In this article it is maybe 
connoted that the neoconservatives wanted to push hard for the enlargement ofthe EU. 
The possible reason is that a Turkish membership might undermine the effort of the 
Europeans to promote a strong political union. Here we can perhaps acknowledge a 
national prejudice of Le Figaro in its coverage of neoconservatism. That is because it 
is a significantly debatable issue in France if a Muslim country such a Turkey can 
69 CERI (centre d'etudes et de recherches internationales) is a French centre for research on the 
international political system founded in 1952 (CERI website). 
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become a full member of the EU and if the boundaries of the Union should enlarge 
further (Royal, 2007: 309, 31 O). 70 
It should be mentioned that the support of the neoconservatives for a full 
membership of Turkey in the EU as Le Figaro connoted should not be taken for 
granted. It contradicts the view of former ambassador of the US in Turkey Mark 
PatTis. Ambassador Parris writes that the neoconservatives were not in favour of 
Turkey's accession in the Union in order to block the European Olientation of this 
country and promote its American one. In particular he argues: 'One occasionally 
hears the arguments, generally in American neoconservative circles that closer 
Turkish-European relations will be inevitably at American expense [ ... ] and that 
Turkey would be best advised to abandon its European vocation altogether' (Parris, 
2005, 149). The attention paid by Le Figaro to the contradictory position from that of 
Ambassador Parris maybe constitutes additional evidence for the concem of the 
newspaper regarding the stability of the EU. 
Furthermore, Le Monde focused on another aspect of the attitude of the 
neoconservatives in its interest in transatlantic relations. This was the lack of . 
cooperation between them and many European diplomats. The French liberal 
newspaper quoted from an unnamed diplomat who said: 'With the neoconservatives 
it is almost impossible [to work with]. They are ideologues and we have no ideology 
1 Avec les neoconservateurs, c'est quasi impossible [de travailler]. Ce sont des 
ideologues; et nous n'avons pas d'ideologie' (Vernet, Le Monde, 16/02/05, Horizons 
Analyses, International). Le Monde also dealt with the negative view of the 
neoconservatives for France. Patrick Jarreau elaborated on potential explanations 
from the perspective of the group as to the real motives of the opposition of the 
French government to the war on Iraq in 2003 and noted: 
'The Weekly Standard, neoconservative weekly [magazine], published many articles and 
editorials presenting Jacques Chirac and his government as allies of Sad dam Hussein for 
economic reasons - the oil - and the French like anti-Semites I Le Weekly Standard, 
hebdomadaire neoconservateur, a publie plusieurs articles et editoriaux presentant 
70 Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also discussed about the support of the 
neoconservatives for Turkey but not in an EU context. The French newspaper considered this country 
as 'favourite ally 1 alliee favourite' of the neoconservatives (Hassner, Le Monde, 26/04/03, Page Une). 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that they 'advocated for a quasi natural US partnership with 
moderate Muslim Turkey 1 von der gleichsam natiirlichen Partnerschaft Amerikas mit der gemaBigt 
muslimischen Turkei verfochten [haben] (Rub, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Politik, 31101103: 4) .. 
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Jacques Chirac et son gouvernement comme allies de Saddam Hussein pour des 
raisons economiques - le petrole - et les Francais comme des antisemites' 
(Jarreau, Le Monde, 12/02/2003, International). 
In a similar case Jan Krauze published an article which was entitled: 'The American 
neoconservatives take it out on Paris 1 Les neoconservateurs Americains Se 
Dechainent Contre Paris' (Krauze, Le Monde, 27/03/03, International). 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung represented the neoconservatives as being against the project 
of further European integration when it interviewed Joschka Fisher. Former German 
Foreign Minister commented on the EU constitution and the French referendum in 
2005 by asking a rhetorical question: 
'Why Will Eurosceptics and neoconservatives be so happy if the Constitution fails? 
Principally when it fails in France? The pleasure will be double and triple / Warum werden 
sich die Euroskeptiker und die Neokonservativen so freuen, wenn die Verfassung 
scheitert? Vor allem, wenn sie in Frankreich scheitert? Die Freude wird doppelt und 
dreifach sein' 
(Jarreau et aI, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 06/05105, Politik: 10). 
Fischer implies that opponents of European integration might wish a failure of the 
Union's Constitution. In this regard he places Eurosceptics and neoconservatives in 
the same category. 
11 Corriere della Sera illustrated the neoconservatives as considering 'opportunism 1 
opportunismo' a significant feature of the EU (Riotta, 11 Corriere della Sera, 23/09103, 
Guerra Dopoguerra). The newspaper also concentrated on the relationship between 
the group and France and pointed out: 'the White House and the neoconservatives do 
not forgive France 1 La Casa Bianca e i neoconservatori non perdonanno la Francia' 
(Danilo, Il Corriere della Sera, 02/06/03, Economia: 3). It also reported that William 
Kristol had said in the US Senate on 8 April 2003: 
'In the best case the French government is not interested in the transatlantic alliance. In 
the worst one it wants to weaken it. The French priorities are the European Union (as 
counterweight to the US power) and/or the UN / Nella migliore delle ipotesi iI governo 
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francese non El interessato all' alleanza transatlantica. Nella peggiore, la vuole indebolire. 
Le priorita francesi sono l'Unione Europea (come contrapesso al potere degli USA) e/o 
l'Onu' 
(Ostellino,11 Corriere della Sera, 04/07/03, Politic a Estera: 1). 
In this case it is maybe connoted that for the neoconservatives the French support for 
the EU project was censurable. In the view of the group - as represented in 11 Corriere 
della Sera - France arguably followed a foreign policy without attributing particular 
importance to the transatlantic partnership. 
For its part La Repubblica associated the neoconservatives with the decision of 
several European countries to express their solidarity to the US before the war on Iraq. 
It maintained specifically that the Vilnius letter of ten former communist states in 
support of the military operation was 'inspired by the lobby of the American 
neoconservatives 1 ispirata dalla lobby dei neoconservatori americani' (Bonnani, La 
Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 14/06/04: 1).71 In this article it is possibly connoted that 
the group could be considered as a driving force behind the foreign policy divide of 
Europe by supporting future EU member states to alight with the US position.72 
Miscellaneous 
The main discussion theme in the media coverage of neoconservatism after 11 
September was American foreign policy. Articles which did not link the political 
ideology to Washington's reaction to the terrorist attacks were also of course found. 
Their content was not different from that of the period before 9/11. In a few cases the 
term was used in domestic context. The interpretation was similar to that analysed in 
Chapter 6. 11 Corriere della Sera, for instance, linked again neoconservatism to a 
policy model of less taxes and a reduced state role (Gorodisky, 11 Corriere della Sera, 
05/04/04, Tasse: 9). 
Further to this, the newspapers often referred arbitrarily to the political ideology 
outside the context of US foreign policy. An article published by The Sunday Times, 
for example, mentioned that in the view of Gerhard Schroder, Angela Merkel was a 
71 The Vilnius letter was signed on 5 February 2003. The European countries, which openly supported 
the US to launch a war against Iraq in 2003, were: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Albania 
72 For a similar example in Le Figaro see: Duplouich, Le Figaro, 20102/03, International 
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neoconservative politician (Celle and Saxony, 04/09105, Overseas News: 25). In 
another case Siiddeutsche Zeitung and Le Monde associated Nicolas Sarkozy with 
neoconservatism but without providing further explanations (Asal, 27/12/04, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Feuilleton: 17; De Montvalon, 23/06/05, Le Monde, France). 
For its part, Le Figaro utilised the term in order to refer to Iranian mullahs seeking to 
do business with foreigners (Minoui, Le Figaro, 20102/04, International: 2). 
Neoconservative Tories? 
It is noteworthy that The Guardian linked neoconservatism to the political 
developments in Britain towards the end of 2005. The main issue of interest was if 
the Conservative Party and its new leader David Cameron could be associated with 
it. 73 We know that neoconservative scholar Douglas Murray wants the Tories to 
follow the way of this political ideology. 74 In this regard, Labour MP Denis 
MacShane notes that British conservatives sought inspiration from the US and that the 
real example Cameron wanted to follow was that of George W. Bush who invented 
'compassionate conservatism' (MacShane, Tribune, 14/04/06: 11).75 He also sees an 
effort from their part 'to cast former US Senator Henry lackson as a kind of closet 
Cameronite' (!bid: 11).76 Nonetheless, the new Tory leader presented his own point 
of view on the issue in September 2006 by claiming: 'I am a liberal conservative 
rather than a neoconservative' (Murray, 12/09106). 
For its part The Guardian saw to some extent a neoconservative tendency in the 
Conservative Party after Cameron was elected its new leader. Although no safe 
conclusions can be reached because the political ideology was linked to this party in 
only four articles in the period covered, the newspaper seemed to reflect the view of 
Denis MacShane. A pQssible explanation can be that it showed ideological bias 
against the Conservative Party. It maybe sought to stigmatise the party by connecting 
73 David Cameron became the leader of the conservatives in December 2005, a few months after the 
General Election of 5 May 2005 seeing a third consecutive win for the Labour Party. The leadership 
was mainly contested by this politician and David Davis. 
74 Douglas Murray is author of the book Neoconservatism: Why We Need it 
75 With respect to 'compassionate conservatism' Labour MP Dennis MacShane notes: 'Bush was 
touring America talking the language of blacks, women, the poor, Hispanics and making sure on every 
platform he was flanked by new Americans [ ... ] Even in office Bush has been more Keynesian than a 
true follower of Milton Friedman. The massive expansion in public spending and hiring of government 
employees under Bush is without precedent in American history' (MacShane, Tribune, 14/04/06: 11) 
76 As it was shown in chapter 2 Henry Jackson had been a hero for the neoconservatives in the late 
1960s and 1970s. This was mainly due to his support for a muscular US confrontation with the Soviet 
Union. 
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it with a tenn - neoconservatism - the meaning of which had been negative after 9/11 
because of its perceived linkage to the Iraq war. Jonathan Freedland, for example, 
commented on the similarity of the policy advocated by Cameron and that followed 
by Bush: 
'Cameron is no chum of Bush - and the president is unlikely to alienate Blair by getting 
too cosy with him now - but the parallel is not entirely bogus. For one thing, Cameron too 
is surrounded by ideological neoconservatives, his campaign manager and shadow 
chancellor George Osborne chief among them' 
(Freedland, The Guardian, 07112/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 31).77 
Freedland noted that Cameron 'is a man of the right' although 'he may talk left' and 
also added that the latter had shown its support for the US by backing the Iraq war 
(!bid: 31). In parallel with Freedland, scholar Timothy Garton Ash maintained that 
Cameron admired neoconservative America. (Ash, The Guardian, 15/12/05, 
Comment and Debate Pages: 29). 
Further to this The Guardian considered the creation of the Henry Jackson Society 
in Britain as an indication that various Tories wanted to apply the principles of 
neoconservatism in the country.78 Given this organisation was named after a hero for 
the neoconservatives the newspaper acknowledged that the political ideology had also 
adherents in Britain. In this regard Neil Clarke noted that conservative politicians 
Michael Gove and Ed Vaizey had been signatories to the statement of principles of 
. the Henry Jackson Society (Clark, The Guardian, 24/10/05, Comment and Debate 
Pages: 29). For his part fonner Labour government adviser David Clark illustrated the 
society as a neoconservative one (Clark, 21111105, The Guardian, Comment and 
Debate Pages: 28).79 
77 Neil Clark also asserted that Cameron's campaign was 'masterminded by the neoconservative trio of 
Tory MPs George Osbome, Michael Gove and Ed Vaizey' (Clark, The Guardian, 24/10105, Comment 
and Debate Pages: 29). 
78 The Henry Jackson Society named after US Senator for Washington State from 1953 until 1983 was 
founded in November 2005. The supporters of the society are 'united by a common interest in fostering 
a strong British and European commitment towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human 
rights, governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security and defense policy and 
transatlantic alliance' (Henry Jackson society website, 2008). 
79 It should be mentioned that The Guardian published a letter from members of the Henry Jackson 
Society who disagreed with Davis Clark's articles and argued that their organisation was non-partisan 
across the board (Mendoza et aI, The Guardian, 23111105, Leader Pages: 31) 
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As opposed to The Guardian it is interesting that The Times was hesitant in using 
the tenn in relation to David Cameron, his Conservative Party and the Henry Jackson 
Society. The Sunday Times, for instance, only did so once referring to the view of 
members of the Labour Party. In particular, the newspaper noted that the aim of the 
'Brownites was to stop Cameron occupying the political middle ground' and that they 
'began briefing that he was not so much a new Tory as a neoconservative' (Cracknell 
and Porter, The Sunday Times, 11112/05, Features, News: 12). As for the Henry 
Jackson Society it did not see it as a purely neoconservative think tank by asserting 
that its members were also social democrats and traditional conservatives (Pollard, 
The Sunday Times, 27/1112005, Feature, News Review: 4). 
The stance of The Times to avoid linking David Cameron and his Conservative 
Party to neoconservatism can be perhaps explained if the special relationship of some 
of its editors with the Henry Jacksoll Society is taken into account. Gerard Baker and 
Stephan Pollard, for instance, had signed its statements of principles of this 
organisation which claims to be a 'cross-pmtisan' one (Henry Jackson society website, 
2008). It could be therefore expected that these editors would not consider it as a 
purely neoconservative think tank in their writings. This argument can be 
strengthened by another factor. This is the negative meaning of the term 
neoconservatism in aftermath of the ten·01ist attacks of 11 September 2001. The 
association of the Henry Jackson Society with this political ideology might also 
'stigmatise' this organisation. 
Conclusion 
There is no continuity in the coverage of neconservatism by the selected newspapers 
in the period before and that after 11 September. Differential interpretations of the 
tenn prior to 9/11 were replaced by a common media approach in its aftennath which 
saw the political ideology and US foreign policy as almost interdependent issues. The 
selected newspapers largely dealt with neoconservatism and constructed the political 
ideology in a similar and accurate way. The adjectival complement 'neoconservative' 
accompanied members of the first and especially the second generation of the 
'movement'. FUlther to this, the foreign policy philosophy of the group was 
synthesised around the same frames: first, its ignorance for multilateral institutions 
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and intemationallaw, second, its willingness to promote democracy by war, third, its 
support for Israel and fourth, its antipathy for Europe. 
The analysis also revealed differences in the coverage of neoconservatism by the 
newspapers. On that basis and in spite of its remarkable similmity it cannot be argued 
that the content of the accessed media was completely homogenised. It was shown 
that although the media mostly agreed as to whom and what they portrayed as 
neoconservative, in a few cases they also depicted different figures and instruments as 
such. If Corriere della Sera, for instance attributed the label to Bush's counsel Ed 
Gillespie while most ofthe other newspapers did not. It was also demonstrated that Le 
Figaro placed the antipathy of the neoconservatives for Europe within the context of 
their support for a full membership of Turkey in the EU while the other newspapers 
ignored this issue. Moreover, Siiddeutscl1e Zeitung and 11 Corriere della Sera did not 
extensively deal with the roots of the political ideology while all the other print 
sources did so. 
The differences, which are acknowledged, however, can be hardly considered as 
marked ones. They cannot distort the general conclusion that all the newspapers 
discussed neoconservatism within a US foreign policy framework as opposed to their 
stance before 11 September. They cannot put into question the fact that all the 
newspapers largely agreed as to the core philosophy and stmcture of the 
neoconservative group. Furthermore, the observed differences did not minor national 
or ideological prejUdices. The only exception is related to the depiction of David 
Cameron, the TOlies and the Henry Iackson Society by the British elite press. 
The findings of this chapter showed as a whole that the accessed newspapers 
expressed a great interest in dealing with the foreign policy principles of 
neoconservatism in the aftermath of 11 September. This interest of the media maybe 
forejudges that they also considered the role of the political ideology as significant in 
shaping Washington's world affairs approach. The following chapter will attempt to 
put light to this question. It will explore the way the selected European newspapers 
covered the issue of the supposed influence of the neoconservatives on the 
administration of George W. Bush. 
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Chapter 8: The War of the 'Neocons' 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 constituted a tuming point for US foreign 
policy. Washington's reaction to the onslaughts, which culminated with the war on 
Iraq, inspired different explanations for its intemational affairs conduct. 
Neoconservatism became almost immediately a cause celebre. There are scholars 
such as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke who emphasise on its significant impact 
on the Bush administration, and other academics such as George Lieber who disagree 
with this approach. Chapter 7 demonstrated that the accessed newspapers expressed 
an interest in decoding the foreign policy philosophy of the neoconservatives after 
9111. The following analysis will attempt to deal with the way these newspapers 
mediated the supposed impact of the group and its plan to promote democracy in the 
Middle East region. 
It will be shown that with the exception of The Times, which followed a 
comparatively balanced approach, the selected media mainly considered as significant 
the influence of the group not only on Washington's decision to invade Iraq but also 
on the whole establishment of US foreign policy. In parallel with this, it will be 
outlined - again with the exception of The Times - that they were pessimistic 
conceming the potential democratisation of the Middle East on the basis of the 
neoconservative plan. After presenting these findings the chapter will endeavour to go 
further. It will comment on the general coverage of the political ideology by the 
media and will explore what this coverage can reveal for their understanding of US 
foreign policy after 9/11. In this part it will be also examined if competing theories of 
neoconservatism - namely nationalism and realism - were discussed in the European 
elite press. 
Influencing the Administration 
Several articles were' found in both news and comment sections of the accessed 
newspapers focusing on the supposed significant impact of the political ideology. In 
these articles the media considered the neoconservatives as a powerful elite group the 
role of which was catalytic in the Bush administration. It can be argued as a whole 
that they endorsed the position of scholars such as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke. 
The newspapers dealt with the supposed impact of the group referring either generally 
to the US administration or specifically to President Bush. This influence was in 
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many cases covered as an 'action type' in which the neoconservatives were involved 
as 'inherent participants' (Kress, 1976: 161). They often were the subject in active 
sentences or the agent in passive syntax. This happened not only in British articles 
but also in the original version of the French, German and Italian ones before their 
translation. The following analysis will attempt to outline the media debate on the 
neoconservative influence by giving various examples. 
Starting with The Times, for instance, Dean Godson analysed in a comment he 
wrote the objectives of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. In so doing, 
research director of Policy Exchange referred to the group and asserted: 'President 
Bush broadly accepted the neocons' analysis and duly invaded Iraq' (Godson, The 
Times, 30112/05, Features: 18). What is maybe connoted in this case is that the 
neoconservatives persuaded Bush to endorse their plan and target Baghdad. In this 
regard Ann Mary Sieghart was explicit and noted that George W. Bush has 'neocon 
beliefs' (Sieghart, The Times, 10112/04, Features: 20).80 
Furthermore Roland Watson wrote a news piece concerning Robert ZoelIick's 
confirmation as deputy of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after the presidential 
elections of 2004. He argued that the neoconservatives might be disappointed with 
this development because Zoellick's realist ideology could perhaps marginalise their 
influence in the second term of the Bush administration. According to the journalist 
this would come to contradiction with the previous four years as the group 'dominated 
Mr Bush's first term' (Watson, The Times, 07/01105, Overseas News: 44). In another 
case Elena Lappin commented on an interview Paul Wolfowitz gave to the Vanity 
Fair magazine in 2003 and considered him along with Richard Pede and William 
Kristol, 'intellectual triumvirate shaping US foreign policy' (Lappin, The Times, 
20106/03, Features: 21). 
As for The Guardian senior adviser to President Bill Clinton Sidney Blumenthal 
wrote a comment in which he used Bob Woodward's book Plan of Attack as a source 
of information. Blumenthal focused on the view of former US Secretary of State 
80 Frankfurter AIlgemeine Zeitung and Silddeutsche Zeitung followed a similar approach. The former 
published a translated article of historian Michael Kimmage who argued: 'The events of 11 September 
made [Bush] a neoconservative president 1 die Ereignisse vom 11 September machten [Bush] zu einem 
neokonservativen Prasidenten (Kimmage, Frankfurter AIlgemeine Zeitung, Feuilletton, 22/10/04: 44). 
The latter maintained: 'The US President is and remains a foreign policy politician with 
neoconservative shaped view of the world, who distinguishes good from evil in the world 1 Der US-
Prasident ist und bleibt ein Aussenpolitiker mit neokonservativ gepragten Weltbild, der die Welt in 
Gut und B6se einteilt (Kliiver, Silddeutsche Zeitung, 16/12/05, Themen des Tages: 2). 
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Colin Powell and asserted: 'Powell believed the government had been seized by a 
Gestapo office of neoconservatives directed by Cheney. It was a separate little 
government that was out there' (Blumenthal, The Guardian, 22/04/04, Leader Pages: 
24). The use of the verb 'seize' certainly maximises the effect of the power of the 
neoconservatives. Likewise Will Hutton noted: 'The radical neoconservatives who 
animated the first term have led the President and the country into a foreign policy 
mess' (Hutton, 1 The Observer, 16/01105, News Pages: 30).81 Stephanie Billen 
followed a similar approach and maintained: 'the neoconservative movement now 
prevails in Washington as the President fights his War on Terror' (Billen, The 
Observer, 1711 0/2004, Magazine Pages: 81). The Guardian also reported that the 
Donald Rumsfeld's strategy in the Iraq war 'draws on the neoconservative idea of a 
revolution in military affairs' (Burkeman and Watt, The Guardian, 28/03/03, Home 
5) 82 Pages: . 
For its part Le Figaro was explicit when it dealt with the supposed influence of the 
neoconservative group on the US administration. . It discussed former Foreign 
Minister Dominique de. Villepin's opposition to the war and included the following 
sub-clause in a sentence: 'The neoconservatives who inspired George W. Bush's 
crusade in order to redesign the map of the Middle East / les neoconservateurs qui 
inspirerent a George W. Bush sa croisade pour redessiner la carte du Proche Orient ... ' 
(Lambroschini, Le Figaro, 02/04/04, International: 2). 83 In this way Charles 
Labroschini can maybe remind his readers the significant role - as he perceived it - the 
group played in the Washington. 
81 An almost similar phrase was used by Il Corriere della Sera which noted that the neoconservatives 
'animate the political laboratory of George Bush 1 animano illaboratorio politico di George W. Bush' 
(Mieli, II Corriere della Sera, 08/04/04, Religione Musulmana: 43) 
82 Siiddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica also used the word revolution in their coverage of 
neoconservatism. For instance, Andrian Kreye wrote a comment in the literature section ofthe German 
liberal newspaper about the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb. Given that she is the wife of Irving Kristol 
and the mother of William, founder of The Weekly Standard, Kreye linked this journal to the 
neoconservative revolution (Kreye, 16/09104, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Literatur: 16). For its part La 
Repubblica attempted to comment on George W. Bush's presidency and especially its foreign policy. 
In this way it started its analysis posing the following question: 'What can be said about America today, 
which is in the hands of intellectuals and politicians of the neoconservative revolution? 1 Che cos' e 
I' America di oggi in mano ai teorici a ai politici della rivoluzione neoconservatrice? (Salvadori, La 
Repubblica, 18/11104, Commenti: 17). 
83 A similar phrase was used by Il Corriere della Sera which asserted: '[The] neoconservatives ... 
inspired the war against Iraq 1 [I] neoconservatori ... hanno ispirato la guerra contro l'Iraq' (Danilo, II 
Corriere della Sera, 10107/03: 14). This newspaper also maintained: '[the] neoconservative 
movement .. .inspires many choices of Bush's foreign policy 1 [Il] movimento neoconservatore .. .ispira 
molte scelte di politic a estera dell'amministrazione Bush' (Di Feo, II Corriere della Sera, 
18/04/03: 10). 
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The French conservative newspaper also conducted an interview with John Le Carnf:. 
The British novelist is - inter alia - famous for blaming the neoconservatives for the 
conduct of US foreign policy after 9/11. The newspaper prefaced the interview by 
giving his following comment: 'the junta of the neoconservative which controls the 
United States / la junte neoconservatrice qui controle les Etats-Unis' (Corty, Le 
Figaro, 30/03/04, Culture: 27). The lexical item 'junta' connotes that the attitude of 
the group in Washington was not only crucial but also illegal. Dictatorial regimes do 
not survive on the basis of free elections but military means. The portrayal of the 
neoconservatives as ajunta by John Le Carre and the reproduction ofthis comment by 
Le Figaro can give the impression that their influence on the US administration might 
be as harmful as it is the remaining of dictators in power. In parallel with that Renaud 
Girard argued in an editorial ofthe newspaper: 
'President Bush made his decision to invade Iraq under the influence of a powerful lobby 
of ideologues called as the neoconservatives I Le president Bush a pris la decision 
d'envahir l'lrak sous I'influence d'un puissant lobby d'ideologues, appeles 
neoconservateurs' 
(Girard, Le Figaro, 20/08/03, Debats et Opinions, Editorial).84 
With respect to Le Monde Patrick Jarreau saw an impact of neoconservatism 
approximately six months before the invasion of Iraq: 'this ideology redefined the 
American right and does not stop to gain influence in the White House / ce courant a 
redefini la droite americaine et ne cesse de gagner en influence cl la Maison Blanche' 
(J arreau, Le Monde, 03/10/02, International). For her part Sylvie Kauffmann wrote an 
account on US foreign policy and acknowledged a success for the adherents of 
neoconservatism in promoting their foreign policy ideas. She referred to them as 'a 
small group of triumphant neoconservatives in the shadow of the Pentagon / un petit 
84 In a similar case scholar of Brookings Institution Philip Gordon argued in Le Figaro that in the view 
of some of his French colleagues: 'Bush was a president influenced accidentally, inexplicably and 
temporarily by the power of the neoconservative extremists / Bush etait un president accidentel, 
inexplicablement et temporairement influence par une poignee de neoconservateurs extremistes' 
(Gordon, Le Figaro, 08/11104, Debats et Opinions: 12). An article with related content was also found 
in 11 Corriere della Sera. Gianni Riotta quoted from Nick Amory British spy diplomat in Berlin in the 
1970s who argued: 'The White House is in the hands of the neoconservative extremists of Rumsfeld 1 
La Casa Bianca e in mano agli estremisti neoconservatori di Rumsfeld' (Riotta, 11 Corriere della Sera, 
18/02/04, Politica Estera: 9) 
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groupe de neoconservateurs triumphants a l'ombre du Pentagone' (Kauffinann, Le 
Monde, 30/04/03, Horizons). A similar line was followed by Jan Krauze who 
illustrated them as 'powerfully represented within and around the Bush administration 
/ puissamment representes dans et autour de l'administration Bush' (Krauze, Le 
Monde, 07/04/03). 
Furthermore Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet were emphatic in their approach. 
Although they rejected the idea that US diplomacy had been in 'hostage / otage' 
because of the neoconservatives they focused on the significant role of the group after· 
11 September. This is a characteristic excerpt of their analysis: 
'It is not an imagination about a mysterious coup d'etat of the neoconservatives in the 
Bush administration that of observing an increase of their influence and their views 
regarding the president's response to the challenge of islamic terrorism I Ce n'est pas 
fantasmer sur un mysterieux coup d'Etat des neoconservateurs dans I'administration 
Bush que d'observer une montee de leur influence et de leurs themes dans la reponse 
que le president a apportee au defi du terrorisme islamiste. C'est une realite' 
(Frachon et Vemet, Le Monde, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses). 
Frachon and Vemet elaborated on the supposed influence of the neoconservatives 
since 9/11 by observing a difference in the foreign policy of the Bush administration 
before and after the onslaughts. In their view the project for the democratisation of 
the Middle East had not been on Washington's agenda prior to the attacks. Frachon et 
Vemet also attributed the tendency of some neoconservatives to refuse their influence 
to a specific reason. This was their desire to become disengaged from the strategy of 
democracy promotion when they started to realise that it could hardly flourish in the 
case oflraq. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung illustrated the neoconservatives as exploiting the 
period of uncertainty for the Bush administration after 9/11 in order to implement 
their own foreign policy. Specifically Suzanne Klingenstein argued: 
1n the aftermath of 11 September, when the Bush administration was looking for new 
ideas, the neoconservatives were ready [to provide] thinking models, which included the 
so-called nation-building [strategy] I Nach dem 11 September 2001, als die Bush 
158 
Regierung nach Konzepten suchte, standen die Neokonservativen mit Oenkmodellen 
bereit, die das sogennante nation-building vorsahen' 
(Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01/11/03: 37). 
The same Gennan newspaper also analysed the policy of democratisation followed by 
the US in the Middle East and possibly acknowledged an important role of the 
neoconservatives by asserting: 
'The ambitious concept seems to be tied up to the ideas represented by the 
neoconservatives I Oas ehrgeizige Konzept scheint an die vor dem Irak-Krieg von 
Neokonservativen vertretene Idee anzuknupfen' 
(Bacia, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22/03/04, Zeitgeschehen: 12).85 
Moreover, Siiddeutsche Zeitung emphasised on the significant impact of the group 
by quoting from chief of Staff to fonner Secretary of State Colin Powell Lawrence 
Wilkinson. As the newspaper reported Wilkinson had asserted: 'a band of 
neoconservative ideologues concocted the war I eine Bande neokonservativer 
Ideologen [haben] den Krieg ausgeheckt (Wernicke, Siiddeutsche Zeitung 31110/05, 
Die Seite Drei: 3). In the same article the newspaper also noted without using this 
time quotation marks: 'A cabal of neoconservative hawks managed to handle 
carefully the US foreign policy machine I Einer Clique neokonservativer Falken 
gelang es, den gesamten aussepolitik Apparat zu umgehen'. Here the word 'cabal' 
can perhaps indicate that the group was powerful and well organised in promoting its 
foreign policy ideas in the US. 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung also conducted an interview with governor of California 
Arnold Schwarzenegger. The journalist Mark Huger started one of his questions as. 
follows: 
'Mr. Governor, moderate Republicans complain that America followed a wrong course, 
that the neoconservatives kidnapped (hijacked) the party I Herr Gouverner, moderate 
85 In a similar case Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung asserted that the military-based democracy 
exportation: 'mirrors the ideas of the neoconservative intellectuals / spiegelt Ideen neokonservativer 
Intellektueller wider' (Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeineine Zeitung, 19/03/03; N3). 
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Republikaner beklagen, dass Amerika einen falschen Kurs einen falschen Kurs 
eingeschlagen hat, dass die Neokonservativen die Partei entfOhrt haben' 
(Huger, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 18/12/04, Politik: 10). 
The supposed impact ofthe neoconservatives seems here to be a conventional wisdom 
not only in Republican circles but also in Germany. The journalist of Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung reproduced it with his question to Amold Schwarzenegger and maximised the 
effect of the group by using the verb kidnap. Likewise the same newspaper 
conducted an interview with journalist Seymour Hersh. Hersh asserted: 
'The mistery is how eight or nein crazy neoconservatives could take over the 
administration I Das Ratsel is, wie acht od er neun verrOckte Neokonservative die 
Regierung Obernehmen konnten' 
(Kreye, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 02110/04, Feuilleton: 19). 
As for 11 Corriere della Sera it provided a striking example as to the impact of the 
group by dealing with The Weekly Standard. We saw that the Italian newspaper along 
with the other ones had agreed as to the neoconservative illustration of this journal. In 
this case, however, 11 Corriere della Sera went further. It asserted that The Weekly 
Standard: 'paralyses the President / paralliza il Presidente (Caretto, 06110/03, Politica 
Estera, 06110/03: 5). The metaphorical use of the verb 'paralyse' can imply that 
George W. Bush followed a consistently neoconservative policy without necessarily 
agreeing with it. In a less emphatic case the same Italian newspaper asserted that the 
neoconservatives: 'found an administration which listens to them / hanno trovato 
un'amministrazione che li sta a sentire' (Severginini, 11 Corriere della Sera, 10/04/03, 
Guerra: 8). 11 Corriere della Sera also quoted from the comic creator and winner of 
the Pulitzer price for his work Maus Art Spiegelman who spoke for a horrible 
neoconservative government of Bush (11 Corriere della Sera, 11109/05, Letteratura: 
35). 
Finally, La Repubb/ica commented on the supposed significant role of the 
neoconservatives in Washington and noted that they: 'built a solid theoretical castle 
based on the war on Iraq during these years around the White House of George Bush 
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1 intomo alla Casa Bianca di George W. Bush hanno costruito in questi anni un solido 
castello teorico, impemiato sulla guerra all' Iraq' (Menichini, La Repubblica, Politic a 
Estera, 04/03/05: 17). La Repubblica also presented the neoconservatives as 
'ideologues who define the policy line to the White House 1 ideologi che danno la 
linea alla Casa Bianca '(Rampini, 19/09/03, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina: 1 and 
Zucconi, La Repubblica, 09/05104, Prima Pagina: 1).86 In parallel with that it noted 
that they had felt confident within the US administration by quoting from editor-in-
chief of Foreign Policy magazine Moises Nairn (Stagliano, La Repubblica, 20/11104. 
Politic a Estera: 10). In this regard it also published an article of British writer Bryan 
Appleyard who observed: 
The neoconservative ministers of Bush - in particular Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul 
Wolfowitz .. .led the country towards the war on Iraq 1I ministri neoconservatori di Bush -
in particolare il vice segretario alia Difesa, Paul Wolfowitz ... [hanno condotto] il paese alia 
guerra in Iraq' 
(Appleyard, La Repubblica, 08/08/04, Cultura: 34). 
The neoconservative failure 
The selected European newspapers often considered as significant the influence of the 
neoconservatives on the Bush administration. Seeing the Iraq war as an initiative of 
the group, they went further and commented on this military project. We saw in the 
previous chapter that the media regarded the promotion of democracy manu militari 
as a neoconservative principle. Here, it will be shown that they so much believed in 
the supposed impact of the group in Washington that they also assessed the efficiency 
of its ambitious plan to transfornl the Middle East into a democratic region. Such a 
theme would have been possibly ignored if the accessed newspapers had not largely 
insisted on the neoconservative cause. The findings suggest that they were not 
optimistic conceming the potential democratisation of the Middle East. 
Starting again with The Times, Simon Jenkins asserted in: 'the neocon bragging 
over a beacon of democracy now being raised over the Muslim world is absurd.' 
86 Likewise Il Corriere della Sera noted that the neoconservatives: 'guide nowadays the foreign policy 
of the USA 1 guidano oggi la politica estera Americana' (Danilo, 11 Corriere della Sera, 10/07/03: 14; 
Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 21106/03: 15). 
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(Jenkins, The Times, 02/02/05, Features: 18). Jenkins explained this observation 
noting that both the US and Britain had invoked the need for free elections in the 
Middle East in order to serve their own foreign policy goals and not in the interest of 
the democratisation of the Arab world. Further to this Jenkins maintained in The 
Sunday Times: 'Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defense Secretary, and Dick Cheney, the 
US vice-President were told by the neocons that freedom would blossom 
spontaneously from the ashes. They were fooled' (Jenkins, The Sunday Times, 
04/09105, Features, News: 18). Anatole Kaletsky also expressed his pessimism in 
The Times and noted: 'The hard military power beloved of braggart neoconservatives 
turns out to be largely an illusion - and one that America cannot sustain on its own' 
(Kaletksy, The Times, 22112/05, Features: 19).87 
The Guardian published a comment of Sidney Blumenthal who considered as 
'romantic' the neoconservative rhetoric about 'the march of freedom and democracy' 
(Blumenthal, The Guardian, 10103105, Leader Pages: 22). Le Figaro conducted an 
interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski. National Security Adviser to President Carter 
commented: 'La formule neoconservatrice est inefficace I the neoconservative model 
is ineffective' and explained that democracy could not be implanted 'ex machina' 
(Germon, Le Figaro, 18/10104, Debats et Opinions: 14). In this case the journalist, 
who conducted the interview Marie-Laure Germon also selected the above-mentioned 
phrase of Brzezinski as the title for her article. The same French newspaper also 
asserted that the US push for democratisation on the basis of a supposed 'domino 
theory' in the Middle East after 9/11 could arguably be compared with that in Europe 
during the Cold War which finally led to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Tertrais, Le 
Figaro, 19/03/05, Debats et Opinions: 14). 
Le Monde was explicit and denied any credit for the neoconservatives even when 
signs of democratisations could arguably be observed in the Middle East. An editorial 
of the newspaper stated: 
'Can it be argued that George W. Bush and his neoconservative friends deserve the 
whole merit for the movement started in the Middle East? Certainly not I Est-ce dire 
87 Anatole Kaletsky expressed a similar opinion in a comment he wrote supporting the departure of US 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from the administration. Kaletsky turned against Rurnsfeld 
although he had initially been in favour of the war on Iraq, as he explains. Discussing about the war 
which had been supported by the neoconservatives he notes that it 'has so far had the opposite effect' 
from what the group had wished (Kaletsky, The Times, 13/05104, Features: 24). 
162 
que George W. Bush et ses amis neoconservateurs peuvent s'attribuer tout la merite 
du mouvement amorce au Moyen-Orient ? Certainement pas.' 
(Le Monde,09/03/05, Horizons Analyses, Editorial). 
In this case the newspaper emphasised on its position by asking a question and 
answering with polarity 'certainly not'. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was also 
explicit in its position from 2003. Wolfgang Gilnter Lerch noted: 
The neoconservative big plan for a new, fundamentally changed Middle East...has 
already failed from its beginning phase I Das von den Neokonservativen ... Gror..design 
eines neuen, grundlegend veranderten Nahen Ostens ... scheitert schon in der 
Anfangsphase. 
(Lerch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 08/09/03, P~litik: 1). 
For its part Siiddeutsche Zeitung quoted from the Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School 
of Government Joseph Nye and considered as 'mistake 1 Fehler' the 'dream 1 Traum' 
of the neoconservatives to attempt to democratise the Middle East region (Nye, 
20/12/05, Siiddeutsche Zeitung Themen des Tages: 2). 11 Corriere dell a Sera 
explained the lack of success of the neoconservative policy concentrating on the chaos 
in Iraq: 
The president has realised that the strategy of his neoconservative counsels is not 
working. The USA has alone won the war but it cannot reconstruct Iraq I " presidente 
ha compreso che la strategia dei suoi consiglieri neoconservatori non funziona. Da soli 
gli Stati Uniti hanno vinto la guerra ma non possono ricostruire ('Iraq' 
(Riotta,11 Corriere della Sera, 09/0912003, Politica Interna). 
With respect to the instability in Iraq the same Italian newspaper made a comparison 
between the US war against this country and that in Vietnam. In doing so it published 
an article which was entitled: 'Vietnam ghosts for Wolfowitz 1 Fantasmi Vietnamiti 
per Wolfowitz' (Riotta,11 Corriere della Sera, 27/10103: 11). 
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Finally, La Repubblica recognised the importance of some changes towards 
democratisation in the Middle East as for example the elections in Iraq. Nonetheless 
it was cautious to reach safe conclusions about a prosperous future in the region and 
underlined that the cost would be paid in human lives. Specifically Bernardo Valli 
argued: 
'Everyone who follows these events [in the Middle East] can hardly refuse their 
importance. So, it would be easy enough to draw reckless, optimist conclusions for 
those who, at a spontaneous moment of euphoria - partly justified- served precise, 
irresistible political interests. The massacre in Hilla was a shower of blood regarding 
the promising developments of the last weeks I Chi segue da tempo quelle vicende [in 
Medio Oriente] puo difficilmente negarne I' importanza. E' stato quindi assai facile 
arrivare a precipitose, ottimistiche conclusioni, per coloro che a una spontanea euforia, 
in parte giustificata, affiancavano un preciso, e irresistibile, interesse politico. La strage 
di Hilla ... e stato una doccia di sangue sui tanti promettenti awenimenti delle ultime 
settimane' 
(Valli, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 01103/05: 1). 
The Opposite Side: The Case of The Times 
The examples of the previous analysis indicate that all the newspapers portrayed the 
neoconservatives as playing a cmcial role concerning US foreign policy and 
especially Washington's decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003. 
Within this framework, all of them commented negatively on the ambition of the 
group to promote democracy in the Middle East region by war. This section will 
attempt to analyse if the media also deemphasised the supposed impact of the 
neoconservatives as it happens in the literature of international relations. Articles 
which did so, however, could hardly be found. In this case there was no need to select 
particular examples because all the articles which disagreed with the idea of the 
catalytic influence of the group wiII be mentioned. 
In the analysis of articles deemphasising the supposed neoconservative impact on 
the Bush administration after the ten"orist attacks of 9/11, the attention is mainly 
turned towards TIw Times. This newspaper - as opposed to the other ones -
systematically challenged the view advocating for a great influence of the f,'TOUp and 
164 
followed thus a comparatively balanced approach. Articles written by Gerard Baker 
are characteristic. Baker, for instance, noted: 
'Miles of newsprint and documentary film footage have been spent in an effort to flush out 
the neocons in the past four years and by any measure the efforts have been 
spectacularly successful. Institutions generally identified as hotbeds of neoconservatism -
think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for the New 
American Century - have received the kind of treatment usually accorded to Mafia 
families. This attention is mystifying. As one neocon puts it: Have you ever seen the 
Project for the New American Century? It consists of five men and a fax machine' 
(Baker, The Times, 19/03/05, Overseas News: 56). 
In this article, Baker attempted to deemphasise the interest shown by most Europeans 
and leftist Americans in the investigation of 'how the neocons [ ... ] came to seize the 
reins of political power in the US and subvert American foreign policy to their ends'. 
He ironically considered this attitude as a 'Neocon-phobia' and supported the 
neoconservative view that the group did not lead the Bush administration to the Iraq 
war. 
In a similar case, Gerard Baker rejected the criticism that Paul Wolfowitz had been 
a leader of the neoconservatives who subverted US foreign policy 'to their own, 
permanent-war, anti-Arab, anti-European, pro-Israel, objectives'. He maintained: 
'Through this barrage of misinformation the world gets occasional glimpses of the true 
Paul Wolfowitz, a softly-spoken academic, given to careful deliberation over the merits of 
a policy debate. He is a deeply cultured man with a firm and sometimes overly romantic 
belief in the centrality of human freedom as the defining theme of foreign policy' 
(Baker, The Times, 18/03/05, Overseas News: 43). 
Other articles are also typical of the comparatively balanced approach of The Times. 
Ferdinand Mount, for example, commented on the book Neoconservatism edited by 
Irwin Stelzer and argued: 'The fairly obvious truth is that it was the blow of 
September 11 rather than any intellectual conversion which propelled Bush into his 
pro active policy' (Mount, The Times, Features, 07/11104: 48). In parallel with that, 
Ben Macintyre considered as a conspiracy theory the argument that the 
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neoconservatives had overrun the White House (Macintyre, The Times, 04/12/04, 
Features: 26). 
The stance of The Times to openly support the position of the neoconservatives in 
some of its articles can be perhaps attributed to the particular sympathy of some of its 
joumalists for the group's core philosophy. It was demonstrated in the previous 
chapter that Gcrard Baker, for instance, had signed the statement of principles of the 
Henry Jackson Society in Britain. Baker was the only joumalist who also wrote 
aIiicles endorsing neoconservative idea to export democracy in the Middle East. He 
asserted for instance: 
'There is growing confidence across the Bush Administration that the hard and 
unpopular choices made in the first term have begun to bear fruit...There is evident 
excitement and optimism about the broader Middle East; democratic change from a 
free and peaceful Palestine to Afghanistan is no longer a neocon fantasy' 
(Baker, The Times, 15/04/05, Features: 21). 
Even when Baker realised the difficulty of the neoconservative project to be applied 
in practice because of the instability in Iraq, he did not stop to qualify their strategy as 
a good option. In this regard he discussed about a song of the Rolling Stones, which 
was entitled 'Sweet Neocon' attacking the neoconservatives within the Bush 
administration, and asserted: 
'The sweet neocons have got many things wrong. They may have been na'ive about 
how easily and quickly a free Iraq would emerge from Saddam's ruins. They may 
underestimate different levels of ethnic, religious and political resistance to democracy. 
But the path of chaotic freedom down which they want to nudge the world remains a 
better route than the alternative, supposedly realist approach to international affairs 
that we have tried in the past' 
(Baker, The Times, 26/08/05, Features: 25). 
ApaIi from the sympathy of some journalists of The Times for neoconservatism, the 
comparatively balanced approach followed by this newspaper in its coverage of the 
political ideology maybe reflects a general influence from the part of Rupert Murdoch. 
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The media magnate had started to support the neoconservative cause from the mid 
1990s and was perhaps keen on promoting it. As for his influence on journalists of 
his newspaper the account of former editor of The Sunday Times Andrew Neil is 
useful. Neil notes: 
'Editorial freedom, however, has its limits: Rupert has an uncanny knack of being there 
even when he is not. When I did not hear from him and I knew his attention was 
elsewhere, he was still uppermost in my mind. Rupert expects his papers to stand 
broadly for what he believes: a combination of right-wing Republicanism from America 
mixed with undiluted Thatcherism from Britain' 
(Neil, 1996: 165). 
The comment of Andrew Neil becomes even more important in the context of the 
Iraq war. The media Murdoch owned did not see this military campaign in a negative 
way. The Fox News Channel constitutes a characteristic example. As Adel Iskandar 
observes the coverage of the war by this channel was marked by complete trust in the 
administration of George W. Bush, hyperpatriotic rhetoric and disqualification of all 
alternative narratives (lskandar, 2005: 161 and 166). The Times was not an exception. 
Murdoch was prepared to back the prime minister of the Labour party Tony Blair in 
his decision to cooperate with the US. Within this framework and given the support 
of the neoconservatives for the Iraq war it can be hardly regarded as a paradox that the 
The Times endorsed in some cases the ideas of the group. 
The Times was the only newspaper which covered neoconservatism in a 
comparatively balanced way. The other newspapers did not publish either news or 
comment pieces which were optimistic concerning the promotion of democracy in the 
Middle East on the basis of the neoconservative plan. Further to this, they did not 
deemphasise the supposed influence of the group on the Bush administration after the 
telTorist attacks of 11 September 2001 adopting thus a one-sided approach in their 
coverage. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that a few articles which referred to 
neoconservative sources presented the position of the group but without endorsing 
it.88 In only one case, II Corriere del/a Sera disagreed with the idea of the supposed 
83 Le Figaro conducted an interview with the vice-President of the American Enterplise Institute 
Danielle Pletka who considered as 'stupid' the claim that the US president had been under contingent 
control of the neoconservatives. (Lambroschini. Le Figaro, 05illi04, International: 4). Likewise, Le 
MO/l{/e presented the view supported by scholars such as Max Boot and Joshua Muravchik (Frachon et 
Vemet, Le Monde. 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses). For its part, La Repubb/ica mentioned Max Boot and 
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significant neoconservative influence. This happened when the newspaper published 
an interview it conducted with Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan Todorov. Todorov 
argued he prefen-ed to talk about 'neofondamentalists' instead of neoconservatives. 
In his view the promotion of democracy by military means could hardly be connected 
to conservatives whether they were 'neo' or not (Di Stefano, 11 Corriere della Sera, 
31/08/03, Varie: 25).89 
A neoconservative perspective for US foreign policy? 
The dominant position of the accessed newspapers was' that the neoconservative 
group had been highly influential in Washington and had persuaded the Bush 
administration to accept its 'revolutionary' plan and invade Iraq. 11 can certainly be 
claimed that neoconservatism was an international relations theory they concentrated 
on in the aftennath of 11 September. Taken this, can it be also argued that the 
European media largely emphasised on the impact of neoconservatism or that they 
understood US foreign policy through the perspective of the political ideology? Such 
a claim cannot be made before a context for their general understanding of 
Washington's world affairs approach after 2003 has been given. 
There are two intemational relations theOlies, which can compete with 
neoconservatism as an explanation of the invasion of Iraq, namely: nationalism and 
realism. Chapter 3 suggested that many members of the US administration, notably 
Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice belong either to 
the fornler or the latter foreign policy school. An examination of the interest shown 
by the elite media in nationalism and realism with reference to American foreign 
policy can provide a necessary comparative basis to conclude if the focus on 
neoconservatism by the selected European newspapers was misplaced. 
Nationalism and realism were selected for analysis instead of other possible 
explanations of the Iraq war such as the oil factor because they constitute distinctive 
foreign policy schools. These schools - along with neoconservatism - can mirror the 
wrote that he attempted to defend the neoconservative position (La RcplIbhlica, 19/04104, Commenti: 
16) 
Sq It is also worth-mentioning that SiiddclItsche Zcitung published a translated piece of Turkish author 
Ahmet 'Omit which - without contesting the influence of the neoconservatives - went further. In 
parallel with neoconservatism, the Turkish author attlibuted the cause of wars in the aftermath of 11 
September to the imperial demands of the new world order and the unsolved problems of civilisation 
(Neumann. Siiddclltsche Zeitlmg, 04illi04, Feuilleton, 15). 
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thinking of the Bush administration. Findings demonstrating that the media insisted 
on oil as a reason for the invasion could not be particularly helpful as they would not 
necessarily challenge the claim that the newspapers exaggerated the influence of the 
neoconservatives in the US. That is because there is no evidence suggesting that 
neoconservative politicians and intellectuals were not interested in oil. Paul 
Wolfowitz, for example, assured Congress in the run up to the Iraq invasion that the 
country's oil would pay for its reconstruction (Baer, 17/05107). Therefore, as opposed 
to nationalism and realism, the oil factor can hardly be considered as a counterbalance 
of neoconservatism in a discussion of the reasons for the military operation against 
Baghdad but only as a complementary one. 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 that the accessed newspapers largely published on 
neoconservatism in the afiennath of 9/11 and especially from the beginning of 2003 
onwards. In order to compare the attention the media paid to neoconservatism with 
their interest in nationalism and realism, a quantitative analysis of the coverage of the 
two competing intemational relations theories is useful. The volume of articles 
published on the three different foreign policy schools within a US foreign policy 
context can provide a basis for conclusions. The period of interest stmis in January 
2003 and ends in December 2005. It thus includes the years which saw an explosion 
of articles produced regarding neoconservatism. Table 1 present the findings of the 
quantitative analysis. 
Table 5: Volume of articles containing the term neoconservatism, nationalism and realism within 
a US foreign context from the 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2005 
Newspaper Title Number of Articles 
N eoconservatism Nationalism Realism 
The Times 200 17 16 
The Guardian 205 34 14 
Le Figaro 232 32 22 
Le Manele 286 37 36 
Fran/~furler Allgemeine 187 15 9 
Sudelcutsche Zeitung 138 7 9 
11 Carriere del/a Sera 197 12 18 
La Repubb/ica 202 11 8 
Total: 1648 170 132 . 
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The data presented in Table 1 show that all the selected newspaper paid much more 
attention to neoconservatism than to nationalism and realism. That is to say that they 
showed a preference in the intemational relations theory of neoconservatism 
discussing Washington's foreign policy from 2003 until 2005. The bar chart of figure 
1 highlights this presenting the volume of articles published by the newspapers on the 
one hand on neoconservatism and on the other on both nationalism and realism. 
Figure 3: Volume of articles published on neoconserV:ltism :md both nationalism :lIld realism 
from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2005. 
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o Neoconservatism 
• Nationalism and 
Realism 
Articles refen-ing to nationalism and realism deemed these foreign policy schools as 
representing the thinking of members of the Bush administration such as Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell. In many cases, these two intemational theories - most 
notably natiorialism - cooccurred with that of neoconservatism but did not compete 
with it. That is because the media often linked them together in their attempt to 
explain American foreign policy after 11 September 2001. The Guardian, for instance, 
spoke for a 'man"iage of the neocons and the Rumsfeld wing of the Bush 
administration before the war on Iraq (Burkeman, The Guardian, Foreign Pages: 12). 
In a similar case Jan Krauze argued in Le l\londe that the neoconservatives had not 
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been isolated within the US administration but that Dick Cheney and Donald 
Rumsfeld had stood near them (Krauze, Le lvfonde, 07/04/03).90 
The thesis certainly acknowledges that the selected European newspapers dealt in 
some articles with nationalism and realism in their coverage of US foreign policy. 
However, they focllsed to a much higher degree on neoconservatism. The above-
presented data show that media emphasised on this political ideology and its alleged 
impact on the George W. Bush administration. \Ve should also remember, at this stage, 
that they did not depict nationalist politicians such as Cheney and Rumsfeld as 
neoconservative in spite of the similarity between neoconservatism and nationalism in 
the literature of intemational relations. If Cheney and Rumsfeld had been deemed as 
neoconservative by the newspapers, their coverage of the supposed influence of the 
group would have taken a different dimension. In such a case, their focus on the 
neoconservative cause might not have been considered as being exaggerated or 
misplaced. That is because in their perception, the group would also have included 
the influential Vice President and Secretary of Defence in the nm up to the Iraq war. 
The argument that the media exaggerated the influence of the neoconservatives can 
perhaps lead to an additional conclusion. This is that they significantly framed US 
foreign policy through the perspective of neoconservatism, at least conceming the 
usage of intemational relations theories, in the aftermath of 9/11 and especially from 
2003 onwards. There are two main reasons which can strengthen this observation. 
First, the selected newspapers had not shown an interest in neoconservatism and US 
foreign policy before 11 September. They had ignored even the 1998 letter of the 
PNAC considering as essential the removal of Saddam Hussein from pO\ver. Noting 
that neoconservatism preexisted in the literature of intemational relations as a political 
ideology with specific foreign policy goals, the media focus on it only after 9/11 
indicates that it was a new tool they used in their analysis of US foreign policy and 
the Iraq war. 
And second, the selected newspapers - with the exception of The Times - did not 
publish articles deemphasising the supposed influence of neoconservatism. Although 
the impact of the political ideology on the. Bush administration has been disputed in 
the literature of intemational relations, the media did not challenge the view that the 
90 For similar examples in the other newspapers see: Lacroix, Le Figaro: 09il 0104, Debats et Opinions: 
13; Sattar. Fra1l1~fllrTcr Allgemeine Zeitllrtg, 19/08/04, Zeitgeschehen: 5; Muller, Siiddelltsc!le ZcilUlIg, 
Feuilleton, 25/01/05; Schlesinger, 17/lOi03, Jl Con'icre de!la Sera, Politica Estera: 35 and Rampoldi, 
La Repllbblica, 19!04/04. Prima Pagina: 1. ' 
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role of the group was catalytic in Washington. By contrast, they insisted on the 
neoconservative cause and exaggerated the inf1uence of the group by mediating it as 
an action type, by taking it often as granted and by using characteristic vocabulary in 
their news or comment mticles. This stance of all the newspapers along with the 
familiarity they demonstrated in their usage of the tenll neoconservatism or its 
equivalents after 2003 cannot but show that they considered is a crucial theory 
shaping US foreign policy. 
Conclusion 
The dominant position of the media was that the neoconservatives had been highly 
influential in Washington. The political ideology was seen as a driving force behind 
George W. Bush's world affairs approach and his administration's decision to invade 
Iraq in March 2003. The supposed impact of the political ideology was in some cases 
expanded beyond the war in Iraq to the whole establishment of US foreign policy. 
The only newspaper demonstrating a comparatively balanced approach in its coverage 
was The Times. The Times not only published mtic1es deemphasising the alleged 
impact of the group but it also supported in some cases the idea of democracy 
promotion in the Middle East. The stance of this newspaper was mainly attributed to 
the sympathy shown by some of its journalists, for example Gerard Baker, to 
neoconservatism. A possible influence from the part of Rupert Murdoch, who 
supported the Iraq war and the neoconservative cause, was also acknowledged. With 
the exception of The Times all the other accessed newspapers suppOlted the view that 
the group played an important role in the US. They were also pessimistic concerning 
the potential democratisation of the Middle East region. 
The chapter also argued that the European press exaggerated the inf1uence of the 
neoconservatives on US foreign policy. Their emphasis on the political ideology was 
justified on the basis of the results of a quantitative analysis of the coverage of 
nationalism and realism. That is because the media dealt to a much larger extent with 
neoconservatism than with the other two theories of international relations from 2003 
until 2005. Although they acknowledged that nationalism and realism min'ored the 
policy view of various members in the Bush administration, they did not saw them as 
competing with neoconservatism. The preference of the European press for 
neoconservatism along with its indifference in challenging the view that the group 
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was highly influential led to the conclusion that the media significantly framed US 
foreign policy after 9/11 through the perspective of this political ideology_ The next 
chapter. which will deal with the representation of political philosopher Leo Strauss 
will attempt to complement the findings of this onc. rt will endeavour to show if the 
selected newspapers also focused on the eminent theorist in their interest in 
neoconservatism and if they portrayed him as an influential figure for the group and 
subsequently for the Iraq war. 
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Chapter 9: The 'Leo-Cons' 
. The particular attention paid to neoconservatism by the selected newspapers after 11 
September 2001 and their concentration on its supposed impact can pave the way for 
another relevant theme to be discussed. This is the relationship between political 
philosopher Leo Strauss and the neoconservatives. It was seen in Chapter 7 that an 
important part of the media representation of the group had been based on 
personifications. The attention here is turned towards a long ago dead but seemingly still 
influential figure. It is thus interesting to investigate if the accessed newspapers 
combined their increased interest in neoconservatism with a similar one in the eminent 
theorist. The representation, however, of Leo Strauss by the media is significant not only 
because it is a personification issue. The results of the analysis can also outline the 
position taken by the newspapers on an important debatable issue regarding 
neoconservatism: the supposed influence of Strauss's philosophy on the group and on 
US politics after 11 September. 
The chapter will explore the relationship between neoconservatism and Strauss as 
mediated in the European elite press by using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
It constitutes a case study in the thesis. The chapter will start with an introduction of Leo 
Strauss, his teaching, philosophy and supposed impact. It will then concentrate on his 
representation by the chosen opinion-forming newspapers. The findings show that the 
prominence devoted to both the eminent theorist and his supposed acolytes is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. They also suggest that the newspapers accessed agreed generally as 
to their understanding of Leo Strauss philosophy and his supposed impact on the 
neoconservatives within the framework of the war on terror and its aftermath. They 
depicted him as a significantly influential figure and their coverage often exaggerated 
while describing his influential role. 
Strauss and his Legacy 
Leo Strauss was born in Germany and came to the United States as a Jewish refugee in 
1938. Later he taught at the New School of Social Research and then at the University of 
174 
Chicago and by the time of his death in 1973, he had published fifteen books. Strauss' 
esoteric and obscure writings concentrated on the importance of the classic works of 
Aristotle, Xenophon, Plato, al Farabi, Machiaveli and Aristophanes as well as European 
philosophers like Locke, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Heidegger and had little concern with 
contemporary politics. Particular attention was devoted to Spinoza, Maimonides and Carl 
Schmitt's book The Concept of the Political. 
Strauss came to greater public prominence after his death and has been routinely cited 
in an ongoing and complex debate as to his influence on neoconservatism and over its 
advocates. For instance, Alex Callinicos identifies Strauss as a significant intellectual 
influence for members of the group (Callinicos, 2003: 47). It is notable that Irving Kristol, 
the so-called 'godfather of neoconservatism' has acknowledged his debt to Strauss 
(Kristol, 1995: 6-7). Whilst Irving Kristol was a stalwart of the movement's first 
generation those associated with the second and who have since taken up influential 
leadership positions following the collapse of the Soviet Union have also been linked to 
the theorist. James Mann's Rise of the Vulcans argues that Paul Wolfowitz chose to study 
at the University of Chicago rather than Harvard in no small part because Leo Strauss 
was still teaching there (Mann, 2004: 26). Although Wolfowitz did not become especially 
close to Strauss, he did take two courses with him on political theory, one dealing with 
Plato, the other with Montesquieu (!bid: 28). 
Leo Strauss' posthumous influence has been such that he has come to be regarded as 
having bequeathed a legacy that has attracted devoted adherents, even 'disciples', some 
of whom have taken to identifying themselves as 'Straussians'. Their work has been seen 
to have had a more tangible impact on contemporary politics, particularly since the 
inauguration of George W Bush in 2001. Dominant intellectual Straussians include 
Joseph Cropsey of Chicago University, Harvey Mansfield of Harvard and Harry Jaffa of 
Claremont Graduate School. Other notable authorities influenced by Strauss include 
Albert Wohlstetter of Chicago University and Allan Bloom of Cornell and Chicago, both 
of whom tutored some of the future neoconservative intellectuals and politicians who 
would play influential roles once the Republicans had resumed power. The leading 
'Straussians' include Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence in the first Bush 
administration and Richard Perle, a vocal member of the Defence Policy Board. Others 
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include intelligence specialists Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky, intellectual Francis 
Fukuyama and scholars like William Kristol and Robert Kagan (Norton, 2004: 7-9 and 
16-18). 
The nature and scope of Leo Strauss' influence over contemporary neoconservatism is 
a complex and controversial issue and one informed by the US administration's decision 
to undertake a military operation against Iraq. It has been suggested Strauss' advocacy of 
liberal democracy and focus on the dangers of tyranny provided intellectual sustenance 
for those members of the Bush's administration who advocated the war. Writing in The 
Public Interest William Kristol together with Steven Lenzner acknowledged the theorist 
as an influence on the Bush's presidency policy of regime change (Kristol and Lenzner, 
2003: 38). This stance chimed with Strauss' critique of moral relativism and defence of 
moral judgments about good of American democracy versus evil of Soviet communism 
during the early stages of the Cold War. It is worth-mentioning that the neoconservative 
intellectual Joshua Muravchik writes that the reason the name of Leo Strauss has been so 
readily invoked is that he was a Jew noting that many neoconservatives are Jewish as 
well (Muravchik, 2003: 29). 
Despite Strauss' revered status, several neoconservatives have appeared reluctant to 
embrace his legacy and claim him as a leading inspiration for their cause. Moreover, 
since 2003, there has been an attempt to refute the link with Strauss in spite of a 
recognition that he was and continues to be a powerful teacher and thinker. Joshua 
Muravchik, for example, casts doubts on Strauss' importance because he was 'rarely if 
ever engaged in contemporary politics' (Muravchik, 2003: 29). Paul Wolfowitz has also 
distanced himself from Strauss and the label Straussian (quoted in Mann, 2004: 29). 
Similarly Kristol and Lenzner, whilst prepared to cite Strauss as an authority, deny him 
much influence on contemporary US foreign policy suggesting those who suggest a link 
have not properly studied his writings nor understood his political thought (Lenzer and 
Kristol, 2003: 19). Max Boot, contributing editor to the Weekly Standard has suggested 
few neocons actively study or engage with the theorist's work today (Boot, 2004: 26). 
The attempts by leading neoconservatives to distance themselves from Strauss have 
been in part a response to what they see as negative publicity generated by opponents 
such as the radical Hollywood actor and director Tim Robbins. Robbins' play Embedded 
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presented Leo Strauss' philosophy as a significant influence on the Bush administration 
and more especially its decision to undertake a military campaign against Iraq. The play 
depicted Strauss as a champion of Plato's 'noble lie'- the idea that a lie told to the masses 
by the elites can keep a stable social structure and the former under control of the latter. 
The neoconservative scholar Lawrence Kaplan vehemently dismissed the play as 'a 
masterpiece of artless propaganda' (Kaplan, 03/09/04). The neoconservatives also 
rejected the work of Professor Shadia Drury, who considers Strauss as one of the most 
influential individuals in the 'neoconservative movement' (1999). They also did so with 
the observations of presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. who went further 
than Robbins and labelled the political philosopher a 'fascist thinker'. 
Considerable neoconservative ire has been focused on criticising the media, particularly 
in Europe, in the aftermath of the Iraq war. Vice President of the Hudson Institute 
Kenneth Weinstein has suggested no intellectual has been as vilified in the mainstream 
European media as Leo Strauss. In particular, he notes: 'Strauss was characterised as the 
force behind the [Iraq] war, the behind-the-scenes intellectual elitist who preached the 
politics of force and deception, and the philosopher-king of the neoconservative 
movement' (Weinstein, 2004: 203). At this stage, it is interesting to outline how the 
European elite press represented Leo Strauss. 
Expressing an Interest in Strauss and the Straussians 
To begin with we should first remember that the term neoconservatism has become 
particularly popular in the selected newspapers since 2003. On that basis it could be 
hypothesised that Leo Strauss would be mainly connected to the political ideology in the 
media discourse from the same year onwards. bar chart of figure 1 attempts to explore 
this.91 
91 The analysis of the representation of Leo Strauss by the accessed newspapers does not cover the years 
before 2001. That is because it is placed within the context of the Bush presidency and especially the war 
on terror and its aftennath 
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Figure 1: Number of articles where the name Leo Strauss and the term neoconservatism or its 
equivalents cooccurred from 2001 until 2005 
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With the exception of one article found in The Guardian in 2002 it was the year of 2003 
when the name of Strauss and the term neoconservatism or its equivalents started to 
cooccur. There seems to be a similarity in the extent to which the British, German and 
Italian press (19, 16 and 19 cases respectively) associated the eminent theorist with the 
political ideology. The French press did so to a higher degree (32 cases) while Le Monde 
had the lead (20 cases). Further to this the name and the term co occurred more times in 
liberal (50 cases) than in conservative newspapers (36 cases). As the linkage between 
them has started to be established since 2003, the analysis will have the beginning of this 
year as its starting point. Articles published about Strauss before 2003 can be ignored 
because they cannot be placed in the framework of his supposed influence on the 
neoconservatives. 
Another hypothesis which could be made is that the volume of articles containing the 
name of the political philosopher would be higher from 2003 onwards compared to the 
previous years. Indeed figure 2 indicates this. Specifically, the total number of articles 
containing the name was 32 in 2001,34 in 2002,57 in 2003, 71 in 2004 and 70 in 2005. 
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Figure 2: Articles containing the name of Leo Strauss from 2001 until 2005 
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Once again the French press (68 cases) published more on Strauss than the British (35 
cases), German (45 cases) and the Italian one (51 articles). Liberal newspapers (119 
cases) dealt more extensively than conservative ones (80 cases). In particular, The Times 
(13 cases) and 11 Corriere della Sera (14 cases) published less articles than Le Figaro (31 
cases) and Frankfurter Allgemeine (22 cases). With reference to liberal newspapers Le 
Monde and La Repubblica (37 cases each) were keener in dealing with Strauss than The 
Guardian (22 cases) and Siiddeutsche Zeitung (23 cases) 
The differences as to the number of articles published by the accessed newspapers are 
arguably significant. The qualitative analysis will show that the nature of coverage in 
articles dealing with Leo Strauss and neoconservatissm was rather similar. 
Neoconservatism was not of course the only theme in articles concerning Leo Strauss 
after 2003. It was, however, an important one. Figure 3 indicates that a significant 
percentage of articles containing the name of the theorist also mentioned the term 
neoconservatism or its equivalents. 
Figure 3: Percentage of articles about Leo Strauss with and without the term neoconservatism or its 
equivalents from 2003 until 2005 
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Articles containing the name of Strauss but not referring to neoconservatism were mainly 
of philosophical content. They discussed his work or that of other theorists, as for 
instance Hobbes, Hegel, Kojeve and Nietzsche, or reviewed forthcoming books or events. 
In many articles Leo Strauss was also mentioned indirectly. For example, an article of La 
Repubblica referred to Strauss discussing Karl Lowith: 'Finally [it is] the philosophical 
vocation, which led [Karl Lowith] in front of the forthcoming star Heidegger side by side 
with Gadamer, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss 1 E infine la vocazione filosofica, che 10 
aveva condotto al cospetto dell' astro nascente Heidegger, al fianco di Gadamer, Hannah 
Arendt e Leo Strauss • (Filoni, La Repubblica, 15/11//04: 36). For the purpose of the 
thesis, however, the attention is turned towards articles including both the name of Leo 
Strauss and the term neoconservatism. In these articles the selected newspapers focused 
not only on the political philosopher but also on his adherents. Table 1 illustrates how 
many times the name of various Straussians was mentioned in articles containing that of 
Leo Strauss. 
Table 1: Cocitation analysis: Leo Strauss and the Straussians. 
Kristoi 
Schmitt Wohi-
Bloom Kagan Fukuyama W. Perle Shuisky Woifowitz 
G. stetter 
TI 1 - - 1 1 - 1 7 -
GU 3 - 2 1 5 - - 9 -
FI 2 1 1 1 3 
- - 4 -
MO 5 - 1 2 3 - - 7 5 
FR 4 4 4 6 2 - - 8 1 
SU 1 1 1 2 1 - 1 4 -
CO 1 1 1 1 3 1 - 4 1 
RE 3 - 2 - 1 - - 4 -
Total 20 7 12 14 19 1 2 47 7 
Neoconservative politician Paul Wolfowitz received more voice in the media (47 hits) 
compared to other Straussians. Attention was also dedicated to Richard Perle (19 hits) 
but to a lower degree. Newspapers focused to an equal extent on neoconservative 
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scholars such as Francis Fukuyama (12 hits) and William Kristol (14 hits) but they dealt 
less with Robert Kagan (7 hits). It is also interesting that the name of Allan Bloom (20 
hits) was mentioned more than twice times more than that of Albert Wohlstetter (7 hits) 
while a balanced distribution of attention to both professors might have been expected. 
Further to this, the names of the intelligence experts Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky 
were rarely quoted. 
In their interest in covering the relationship of the theorist to the neoconservatives the 
newspapers often followed in the international relations debate. They used reported 
speech and direct quotations based mainly on sources which were not symphathisers to 
the neoconservative position. Table 2 indicates this tendency of the media. 
Table 2: Scholars and Sources mentioned in the selected newspapers 
Actors Sources 
TI Embedded (3), NY Times, 
New Yorker Magazine 
Power of Nightmares (3), 
The Economist 
GU Richard Drayton Embedded (3), 
Power of Nightmares (4) 
FI Bemard-Henri Levy, 
Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer, 
Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet 
MO Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet 
Giles Gipel 
FR Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 
Harald Bluhm, Anne Norton 
SU Greil Marcus, Eva Horn Embedded, NY Times 
Horst Bredekamp, Lyndon LaRouche New Yorker Magazine 
CO Mark Blitz Embedded, NY Times 
RE Shadia Drury, Slavoj Zizek NYTimes 
Patrick McGrath, Richard Rorty 
Christopher Hitchens92 
92 Richard Drayton is senior lecturer in history at Cambridge University. Bemard-Henri Levy is a 
philosopher, inteIIectual and writer. Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer are criminologists. We saw that Alain 
Frachon and Daniel Vemer are authors of the books: L'Amerique Messianique: Les Guerres des 
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Table 2 shows that the British elite newspapers mainly focused on Tim Robbins's 
theatrical play Embedded and on Adam Curtis' documentary The Power of Nightmares. 
The latter had been broadcasted by the BBC in the autumn of 2004 illustrating Leo 
Strauss as a major intellectual influence for the neoconservatives. That is to say that 
Embedded and The Power of Nightmares seem to have had a significant impact on the 
understanding of the political philosopher in Britain. Furthermore, four newspapers, 
namely The Times, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 11 Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica, 
quoted from James Atlas's article in The New York Times who portrayed the 
Neoconservateurs (The Messianic America: The Wars of the Neoconservatives). Giles Kepel is an expert 
on Middle East affairs and professor at Institut d' Etudes Politiques. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. is a historian 
who served as a special assistant to the President during the JFK administration as well. Harald Bluhm is a 
research associate in the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and author of the book: Die Ordnung 
der Ordnung: Das Politische Philosophieren von Leo Strauss (The Order of the Order: The Political 
Philosophy of Leo Strauss). Anne Norton is Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Pennsylvania 
and author of the book Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. Greil Marcus is a historian. Eva 
Horn is an Assistant Professor of at the Europe University Niadriva of Frankfurt teaching on Western 
European literature and cultural studies. Horst Bredekamp is Professor of history of art at Humboldt 
University. Mark Blitz is the Fletcher Jones Professor of political philosophy at Claremont McKenna 
College and was counsel during Ronald Reagan's administration. Michael Ledeen is an expert on US 
foreign policy and author of the book The War Against the Terror Masters. Shadia Drury holds the Canada 
Research Chair in social justice at the University of Regina, Canada .. Slavoj Zizek is a sociologist, 
philosopher and cultural critic. Richard Rorty was philosopher and professor at various US universities. 
Patrick MacGrath and Christopher Hitchens are British authors 
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neoconservatives as 'Leo-Cons.' The Times and Siiddeutsche Zeitung also quoted from 
Seymour Hersh's article in New Yorker Magazine who had illustrated members of the 
Pentagon as a 'cabal of Straussians'. Finally, Siiddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica 
referred to Lyndon LaRouche and Shadia Drury who are both hostile to the 
neoconservatives. 
The findings presented in Table 2 also reveal a difference in the media coverage on the 
basis of their nationality. \Vhile the British press was rather interested in quoting from 
commercial sources, the French. Gemlan and Italian one was keen on using references 
from academics. In other words, French, German and Italian newspapes showed a greater 
interest in alaysing Strauss's influence more deeply. Further to this, The Times and The 
Guardian quoted from British and American sources while Le Figaro and Le MOl1de only 
from French ones. By contrast, the Gennan and Italian newspapers did not show a 
national preference in the selection of their sources which were mainly American. 
Strauss as a 'Guru' 
In their discussion of the relationship between Leo Strauss and the neoconservatives all 
the accessed newspapers often portrayed the political philosopher by utilising specific 
words. Table 3 presents characteristic semantic features found in the coverage of each 
newspaper respectively. 
Table 3: Representation of Leo Strauss with specific lexical items 
TI 
GU 
FI 
MO 
FR 
SU 
CO 
RE 
Terms used 
guru, Karl Marx, intellectual godfather, mentor 
founder, spiritual leader, intellectual father 
inspiring figure, intellectual reference, maitre 
maitre, inspiring figure 
guide star, intellectual source, philosophical king 
intellectual ancestor, master, impulse giver 
maestro, inspiring figure, patron 
historical father, political guru, source of inspiration 
183 
The use of specific lexical items can construct Strauss's supposed impact as important 
and maximise his influence. This representation of the eminent theorist also seems to 
have ideological significance because some of the terms such as Kad Marx were 
certainly employed metaphorically (Fairclough, 1989: 119). What is necessary, however, 
is to deal not only with words but also with the general context: that is to say the meaning 
of the sentences these words appeared. The following section will aim to do so and will 
be based on a macro-propositional analysis. 
Mediating the Influence 
The chosen print media largely agreed on the catalytic role Leo Strauss supposedly 
played in shaping the philosophy of the neoconservatives. Even The Times did not seem 
to contest the impact of the philosopher. Gerard Baker, for instance, a neocon 
symthathiser, noted in this case that 'many adherents were enthusiastic followers of Leo 
Strauss' and that Wolfowitz 'became intrigued by [his] neoconservative ideas' at the 
University of Chicago (Baker, The Times, 19/03/05, Overseas News: 56 and 18/03/05, 
Overseas News: 43). 
Strauss's influence was not always explained or attributed to specific factors. By 
contrast, it was in some cases taken for granted because it was maybe presumed or 
presupposed (Van Dijk, 1998: 34). It seemed thus that his supposed influential role had 
become a recurrent feature in media coverage. Eric Homberger, for example, wrote an 
obituary in The Guardian after the death of intellectual Susan Sontag. His main 
proposition was: 
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'[Susan Sontag] formed strong bonds with teachers such as the political philosopher Leo 
Strauss, who later become the intellectual father of neoconservatives in the Bush 
administration' 
(Homberger, The Guardian, 30/12/04, Leader Pages: 20). 
What is interesting in this case is that Homberger did not hesitate to use a subordinate 
clause and to link Leo Strauss to neoconservatism although the content of his article was 
not relevant to either the eminent theorist or the political ideology. Likewise Le Monde 
considered Strauss as one of the 'masters' of the neoconservative thinking in an article 
which focused on a seminar on European politics at the University of Chicago. (Jarreau, 
Le Monde, 27/05104, Page Une). In this case Patrick Jarreau remembered the political 
philosopher only because the venue of that event was the university where the latter had 
taught. 93 
As for articles which elaborated on Strauss's alleged influence they saw a degree of 
homogenisation in their content. As it will be shown below the media largely agree -
with a few exceptions - on the aspects of this influence. Not all of the selected 
newspapers, nevertheless, were analytical while approaching this issue. The Times and 
The Guardian did not devote many lines to it.94 This certainly contradicts their general 
coverage of neoconservatism. On the contrary, the French, German and Italian chosen 
media offered a more detailed analysis. They often endeavoured to introduce Leo Strauss 
to their readers and to elaborate on his work and teaching. Many of their articles were 
long and demanded high levels ofliteracy from the audience. 
It is noteworthy that some newspapers concentrated on Strauss' theoretical impact by 
attempting to deconstruct the argument of various neoconservatives and explain why the 
view of the latter had been wrong. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for example, 
recontextualised the argument of Strauss's daughter Jenny who argued that her father had 
93 For similar examples see: Gill, The Sunday Times, 24110/04, Features, Culture:12; Paoli, Le Figaro, 
23/09/04, Litteraire: 4; 'Uberwaltigend Wie die Sonne,' Suddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/04: 13 and Riotta, 
Corriere della Sera, 27/10/04: 13; Fiesta, La Repubblica, 091101 04, Cultura: 36. 
94 Exceptions are acknowledged. Sarah Baxter wrote an analytical article on the issue in The Times (Baxter, 
The Sunday Times, 11/05/03, Overseas News: 27). Richard Drayton also did so for The Guardian (Drayton, 
The Guardian, 28112/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 26). 
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not influenced contemporary American politics. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
18/06/03, Feuilleton: 35). Likewise La Repubblica published a translated comment of 
writer Bryan Appleyard who disagreed with Wolfowitz's opinion that the work of the 
philosopher had not been relevant to contemporary American politics (Appleyard. La 
Repubblica, 08/08/04, Cultura: 34). 
Muravchik's point that Leo Strauss had been readily invoked because he was a Jew -as 
many members of the neoconservative group - cannot be confirmed by the findings of the 
project. The theorist was not connected to the political ideology in the selected 
newspapers on the basis of his ethnicity. Although some articles noted Strauss was a Jew 
this does not entail that they focused on him for this reason. In parallel with that, they 
often mentioned that the political philosopher was a German emigre. It seems logical 
therefore that the media dealt with his ethnicity in their interest in dealing with his 
biography and not because they were biased against it. 
Learning to Defend Democracy 
Chapter 7 suggested that according to the chosen newspapers the neoconservatives had 
advocated for a US policy of democratisation in the Middle East. This finding can be 
complemented here. The group's support for liberty was considered by the media as an 
inspiration from Leo Strauss. In this regard, the newspapers constructed Strauss' 
influence in two ways. First they dealt with theorists' defence for democracy vis-a-vis 
totalitarian regimes. This was perceived to be based on his personal experience from 
Germany and his study of the work of ancient philosophers who had attributed particular 
importance to the notion of regime. And second the media also focused on Strauss' 
insistence on morality and moral judgements and his criticism of moral relativism. 
The Times, for instance, dealt with Strauss' youth in the context of his relationship to 
the neoconservatives. It noted that political philosopher's 'experience of the Weimar 
Republic, overthrown by AdolfHitler in 1933, convinced him that democratic values had 
to be fought for' (Baxter, The Sunday Times, 11105103, Overseas News: 27).95 The 
95 Likewise Le Monde, posed a rhetorical question: 'Is it not the dissolution of the Weimar Republic which 
led [Leo Strauss] to analyse the fragility of the democratic regimes vis-a-vis the tyranny / N'est-ce. pas 
I'effondrement de la Republique de Weimar qui a conduit [ Leo Strauss] a analyser la fragilite des regimes 
democratiques face it la tyrannie?' (Sole, Le Monde, 04/05/03). Siiddeutsche Zeitung interviewed art-
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Guardian, had The Power oJ Nightmares as its source of information and commented on 
the view of Strauss for the US society after the end of World War H. The newspaper 
argued that he 'rejected the liberalism of postwar America as amoral and ... thought that 
the country could be rescued by a revived belief in America's unique role to battle evil in 
the world' (Beckett, The Guardian, 15/10104, Feature Pages: 21). In parallel with that 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung illustrated as a fundamental aspect of Strauss' 
philosophy his desire to see lawful states be led by moral individuals (Klingestein, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/03/03, Geistenwissenschaften: N3). 
For their part Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet published a high analytical article 
concerning Leo Strauss and the political ideology in Le Monde. They - inter alia -
acknowledged the concern of the theorist for the existence of totalitarian regimes or 
'tyrannies' in Aristotle's terminology in the 20th century (Frachon and Vernet, Le Monde, 
16/04/03, Horizons). In this regard, Il Corriere della Sera concentrated on the use of 
classic works in politics and noted that the neoconservatives studied Thucydides, Plato, 
Aristotle and Machiavelli thanks to Leo Strauss (Montefiori, If Corriere della Sera, 
04/10/03, Politica: 35). 96 
Le Figaro, Siiddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubb/ica were more explicit in their 
approach. The French newspaper, for example, published an interesting piece of Patrice 
Bollon. Bollon noted about the theorist: 
'It seems from his criticism for modern non-values and his rehabilitation of the classical 
values like a follower of a strategy of democracy expansion on the whole world, which was 
the intellectual basis for the American intervention in Iraq I Strauss aparrait bien, par sa 
critique des non-valeurs mod ernes et sa rehabilitation des valeurs classiques, comme un 
adepte d'une strategie de diffusion de la democratie au monde entier, base intellectuelle de 
I'intevention americaine en Irak ' 
historian Horst Bredekamp, who also considered as crucial for Strauss's defence for democracy the fall of 
the Weimar Republic (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 07/04/03: 14). 
96 For similar examples about Strauss' support for democracy and moral values in the context of his 
influence on the neoconservatives see: Hayoun, Le Figaro, 06/09103, Debats et Opinions; Durin-Valois, Le 
Figaro, 29110104, Magazine: 48-50; Lacroix and Germon, Le Figaro, 03111/03, Vivre Aujourd'uit, Modes: 
13; Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01111/03, Feuilleton: 37; Montefiori, 11 Corriere della 
Sera, 04110103, Politica: 35; Riotta, 11 Corriere della Sera, 07/05103, Titanic: 12. 
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(Bollon, Le Figaro, 23/09104, Litteraire: 5). 
Bollon acknowledged here he was not sure that this was a safe conclusion which could 
reached from Strauss' work. He did not hesitate, nonetheless, to produce this view in the 
text. Further to this, Andrian Kreye discussed Embedded in Siiddeutsche Zeitung and 
argued: 
'Leo Strauss ... formed decisively with his ultra-pragmatic antithesis concerning moral 
relativism the world image of the neoconservatives like Deputy Defence Minister Paul 
Wolfowitz and editor of the Weekly Standard William Kristoll Leo Strauss ... pragte mit seinen 
ultrapragmatischen Antithesen zum moralischen Relativismus entscheidend das Weltbild von 
Neokonservativen wie dem stellvertretenden Verteidigungminister Paul Wolfowitz und den 
Chefredakteuer des Weekly Standard William Kristol' 
(Kreye, 17/03/04, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Feuilletton: 15). 
Kreye saw in this case a similarity between the play and the comment pages of The New 
York Times with respect to Strauss' influence on the neoconservative group. 
Finally, La Repubblica published a translated article of Patrick McGrath who quoted 
from the book On Tyranny of Leo Strauss in which the British author illustrated the 
theorist as stressing the importance for a democratisation of the whole world. McGrath 
argued that Bush's Junior administration adjusted its policy to the 'domination 
programme 1 programma di dominazione' of Strauss (McGrath, La Repubblica, 24/08/03, 
Cultura: 37). 
Having Secrets and Telling Lies 
Another issue the elite media covered in their interest in Strauss' relationship to the 
neoconservatives was the idea of noble lies. Not all the accessed newspapers, however, 
discussed this issue. The French ones and 11 Corriere della Sera ignored it. II Corriere 
della Sera did not deal with it even while reporting from Embedded (Rossi, II Corriere 
della Sera, 11101104: 36). The other newspapers reproduced the view that Strauss had 
taught the neoconservatives the method of noble lies. 
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The media which paid attention to the idea of 'Straussian lies' mainly dealt with 
theorists' esotericism and his view that hidden meanings found in classical texts could be 
understood by only few people. Subsequently they explored if this belief of the political 
philosopher could be transformed into a preoccupation for secrecy in the political arena 
where supposedly only the elite few might know the truth. The newspapers connected 
here Strauss either implicitly or explicitly to the neoconservatives. The reason is that the 
latter might have arguably deceived people in the context of the US war on terror by 
cultivating a climate of fear and by telling lies concerning the possession of weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq and the links of this country to al-Qaeda. 
In this regard, the British elite newspapers had mainly Adam Curtis' documentary and 
Tim Robbin's play as their source of information. The Times, for instance, noted that for 
Leo Strauss the solution was 'a government that could unite the people through a myth of 
nationhood' (Segal, The Sunday Times, Features, Culture, 17/10/04: 72). The Guardian 
published an article which reported that BBC world affairs editor John Simpson had 
endorsed Embedded despite the corporations' demand for neutrality on the Iraq war. This 
included the following excerpt from the programme notes of the play: 'One of the great 
services that Strauss performed for the Bush Administration (was) the provision of a 
philosophy of the noble lie, the conviction that lies, far from being simply a regrettable 
necessity of public life, are instead virtuous and noble instruments of wise policy' (Pierce, 
The Times, 15/09/04, Home News: 6). The Guardian also illustrated the political 
philosopher as a 'believer in national secrets' (An drew, The Guardian, 24/10/04, Review 
Pages: 20). Further to this Andy Beckett was emphatic and argued: 
'Strauss' certainty and his emphasis on the use of grand myths as a higher form of political 
propaganda created a group of influential disciples such as Paul Wolfowitz, now the US 
deputy defense secretary. They came to prominence by talking up the Russian threat during 
the cold war and have applied a similar strategy in the war on terror' 
(Beckett, 15/10/04, Feature Pages: 21). 97 
97 See also: Audrey, The Guardian, 31103/04, Feature Pages: 11 and Adams, The Observer, 2411 0/04, 
Review Pages: 8 
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Moreover, The Guardian published a comment of senior lecturer in history at Cambridge 
University Richard Drayton. Drayton took part in the debate about 'Straussian lies' and 
argued: 'Neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Lewis Scooter 
Libby, learned from Leo Strauss that a strong and wise minority of humans had to rule 
over the weak majority through deception and fear, rather than persuasion or 
compromise' (Drayton, The Guardian, 28/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 26).98 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung maintained that the assumed influence of Leo Strauss 
as to the' use of 'necessary lies 1 notwendigen Liigen' was not an imaginary notion 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, 18/06/03: 35).99 For its part, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung concentrated on Strauss' elitism and noted that according to the position of the 
philosopher the masses should not necessarily know the truth (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
04/07/03:16). In a similar case, La Repubblica quoted from British author Christopher 
Hitchens who asserted: 
'For the Straussians truth and liberty are not suitable for the rough masses, premises and 
objectives of a political choice (such as the war in Iraq) do not have to be publicly confessed I 
Per gli straussiani verita e liberta non si addicono alle rozze masse, premesse e obiettivi di 
una scelta politica (come la guerra in Iraq) non possono essere publicamente confessati' 
(La Repubblica, 04/11103, Cultura: 42). 
Not all the accessed newspapers, nevertheless, agreed with the idea of Strauss's 
supposed insistence on noble lies. It was mentioned that Le Figaro, Le ll10nde and 11 
Corriere della Sera had ignored this theme in their analysis of the influence of the 
philosopher on the neoconservative group. This stance of the three newspapers maybe 
indicates that they did not accept the claim that the eminent theories taught the group to 
deceive the masses. Further to this, articles explicitly rejecting the idea of 'Straussian 
lies' were found in The Times. Clive David, for instance, noted that Embedded had been 
based on the work of 'the notorious anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist' Lyndon Larouche 
(Davis, The Times, 06/09/04, Features: 17). The Sunday Times also commented 
98 It should be mentioned that The Guardian published two days later a reply from Douglas Murray 
expressing his disagreement with Drayton's view (Murray, The Guardian, 30/12/05, Leader Pages: 29). 
99 See also Geyer, Frankfurter A/lgemeine Zeitung 23/06/03, Neue Sachbiicher: 37 
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ironically on the Power of Nightmares and the view of Adam Curtis that Leo Strauss had 
influenced the neoconservatives in telling lies to the people: 
What the neocons are here to provide, is a collective crusade, a sense of shared moral value 
that can only come from the focusing on a shared fear. So bring on global terrorism and the 
big lies about orange alert, imminent threats, dirty bombs, ricin in your sock drawer, anthrax 
in the mail box and exploding supermarket shelf-stackers, to keep the fear hot and focused' 
(Gill, 24/10/04, The Sunday Times, Features, Culture: 12). 
In the view of the journalist American politics work almost exclusively on the 
assumption of conspiracy and Curtis' documentary did not constitute an exception. 
Yes, But ... 
Leo Strauss' influence on the neoconservatives was not disputed by the media in spite of 
a few converging or absent views as to whether the philosopher had been a champion of 
noble lies. What the selected newspapers put in some cases into question was the direct 
impact of Strauss on the foreign policy of Bush's Junior administration. Although they 
considered him as a powerful teacher they also argued that he had never dealt with 
international politics and died many years before the war on Iraq. The Times, for 
example, commented ironically and in a humoristic way on theorists' supposed impact on 
the US decision to attack this country. Gerard Baker noted that before the war 'Paul 
Wolfowitz had contacted the spirit of Leo Strauss to get final authorisation' (Baker, The 
Times, 17/06/05, Features: 24). Furthermore, Le Monde asserted that it would be 
'simplistic' to judge Strauss' work only in relation to its potential impact on modem 
politics because it is infinitely rich and complex (Droit, Le Monde, 16/05/03).\00 In this 
regard, If Corriere della Sera quoted from Professor of American Enterprise Institute 
Michael Ledeen who deemphasised Strauss' impact on US politics by arguing: 
'Everyone talks about Leo Strauss but only a few have studied him. It certainly creates a 
great fuss saying that people in America refer to Machiavelli or Strauss with respect to 
100 See also: Bollon, Le Figaro, 23/09/04, Litteraire: 5 
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international politics I Tutti parlano di Leo Strauss ma pochi 10 hanno leUo. Certo fa scalpore 
che in America ci citino Machiavelli 0 Strauss quando si parla di politica internazionale' 
(Montefiori,1l Corriere della Sera, 04/10/03, Politica: 35). 
Likewise La Repubblica published an article which rejected the idea of Strauss' influence 
on American politics by quoting from philosopher Richard Rorty: 
'There is no link between the ideas of Strauss and those of figures such as Bush, Cheney and 
Rumsfeld. The idea that the thoughts of Strauss to some extent account for the actions of the 
Bush administration is ridiculous I Non c'e nessun legame tra le idee di Strauss e quelle di 
persone come Bush, Cheney e Rumsfeld. L'idea che i pensieri di Strauss in qualche modo 
motivino le azioni dell' amministrazione Bush e ridicola' 
(Bosetti, La Repubblica, 24/09/04, Cultura: 46). 
Here Richard Rorty noted that the only motivation of the Bush administration was to be 
reelected. He therefore rejected the idea that political philosophers such as Leo Strauss 
had inspired US foreign policy with their work and teaching. 
Furthermore, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Siiddeutsche Zeitung 
attributed particular importance to the peculiar way Strauss' adherents interpreted his 
philosophy after his death. These newspapers explained that although the theorist 
provided Straussians with a significant intellectual background, the latter partly modified 
their views and adjusted them to the requirements of the post-Cold War era. The media 
explained that the political philosopher had not been aware of the collapse of the bipolar 
structure of the world while he was teaching and writing. His supposed influence could 
thus not reflect the crucial change of the international environment after 1989 and the fact 
that the US remained as the sole superpower of the world. And of course it could not 
mirror the beginning of the new era for US foreign policy in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September. 
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Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet, for example, explained in Le Monde that the 
importance attributed by the neoconservatives in the Bush administration to the nature of 
political regime and their support for militant democracy and American values: 
'derive possibly from Strauss' teaching [which is] sometimes revised or corrected by Straussians 
of the second generation. One thing distinguishes them from their putative maitre: the optimism 
of messianism the neoconservatives deploy in order to bring liberty in the world (in the Middle 
East in the future, in Germany and Japan in the past) as if political voluntarism could change 
human nature I peuvent etre tires de I'enseignement de Strauss, parfois revu et corrige par les 
straussiens de la deuxieme generation. Une chose les separe de leur maitre putatif: I'optimisme 
teinte de messianisme que les neoconservateurs deploient pour apporter les libertes au monde 
(au Moyen -Orient demain, hier a l'Allemagne et au Japon), comme si le volontarisme politique 
pouvait changer la nature humaine. 
(Frachon and Vemet, Le Monde, 16/04/03, Horizons). 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung went further and argued that Strauss: 'had exercised no 
influence on the dominating American political science but left an influencing school 1 
hatte keinerlei Einfluss auf der hereschende amerikanische Politikwissenschaft, 
hinterliess aber eine einflussreiche Schule' (Ritter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
29/06/03, Ansichten: 15). The same German newspaper also quoted from scholars 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Anne Norton and noted that the eminent theorist had never 
talked about a 'Jewish-Christian alliance' against Islam (Mejias, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 20/09/04, Feuilleton: 34).101 Likewise, Tim Muller maintained in Suddeutsche 
Zeitung: 'The students [of Leo Strauss who] stepped away from their teacher and formed 
the world image of the neoconservatives 1 Die Schuler [von Leo Strauss die] immer 
weiter von ihrem Lehrmeister entfemt [sind] formten das Weltbod der Neoconservativen' 
(Muller, Suddeutsche Zeitung ,03/11104, Feuilleton: 15). 
101 In one case Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also suggested that it was mainly Carl Schmitt the source of 
inspiration for the American neoconservatives (Muller, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05105/04, Natur 
und Wissenschaft: N3). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the selected newspapers had paid particular attention to the 
work and teaching of Leo Strauss. It was indicated that the prominence devoted to both 
the eminent theorist and his supposed acolytes had started to come to the forefront from 
2003 onwards. The media portrayed Strauss since 2003 as a significant intellectual 
reference for the neoconservatives and attempted to explore his impact on US 
contemporary politics. They agreed that political philosopher's support for democracy 
and morality was crucial in shaping the thinking of the group. Further to this, they were 
cautious as to the direct impact his philosophy could have exerted on the implementation 
of US foreign policy after 11 September and especially the Iraq war. 
Differences were, however, observed as concems technical issues of the coverage in 
the four countries. The French, German and Italian press was more analytical in its 
representation of Leo Strauss. By contrast, Blitish newspapers did not devote many lines 
to the debate insisting mainly on commercial sources such as The Power of Nightmares. 
In parallel with this, there was an issue the selected print media did 110t a!,JTee on in their 
representation of the political philosopher. They were divided over Strauss's debatable 
support for noble lies. In this case, the two French print sources along with The Times 
and Il Corriere della Sera either ignored or deemphasised in their accounts the idea of 
'Straussian lies'. This observation, nonetheless, is only related to one parameter of 
Strauss' influence on the neoconservatives. It can hardly distort the general conclusion 
that the political philosopher was perceived to be a powerful teacher for the 
neoconservative group by the accessed newspapers, which is the most important finding 
of the chapter. 
The attention paid by the selected newspapers to the philosophy of Leo Strauss can be 
placed in their general interest in neoconservatism in the aftermath of 9/11. It can 
subsequently confirm their tendency to focus and analyse aspects ofthe political ideology 
after the terrorist attacks. The general position of the media was not only that the 
neoconservatives were influential in the Bush administration and responsible for the Iraq 
war in 2003 but also that the group had a 'guru' who was political philosopher Leo 
Strauss. The last chapter of the thesis will attempt to bring the findings of the research 
project together and elaborate on various theories which maybe led the European elite 
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newspapers to extensively deal with neoconservatism and focus on its supposed impact 
after 11 September 2001, and especially from 2003 onwards. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
The thesis offered an analysis of the way eight selected opinion-forming newspapers of 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy interpreted neoconservatism from the beginning of 
1993 until the end of2005. It was shown that the political ideology had largely impacted 
on their agenda since 9/11 and especially from 2003 onwards. The content of articles 
published in the period before 11 September 2001 could not have predisposed potential 
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readers of the accessed newspapers for the coverage of neoconservatism after the 
atrocities. Media coverage was not synchronised, the political ideology was constructed 
irrespective of US foreign policy and most members of the group's second generation 
were ignored. The position of the neoconservatives concerning critical issues such as 
terrorism was ignored. The foundation of the Project for the New American Century was 
not an issue of interest either. 
Before 11 September neoconservatism was interpreted in many different ways. In most 
of the cases the European newspapers did not agree as to its meaning with the exception 
of US domestic politics. A usage of the term in national context was partly observed as 
for example in the case of the Italian newspapers. The thesis asserted that they had 
maybe focused on US Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich because 
of the entrance of media magnate Silvio Berlusconi in Italian political scene and the 
genesis of a new wave of conservatism in the country. It was suggested that 11 Corriere 
della Sera and La Repubb/ica had also showed an ideological bias as their neutral and 
negative coverage respectively. 
In the aftermath of 11 September and especially since 2003 the newspapers largely 
published on neoconservatism as opposed to the period before the terrorist attacks. They 
linked the political ideology almost exclusively to the development of US foreign policy 
and the military campaign against Iraq, agreed as to its meaning and principles and 
mainly focused on the second generation of the 'movement'. They showed a familiarity 
in using the term and the abbreviation 'neocon' or 'neocons' taking often the supposed 
influence on the group for granted. The accuracy in the use of the term neoconservatism 
or its equivalents by the accessed print sources - with only a few exceptions - could not 
put its quality into question. 
The coverage showed signs of international relations theory use in the interest of the 
media to analyse the war on terror and especially the invasion of Baghdad. In this 
context, the neoconservatives were framed as very influential within the administration of 
Bush Junior and were often portrayed as responsible for the war on Iraq. The selected 
newspapers - with the exception of 17le Times - were not keen on challenging the alleged 
impact of the group on US foreign policy. They adopted as a whole a similar framework 
to what has been developed by intellectuals who attribute particular importance to the 
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role of the neoconservatives in Washington. The work of Stefan Halper and lonathan 
Clarke America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order, for instance, found 
particular resonance. The dominant position of the chosen printed media also was that the 
impact of political philosopher Leo Strauss had been of great significance for the 
neoconservative group. 
The thesis explained that the European elite press exaggerated the influence of the 
neoconservatives in US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September. This argument 
was based on the analysis of Chapter 2 and 3 which showed that neoconservatism had 
existed in the literature of international relations before 9/ll and challenged the view that 
the group had been highly influential in Washington. On that basis, it was demonstrated 
that the media, which had not considered the political ideology as a particular foreign 
policy school before 9/11, linked it to US foreign policy after the ten-orist attacks and 
especially from January 2003 onwards and concentrated on it to a higher degree than they 
did with competing international relations theories such as nationalism and realism. The 
vocabulary they often used describing the alleged neoconservative influence along with 
their increased interest in Strauss's impact on the group only after 2003 also contributed 
to the above-mentioned conclusion. 
This last chapter of the thesis will attempt to go further and explain the media stance in 
the aftermath of 11 September 2001. It will concentrate on the general consensus of the 
newspapers and will identify and comment on different factors which maybe led them to 
extensively deal with the political ideology in the aftermath of 11 September. The 
analysis will be associated with a discussion about the possible existence of a European 
public sphere, an issue of growing interest among various scholars and academics. 
Scapegoating? 
A possible explanation for the media stance to consider the neoconservatives as 
responsible for the Iraq war is that they maybe sought to find someone to blame for the 
conduct of US foreign policy after 9/11. Neoconservatism could constitute a convenient 
device in their coverage of the US military operation against Baghdad. In other words, 
members of the group were maybe an appropriate scapegoat for the media. Such a tactic 
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is not a new one but can be traced back to Greek philosopher Apollonius of Tyana. In the 
1 st century AD this philosopher identified a beggar as an expiatory victim for the plague 
hitting then Ephesus. He thus successfully persuaded the Ephesians to attack the beggar 
in order to tackle the problem ofthe disease (Burkert, 1993: 188-191). 
Scapegoating can be considered as a source of aid and comfort when general problems 
have to be faced and controversial policies have to be either justified or forgotten. In this 
case the media which opposed the Iraq war - with the exception of The Times - might 
have been keen on finding an ancillary way for articulating their opposition to this 
military campaign. In Britain and Italy neoconservatism was maybe a buffer of the 
criticism of Tony Blair and Silvio Berlusconi for their active cooperation with George W. 
Bush. In France and Germany the crucial role the neoconservatives supposedly played 
for the Iraq war was perhaps a good justification for the failure of Chirac's and 
Schroder's governments to put pressure on Washington to choose the option of 
diplomacy. This would have entailed to giye Saddam Hussein more time to disarm as 
both countries had suggested at the UN. 
The consideration of the neoconservatives as expiatory victims challenges the 
conventional wisdom that their role was catalytic in the Bush administration. John 
Macionis explains that a scapegoat is 'a person or a category of people', typically with 
little power, whom people unfairly blame for their own troubles (Macionis, 1997: 330, 
331). So, can it be argued that the neoconservatives were unfairly blamed for the Iraq 
war? Partly yes. Although the analysis of US foreign policy since 9/11 certainly requires 
a reference to neoconservatism, the political ideology is arguably a key component in it. 
The fact that the neoconservatives supported the Iraq war does not entail that they led the 
US to this military campaign. As we saw in Chapter 3 they had not taken positions in the 
top tier of the administration and their role could not but have some limits. 
Oversimplification? 
Given neoconservatism is arguably a key component in US foreign policy after 9/11 the 
particular media attention to its supposed significant impact can be also attributed to 
another factor. The negative evaluation of the political ideology and the portrayal of the 
group as responsible for the Iraq war was maybe an easy, non-laborious way for some 
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journalists to deal with Washington's world affairs approach. These journalists might 
have preferred to simply put the blame on the neocons than to elaborate on a complex, 
difficult and in-depth analysis of US foreign policy. Such an observa60n can be 
strengthened by the routinised use of the teml 'neoconservatism' in the media discourse 
and the fact that its supposed impact along with that of Leo Strauss were often taken for 
granted. 
International news coverage has received criticism by some analysts who note that it 
'tends to shallow' (Sreberny, 1995: 430). Some scholars also put nowadays the quality of 
serious journalism into question and argue that its high standards based on rational 
analysis and thorough, dispassionate investigation are being undermined by triviality 
(McDonald, 2000: 251; Sparks, 2000: 1). Although neoconservatism is certainly not a 
trivial issue in US foreign policy, its core philosophy is questionably a revolutionary one 
as the newspapers constructed it. The question which can be raised is if Bush's military 
doctrine after 9/11 was based on a supposed neoconservative revolution or on the 
fundamental principle in the history of international relations that great powers use force 
to serve their own interests. As we saw in Chapter 3 the US had shown an interventionist 
and preemptive tendency in its foreign policy long before the terrorist attacks of 11 
September and the rise of the neoconservatives. 
In this context, US foreign policy is maybe oversimplified if the supposed influence of 
the neoconservatives is overstated as it happened in the media discourse. The impact of 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September should not be underestimated in the US 
administration's decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Washington acted 
preemptively and used military force against Iraq in order to fight against terrorism. TIle 
oil parameter - as Chapter 3 explained - can be also considered as crucial. Therefore, US 
foreign policy can be arguably considered as being 'hijacked' by a few neoconservative 
politicians and intellectuals who managed to promote their own ideas. 
A conspiracy theory? 
Furthermore, the emphasis the media laid on the supposed crucial impact of 
neoconservatism can be also possibly attributed to their desire to concentrate on a story 
which seemed to be peculiar and could attract the attraction of readers. Some scholars 
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such as Robert Lieber consider the theory based on the idea that the neoconservatives 
promoted their own foreign policy after 9111 as a conspiracy one (Lieber, 2005: 186). In 
fact it has similarities with a conspiracy one although it questionably constitutes one of 
that kind per se. According to Daniel Pipes the defining feature of a conspiracy theory is 
the belief in the existence of a narrow circle of powerful individuals who convert plans 
and schemes and determine the course of history' (Pipes, 1997: 15). A favourite topic of 
modish conspiracy theorists is concerned with the clandestine activities of a malign group 
which is taking over the government of the US (Idid: 15 and Byford, 2002: 26). 
The selected newspapers focused indeed on the group of the neoconservatives, often 
called as a 'cabal', and depicted it as having managed to influence the US administration 
for the necessity of the Iraq war. This group was also illustrated to be inspired by a 'guru', 
political philosopher Leo Strauss. The main difference of the approach of the media 
which contradicts the definition of a conspiracy theory is that they did not refer to 
'clandestine activities' of the neoconservatives and did not illustrate them as plotting in 
secret. Although the supposed influence of the group can be regarded as being 
exaggerated in the media discourse, its presence in the US and the Bush administration 
was not imaginary but visible. Further to this, the equation of the supposed significant 
influence of the neoconservatives with a conspiracy theory, certainly downgrades the 
work of scholars such as Stefan Halper and 10nathan Clarke. 
The media might be keen on largely reproducing a theory which can maybe give the 
impression of a conspiracy one. That kind of theories are very popular and often enjoy a 
high level of public acceptance (Pipes, 1997: 16).102 This is of course relevant to the fact 
that in the contemporary market.;.driven news order audiences are often regarded as 
consumers (Stanyer, 2007: 95, 96). The commercial success of conspiracy stories 
concerning US foreign policy after 11 September is remarkable. Michael Moore's film 
Fahrenheit 9/11, which developed the link between the family of George W. Bush family 
and those of prominent Saudis, constitutes an example. It not only attracted a significant 
number of viewers and broke records for the best-sold documentary ever when it was 
102 In the US, for instance, a conspiracy theory with great success is that of the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy in November 1963. According to opinion polls, some two-thirds of Americans in 1963 suspected 
a conspiracy and 56 percent of the population still did so in 1991 ( Washington Post, 19/05/1991 quoted in 
Pipes: 15). 
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released as a DVD and VHS but also won the Palme d' Or prize at Cannes Film festival 
in 2004. Another example is Loose Change. The creators of this film maintained that the 
terrorist attacks had been organised by the US government. They illustrated subsequently 
George W. Bush as implementing the pre-existing agenda promoted by the Project of the 
New American Century. 100 million people had watched the film by January 2007 (The 
Guardian, 26/01107). 
Common Political Discourse 
Besides the factors which maybe led the accessed newspapers to largely focus on 
neoconservatism since 9111 and mainly 2003, an additional observation can be made. 
This is relevant to the synchronisation and homogenisation of the coverage. Starting with 
the fonner concept this has its basis in the compmison of the volume of mtic1es 
containing the tenn neoconservatism or its equivalents. The thesis showed that 
sychronisation can be confimled by the explosion of mtic1es published by all the 
newspapers from January 2003 onwards and the greater interest the media showed in the 
political ideology at the same periods of time, specifically in March 2003, November 
2004. March 2005 and September 2005. 
As for homogenisation it can be argued that the coverage showed a high degree of 
similarity. It cannot be claimed, nonetheless, that it was completely homogenised. 
Ditferences in coverage were acknowledged even in the aftennath of 9/11, although they 
rarely reflected a national sensitivity. This only happened in the case of the 
'neoconservative Tories' in Britain and in that of the relationship between Turkey and the 
EU in France. Most of the differences were regarded as arbitrary ones. Some newspapers, 
for example, attributed the label 'neoconservative' to a few figures not known as such in 
the literature of international relations while others did not analyse in depth the Oligins of 
the political ideology. 
Furthenllore, in the case of Leo Strauss's representation the 8titish elite newspapers 
were less analytical than the French, Gemlan and Italian ones although The Times and 
The Guardian followed a similar approach with the other European ptint sources in their 
analysis of neoconservatism itself. In addition, attention had to be paid to the single 
newspaper (Archetti, 2008). Obviously, The Times constituted the most charactetistic 
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example as it was keen on challenging the view that the neoconservatives had been 
highly influential in Washington. The increased interest of Le A10nde on the political 
ideology and its high analytical coverage were also explained because its editors Alain 
Frachon and Daniel Vemet are the authors of a book on neoconservatism. 
In spite of the observed differences the coverage of neocol1servatism by the media -
with the exception of The Times - can be regarged as largely homogenised. That is 
because the selected newspapers understood neoconservatism within a US foreign policy 
context and decoded its meaning in a similar way in the aftem1ath of 9/11 as opposed to 
the period before the teITorist attacks. Altho1.lgh the context of news and comment pieces, 
in which the political ideology was discussed, was not always the same, their agreement 
on the interpretation of the t~1111 and in particular on the idea of the supposed influence of 
the group in Washington cannot be contested. In other words, the homogenisation in 
content is mainly related to their general consensus as to the role of the 'movement' in 
the US which led to them to similarly analyse its foreign policy philosophy. This said it 
seems that the media of the 'Big Four' have established a more globally oriented political 
discourse in their analysis of US foreign policy after 11 September (Volkmer, 2003: 236). 
It is certainly acknowledged that journalists are inclined in favour of what is culturally 
familiar, many of the news values are common in most newsrooms in Europe (Manning, 
2001: 68). Comparative studies confirm, however, that despite differences in social and 
cultural formation, subjects about political elites and powerful people, as in this project 
the neoconservatives were perceived to be, are common favourites among news editors 
(!bid: 68). 
The emphasis of the selected European newspapers on neoconservatism after 9/11 
reflects maybe their struggle to negotiate the complexities of the international crisis and 
especially the Iraq war. As Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan put it, 'September 11 has 
decisively transformed the everyday contexts within which many journalists routinely 
operate ... News organisations - together with their sources - lacked a readymade script to 
tell their stories, a frame to help them and their audiences comprehend the seemingly 
incomprehensive' (Zelizer and Allan, 2003: 1). Neoconservatism was maybe the media 
response to this lack of 'a readymade script'. This research project can also complement 
existing empirical studies which deal with EU media coverage. Its main difference is that 
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it did not analyse the coverage of an EU topic per se but dealt with the mediation of a 
subject - neoconservatism - which is related to political developments in the US. 
Although, a discussion about the 'dissemination of a European news agenda' is not 
applicable in this thesis, an interesting conclusion can be reached. This is that the 
coverage of neoconservatism in the selected newspapers of the 'Big Four' showed signs 
of synchronisation and homogenisation in a period which saw not only EU's split over its 
foreign policy but also high tensions in transatlantic relations. 
It is a risky claim to suggest that the findings of the thesis can support the idea of a 
European public sphere. That is because the chosen print media of Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy do not necessarily represent it. No regional newspapers, for instance, 
were used in the project to investigate if they also largely dealt with neoconservatism. 
Further to this, the political ideology is not a European issue per se and therefore it could 
not be explored if the media of the 'Big Four' paid a similar attention to a theme 
exclusively related to the EU. In addition, the differences in their coverage, although 
they were generally not regarded as marked ones, cannot but understimate the idea of the 
existence of a homogenised public sphere in the EU. 
The consensus of the selected newspapers in their representation of neoconservatism, 
however, can be considered as a positive step towards the creation of a European public 
sphere. This observation does not only refer to the common interpretation of the 
political ideology by the media but also to their general understanding of \Vashington's 
world affairs approach. As it was explained in Chapter 8, joumalists of the 'Big Four' 
significantly framed US foreign policy through the perspective of neoconservatism after 
2003 as they focused on it to a a larger degree than they did with competing intemational 
relations such nationalism and realism. This perhaps entails that citizens of Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy who had the chosen newspapers as their source of information 
could have possibly a common understanding of Washington's intemational affairs 
approach. 
The common understanding of US foreign policy by citizens of the 'Big Four' would 
have been highly negative as the accessed newspapers significantly criticised the 
neoconservatives for their supposed role for the Iraq war. The negative assessment of the 
group and its plan to export democracy by military means in the media discourse reflects 
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perhaps the negative picture of the US and its foreign policy in Europe. The possible 
common understanding of US foreign policy by citizens of the 'Big Four' would also 
have had another implication. It might have contradicted the divided stance of the 
governments of their countries over the Iraq war. British and Italian citizens might have 
interpreted US foreign policy as negatively as German and French ones although Blair 
and Berlusconi disagreed with the position of Chirac and Schroder and actively 
cooperated with Bush by sending troops to Iraq. 
Europeanized media discourse? 
The subsequent question which can be raised is if the concept of homogenisation in 
coverage - as it was explained in this project - shows signs of a potential Europeanization. 
Kevin Featherstone defines Europeanization as a process of structural change affecting -
inter alia - ideas and interests. He adds that this change 'must fundamentally be of a 
phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely 
identified with Europe' (Featherstone, 2003: 3). In this regard, three themes reflecting a 
particular European interest can be possibly acknowledged in the highly negative 
coverage ofneoconservatism by the selected newspapers of the 'Big Four'. 
The first European interest which maybe led the chosen newspapers to criticise the 
neoconservatives is the support of the latter for a war-based policy. The EU is generally 
cautious to use force and is more prepared - compared to the US - to live with difficult 
situations than to try to solve problems by military means (Cameron, 2005: 162, 163). 
Europe has a sensitivity regarding a war-based policy maybe because of its historical 
experience which saw its ground to be the main battlefield of two World Wars. In this 
context, war is considered by the EU as the last resort in its approach in international 
affairs. The preservation of peace and the option of diplomacy constitute its fundamental 
foreign policy principles. Jeremy Ritldn outlines the policy of the EU by ,vriting in his 
account: 'European leaders ask rhetorically: Who knows better than us the terrible 
consequences that can result from nations attempting to asselt their will over others by 
means of coercion and force?' (Rifkin, 2005: 197). 
The second possible European motivation predisposing perhaps negatively the media 
towards the neoconservatives was the ignorance of the group for international law. 
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Europe believes in the rule of law and legal norms. It does so not only as a matter of 
idealism but also realism. In the EU view, institutions offer a reliable framework where 
pmver is best exercised and where collective action increases efficiency (Haine, 2003: 
121). In parallel with this, multilateralism based on global cooperation is consided in 
Europe as the most appropriate way to respond to problems and challenges of the world. 
After the terrorist attacks EU former External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, for 
instance, doubted if the US could resolve the new security threats on its own (Cameron, 
2005, 183, 184). In the case of Iraq many European countries - in spite if the Union's 
split - considered the UN route the most appropriate one to be followed. 
And thirdly, the media stance towards the neoconservatives was perhaps influenced by 
the opposition of the latter to the project of European integration. The antipathy of the 
chosen newspapers for the group reflected maybe their interest in the smooth functioning 
of the Union. It also mirrored possibly their concern for a potential failure of the 
neoconservative plan for the Middle East which contradicted the EU policy. In particular, 
while the neoconservatives sought to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by hoping to export 
. democracy in the region, Europe considered the resolution of the conflict itself as the 
fundamental presupposition for the establishment of peace. In the post-Cold War era the 
Union has emerged as a strategic actor towards the Middle East Peace Process (ME PP) 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a high priority in its foreign policy agenda 
(Dannreuther,2004: 153; Soetendorp, 1999: 112). It therefore sought to continue playing 
a significant role in the region after 9/11 and not to be the observer of a possible 
expansion of democracies on the basis of a domino theory as the neoconservatives had 
wished. 
In spite of the acknowledgement of the afore-mentioned potential European interests in 
the coverage, the selected media did not go further and comment on the potential 
development of a significant EU role vis-a-vis the neoconservatives. In other words, they 
did not regard the Union as a distinctive international actor which had maybe to promote 
its own views in the international arena and respond subsequently to the foreign policy of 
the neoconservatives. It can thus hardly be argued that in their coverage of the political 
ideology the selected newspapers saw the EU as needing to act united and speak with one 
voice in the world stage. Furthermore, although some signs of Europeanization can be 
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observed in the discourse of the selected newspapers, the negative predisposition towards 
neoconservatism with emphasis on its supposed significant impact does not constitute an 
exclusive EU phenomenon. It is a usual charge of opponents of the political ideology in 
the US, such as Patrick Buchanan, and many critics of the Iraq war which was welcomed 
and reproduced in the EU media. In parallel with that, the anti-American tinge of the 
coverage is not a distinctive European development. Anti-Americanism is not only 
concerned with countries of the Union but has rather a global dimension. It spans the 
globe from Europe to Asia and from South America to Asia (Pew Research Center 
web site, 24/01105). 
Post scriptum 
Neoconservatism is arguably a key component in US foreign policy after 11 September. 
The Iraq war was supported not only by members of the group but also by other US 
politicians many of whom had been higher ranked. In addition, the neoconservatives are 
questionably inventors of new foreign policy ideas and concepts. The US decision to use 
force preemptively in 2003 in order to serve its own national interest has precedents in 
the history of the country while Washington's perceived hegemonic role can be traced 
back to the work of Thucydides. In this context, although it was acknowledged that a 
reference to neoconservatism is necessary for the analysis of US foreign policy since 9/11, 
the media overemphasis on its supposed impact was attributed to various factors. 
The particular focus of the selected newspapers - with the exception in some cases of 
The Times - on the neoconservatives and Leo Strauss was placed in their interest to find a 
plausible explanation for US foreign policy in the period of uncertainty after 11 
September. The selected newspapers wanted maybe to find an appropriate scapegoat -
the neoconservatives - for the Iraq war. Perhaps they also used sometimes the term as a 
convenient device in order to escape from a laborious analysis of US foreign policy. 
Moreover, the media possibly sought to attract the attention of readers by reproducing a 
story which had many similarities with a conspiracy theory. The thesis, however, did not 
equate the supposed impact of the neoconservatives with a conspiracy theory as for 
example scholar George Lieber argued. 
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In addition, the general consensus of the media as to the significant impact of 
neoconservatism in US foreign policy was regarded as the main reason the concept of 
homogenisation was used in this project in spite of a few observed differences. This 
homogenisation along with the synchronisation in the coverage of the accessed European 
newspapers since 2003 led to a discussion about the potential existence of a European 
public sphere. Although this claim was not supported, the tact that potential readers of 
the selected newspapers in the 'Big Four' might have understood US foreign policy in a 
similar way - that is to say through the perspective of neoconservatism - was considered 
as a positive development in the interest of fmiher European integration. Finally, the 
similarity in the coverage of the political ideology was arguably seen as the result of a 
europeanization in the media discourse. It was rather seen as being part of a global 
phenomenon. 
Implications for further research 
The thesis offered some conclusions concerning the construction of neoconservatism by 
selected newspapers in the Big Four. However, there are certainly points it did not 
discuss or cover. As we saw the political ideology had been associated with 
Washington's world affairs approach in the aftermath of 11 September. With 'respect to 
that a significant limitation of this project is that it did not provide an in-depth analysis of 
the context - that is to say of the general coverage of US foreign policy by the media. On 
the contrary, it is only based on articles referring to foreign policy schools such 
neoconservatism, nationalism and realism. Future research can maybe analyse the 
general coverage of US foreign policy after 9/11 by the European media on the basis of 
specific dates or events and not only focus on the usage of international relations theories. 
This research project attempted to analyse why the media focused on the significant 
influence of the neoconservatives and Leo Strauss. Explanations, however, were mainly 
based on the literature of media studies. The opinion of journalists and editors who used 
the term neoconservatism or its equivalents remained unknown. Further to this, the 
project did not deal with elite public opinion in Britain, France, Germany and Italy in 
relation to its understanding of neoconservatism. The results of the thesis can be possibly 
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complemented if interviews with journalists of the selected newspapers will be arranged 
and focus groups - maybe with subscribers of the chosen print media - will be conducted. 
Moreover, the thesis had the year of 2005 as its ending point. Although the analysis 
included the first year of the second term of Bush Junior's administration, a significant 
part of it was ignored. This was due to specific time budget and the high volume of 
articles which had to be read, especially between the year of 2003 and that of 2005. It 
will be interesting to complement the project with an analysis of the years 2006, 2007 and 
2008. In so doing, the coverage of neoconservatism will be explored in both terms of the 
presidency of George W. Bush and comparisons will be possibly made. 
This research can be also expanded with an analysis of the coverage of neoconservatism 
in other European newspapers. In this way, the European public sphere could be 
represented by the media of a higher number of countries of the Union and not only by 
four of them. The results of this thesis can finally constitute a basis for a comparison 
with the findings of a future project that will focus on the interpretation of the political 
ideology by the US media. 
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